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Superficially Similar but Fundamentally Different: A Comparative Analysis of US 
and UK Affirmative Action. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The aspiration that all people should enjoy equality of treatment and opportunity is 
enshrined in the democratic psyche of the US and the UK and each country has adopted 
legal measures to secure an equivalent opportunity for individuals to enjoy full societal 
franchise.  In their pursuit of equality both the US and the UK also require or allow that 
certain previously excluded and underrepresented groups are afforded preferential 
treatment under the law.  In the UK such measures are referred to collectively as positive 
action, whilst in the US affirmative action is the general term employed.  This thesis will 
use these two terms either in reference to one or both country’s policies.  The overarching 
similarities between the US and UK have led a number of commentators to cite the 
importance of trans-Atlantic cross-referencing in shaping the development of affirmative 
action.  Lizzie Barmes, for example, has suggested that UK positive action ‘owes much to 
the US approach of combating equality through law’.1  In addition, Bob Hepple considers 
that ‘American precedents and legislation [relating to affirmative action] have been a 
crucial stimulus to legal development in Europe’.2  Arguing along similar lines Sean 
Pager has cited the ECJ’s ‘American approach’ to deciding context-dependent questions 
relating to positive action,3 and Daniela Caruso refers to positive action as the ‘lesser-
known European relative’ of US affirmative action, thus explicitly linking European 
measures, which form the permissible limits for UK positive action, with US  legal 
provisions.4  Whilst US and UK affirmative action policies share certain similarities this 
should not obscure fundamental differences in the principles upon which the policies are 
based, their objectives and their uses, a situation which has also been expressed in the 
literature,5 and demonstrated in surveys,6 concerning US and UK positive action.  These 
                                                 
1 L. Barmes, ‘Equality Law and Experimentation: the Positive Action Challenge’, Cambridge Law Journal 
(2009) 68(3), pp. 623 – 654, p. 627. 
2 B. Hepple, ‘The European Legacy of Brown v Board of Education’, 2006 U. Ill. Rev. 605, p. 611. 
3 S. Pager, ‘Strictness and Subsidiarity: An Institutional Perspective on Affirmative Action at the European 
Court of Justice’, 26 Boston College Int’l & Comparative Law Review, 35 (2003). 
4 D. Caruso, ‘The Limits of the Classic Method: Positive Action in the European Union after the New 
Equality Directives’, 44 Harvard Int’l Law Journal 331 (2003).  
5 See B. Hepple, ‘The European Legacy of Brown v Board of Education’, op. cit., who, having noted the 
importance of US precedents to European positive action developments, emphasises the differences in each 
country’s legal framework resulting from the importance of context and country-specific influences. 
6 See, for example, R.S. Dhami, J. Squires, and T. Modood, Developing Positive Action Policies: Learning 
from the Experiences of European and North America, (HMSO, Norwich, 2006), pp. 19 – 24, 53 – 80. 
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differences have meant that the extent to which the two countries can learn from the 
experiences and practices of the other as regards positive action has previously been 
limited.  However, as well as establishing the extent of the fundamental differences 
between US and UK positive action this thesis will show that amid the most recent 
developments the superficially similar but fundamentally differing natures of affirmative 
action may now offer the potential for useful cross-referencing to be made between the 
two countries, to help the legal provisions match both the specific problems and the social 
context encountered within each location.  Some more detailed examples which 
demonstrate further how superficial similarities conceal fundamental differences and the 
opportunities for cross-referencing in US and UK positive action are considered below.   
 
1.1 A Legal Solution for Societal Inequality 
 
Both the US and UK utilise formal legal mechanisms to deal with the ‘ever-present and 
practical…problem of ‘equality’ in the law’.7  In addition, both countries have enacted 
legislation to impose or permit individuals and groups to take action to achieve de facto 
and de jure equality.  Despite this overarching similarity the formulation and effect of 
each country’s legal framework encompassing these provisions is distinct and arises from 
different legal sources.  In the US, for example, the broad legal basis for equality, out of 
which affirmative action has grown, states simply that all ‘citizens of every race and 
color ... [have] full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person 
and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens’.8  The minimal guidance offered by this 
declaration has resulted in a significant amount of case law seeking to discern the 
parameters of affirmative action, which by its nature constitutes an inconsistent and 
patchy basis for legal development.   The nature of the judicial input in US affirmative 
action has also meant that radical progress in the scope and direction of affirmative action 
has frequently been followed by conservative judgments which render these gains 
 
7 N. Dorsen, ‘A Lawyer’s Look at Egalitarianism and Equality’, in R. Pennock and J.W. Chapman (eds.), 
Equality, (Atherton Press, New York, 1967), p. 37. 
8 Civil Rights Act 1866 (14 Stat 27) passed 9th April 1866.  The equality commitment articulated in the Act 
was added to the Constitution by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted 9 July 
1868, in response to Congressional uncertainty over its ability to legislate in the terms of the 1866 Act.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment was similarly broad in its commitment to equality which afforded persons born or 
naturalised in the US ‘equal protection of the laws’.   
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impotent.9  In addition, the US Constitution is largely unchangeable by normal political 
processes, because of its hallowed position as one of the country’s founding documents.  
By contrast, UK positive action provisions are drawn from a range of national and 
supranational sources, including domestic legislation, the EC Treaty, 10  and are also 
influenced by the country’s commitment to the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’) resulting from its membership of the Council of 
Europe.11  In addition, ‘soft law’12 has been important in governmental promotion of 
positive action in the UK.13  The result of these influences is that UK positive action is 
able to evolve through ordinary legal and governmental processes.  Despite the existing 
differences in the nature of legal provisions in the US and UK there may be increasing 
scope for the two countries to use the experiences and measures adopted in the other.  The 
US, for example, may be able to borrow the UK’s ‘soft law’ approach, as a means of 
enabling affirmative action to develop more fluidly, whilst the UK’s enactment of the 
Equality Act 2010, with its greater legislative focus on positive action, may indicate its 
movement closer to the US’ focus on statutory affirmative action provisions, as opposed 
to keeping most forms of positive action confined to non-legally binding instruments. 
 
1.2  The Primacy of Race and Gender within Positive and Affirmative Action 
 
Key forms of affirmative action in the US and UK are the pursuit of either racial or 
gender equality.  This similarity is, however, quickly eclipsed by differences in how each 
country deals with concerns relating to race and gender and the extent to which the focus 
of positive action has broadened as this area of law has matured.  US affirmative action 
has continued to prioritise preferential treatment for ethnic minorities,14  most notably 
African Americans, and only hesitantly expanded into new areas amid opposition to such 
 
9 For example, see the decisions in United Steelworkers v Weber 443 US 267 (1986) and Wygant v Jackson 
Board of Education 476 US 267 (1986) by which the gains for affirmative action in the former decision 
were cancelled-out by the latter.  
10 The most pertinent provisions for positive action in the EC Treaty are the general anti-discrimination 
provision in art 13 and art 141(4) which exclude positive action from the principle of equal treatment. 
11  See ECHR, as amended by Protocol No 11 (Rome 4 XI, 1950), art. 14 which assures that all individuals 
equal enjoyment of its rights ‘without discrimination on any grounds’. This provision is inserted into UK 
domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42), s. 1(2) and Schedule 1. 
12 ‘Soft law’ refers here to non-legally binding governmental instruments, including publications to 
encourage the use of positive action.   See L. Barmes, ‘Equality and Experimentation: the Positive Action 
Challenge’, Cambridge Law Journal (2009) 68(3), pp. 637 – 641 referring to the role of soft law in UK 
positive action. 
13 See, for example, Cabinet Office, ‘Delivering a Diverse Civil Service, A 10-Point Plan’ (2005).  See also 
Cabinet Office, ‘Promoting Equality, Delivering Diversity. A Strategy for the Civil Service’ (July 2005). 
14 See M.E. Levin, ‘Is Racial Discrimination Special?’ 15 Journal of Value Inquiry 225 (1981), pp. 227 – 8. 
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developments.15   By contrast, from its original focus on gender and race,16 UK positive 
action has subsequently adopted provisions protecting individuals on a range of additional 
grounds.17  The breadth of the UK approach has been confirmed by the Equality Act 2010, 
commencement of which began in July 201018 with the substantive provisions, including 
the general positive action requirement, having come into force in October 2010.19  This 
Act brings together previous anti-discrimination legislation prohibiting discrimination on 
the grounds of age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership, 
pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex and sexual orientation. 20   The 
inclusion of this wide range of protected characteristics gives the different forms of 
unlawful discrimination, and consequently the grounds upon which positive action can be 
based, 21  an equal legislative footing. 22   The focus on affirmative action aimed at 
benefitting African Americans reveals the extent to which the US still feels a debt to 
individuals within this racial group for the discrimination suffered by them during and 
since slavery.  By contrast the UK’s evolution of positive action from focusing solely on 
gender and race-based equality to encompassing a range of forms of action reflects the 
more even focus on remedying all aspects of societal inequality in legislative provisions.  
Looking forward, the US may learn from the UK’s parallel legal treatment of all protected 
groups, and use it as a way of avoiding criticism of affirmative action from non-benefited 
minorities.  The UK in turn could take inspiration from the nature of the US’ positive 
action afforded to African Americans to tackle the worst instances of inequality, while 
maintaining protection across all groups. 
 
 
15 For example, Evan Gerstman has suggested that the passage in 1992 of Colorado’s Amendment 2, which 
stated that homosexuality was not to be a protected class, had more to do with popular reluctance to expand 
the scope of civil rights than opinion regarding homosexuality.   See E. Gerstman, The Constitutional 
Underclass, Gays, Lesbians and the Failure of Class-Based Equal Protection, (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1999), p. 103.  Amendment 2 has subsequently been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court in Romer v Evans 517 US 620 (1996). 
16 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (c. 65) (‘SDA’), ss. 47 and 48 and Race Relations Act 1976 (c. 74) (‘RRA’), 
ss. 37 and 38. 
17 See Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1660; Employment Equality 
(Age) Regulations 2006 SI 2006/1031; Employment Equality (Age) Regulations (Amendment) Regulations 
2008 SI 2008/573; and Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 SI 2003/1661. 
18 The Equality Act 2010 (Commencement No. 1) Order 2010, No. 1736 (c. 91).  See also The Equality Act 
2010 (Commencement No. 2) Order 2010, No. 1996 (c. 104) and The Equality Act 2010 (Commencement 
No. 3) Order 2010, No. 2191 (c. 109). 
19 The Equality Act 2010 (Commencement No. 4, Savings, Consequential, Transition, Transitory and 
Incidental Provisions and Revocation) Order 2010, No. 2317 (c. 112). 
20 Equality Act 2010 (c. 15), s. 4. 
21 ibid, s. 158. 
22 A number of the key positive action provisions in the 2010 Act were subject to additional consideration 
by the coalition government, including the public sector equality duty (s. 149) and positive action in 
recruitment and promotion (s. 159).  See www.equalities.gov.uk/equality_bill.aspx. Accessed 08.10.10. 
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1.3 The Key Foci of Equal Opportunities 
 
Within both the UK and the US affirmative action is similarly found in three key contexts: 
education, employment and executive action.  However, the forms of affirmative action 
utilised in these areas and the extent to which each has been prioritised or marginalised 
have varied.  In the US the executive was the first major public forum for affirmative 
action, before expanding to include remedial measures in employment and education-
based action.23  More recently judicial conservatism has curtailed the educational use of 
affirmative action by requiring that it fulfil very high standards for constitutionality, 
whilst measures within the employment context have continued to be controversial, and 
therefore marginally used.  By contrast the clear legal framework for executive action 
means that it retains an important position within US affirmative action.24  In UK law the 
primary legislative provisions for positive action provide for voluntary action to be taken 
in the employment context, a characteristic that will continue following the full 
commencement of the Equality Act 2010.25  The UK executive has also used positive 
action, but this has mainly been limited to particular circumstances, as opposed to as part 
of a general policy.  Further illustrating the limited contexts in which UK positive action 
has been used is that education-based action has arisen only as a result of the individual 
endeavours of institutions, as opposed to any legislative provision.  Directly comparing 
the two countries therefore, the UK’s focus on the employment context contrasts to the 
US’ range of contexts for action.  A greater cross-referencing between the US and UK 
may develop once the UK’s governmental duty to promote equality and the promotion 
and recruitment tie-break measures are commenced, as these may open the door to the use 
of US-style action. 
 
The three brief examples cited above reveal how many of the similarities thinly veil 
profound and fundamental differences existing at the heart of US and UK affirmative 
action, and that in comparing the two countries, especially in relation to the more recent 
developments, it is apparent that there is some scope for instructive cross-referencing.  
This conclusion is important in contextualising likely future developments in this area of 
law.  This thesis will show why the fundamental differences between US and UK positive 
 
23 Equal Employment Opportunities Act (Public Law 92 – 261) of 1972 and see also Carter v Gallagher 
452 F. 2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971). 
24 See section 2.3.1 below. 
25 See Equality Act 2010, s. 158 and also s. 159 which will allow positive action in relation to recruitment 
and promotion, once commenced.  
10 
 
action have developed and how they have affected the use and operation of affirmative 
action in each country.  In order to set this exploration in context this thesis will start by 
exploring present parameters of affirmative action in the US and UK.  This thesis will 
then demonstrate that the reasons for these differences centre upon three specific factors: 
the principles upon which the laws are based; their developmental contexts; and the 
nature of the permissible uses of affirmative action in each country.  This thesis will end 
by considering the factors which may influence future development of affirmative action 
and will show that the fundamentally different nature of the law in each country may 
diminish if the differing legal provisions are loosed from their country-specific moorings 
and used to better effect on the opposite side of the Atlantic.  
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2. The Parameters of Affirmative and Positive Action in the US and the UK 
 
As a foundation for exploring the fundamental differences between US and UK 
affirmative action it is first necessary to establish what is meant by the two terms, and in 
particular how they will be used within this thesis.  This chapter will therefore begin by 
exploring the semantic differences that infuse this area of law with nuances and consider 
what these reveal about each country’s attitudes towards affirmative action policies.  
Having set out the linguistic parameters of affirmative and positive action the main part of 
this chapter will summarise the current laws and academic arguments that make-up the 
contemporary positive action framework in both the US and the UK, thus setting the 
scene for an exploration in the rest of this thesis of how these situations have arisen, why 
they have resulted in fundamentally different legal provisions in each country and this 
situation might lead to future cross-referencing between the two countries. 
 
2.1 The Language of Affirmative and Positive Action 
 
Before embarking on the substantive analytical elements of this thesis it is important to 
give some consideration to differences in the language of positive action.  In doing this it 
quickly becomes apparent that again there is little consensus between the US and UK 
with the semantic nuances providing further evidence of the different views regarding 
affirmative action that exist within and between the two countries.  One may, for example, 
use the term ‘reverse discrimination’26 although this arguably conveys a criticism of the 
action to which it refers, irrespective of its motives, as a result of the emotive history of 
prejudicial discriminatory treatment.27  Two additional terms, ‘positive discrimination’ 
and ‘benign discrimination’, are also problematic both because of their use of 
‘discrimination’ and because they presuppose that the treatment in question works 
towards a desirable end goal of social policy, the attainment of which justifies the means 
employed to attain it. 28   What constitutes a worthy end goal necessarily requires a 
subjective assessment which may itself be conditioned by the very discriminatory 
 
26 For example see P.G. Polyviou, The Equal Protection of the Law, (Gerald Duckworth and Co., London, 
1980), p. 349; R. Dworkin. Taking Rights Seriously, (Gerald Duckworth and Co., London, 1987), ch 9; R. 
Dworkin, A Matter of Principle, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1985), chs 14 – 16; and R.J. 
Richards, The Sceptical Feminist, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1980), pp. 107 – 8.   
27 K. Greenawalt, Discrimination and Reverse Discrimination, (Alfred A Knopf Inc, New York, 1983), 
pp.16 – 17. 
28 G. Pitt, ‘Can Reverse Discrimination be Justified?’ in B. Hepple and E.M. Szyszczak (eds.), 
Discrimination: The Limits of Law, (Mansell Publishing Limited, London, 1992), p. 282. 
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background in which the policy has become necessary.  In order to move away from the 
highly emotive connotations of intentionally discriminating against one person to benefit 
another some commentators have referred to ‘differential treatment’29 and ‘preferential 
hiring’ 30  although these emphasise differences between individuals and that such 
measures, whilst preferring one individual, are necessarily detrimental to another.  The 
terms ‘positive action’31 and ‘affirmative action’32 will be used within this thesis because 
they are among the most widely understood and least nuanced transatlantic terms for this 
subject.  Despite the relatively non-nuanced nature of these terms Katherine Cox has 
suggested that the UK government adopted ‘positive action’ in favour of ‘affirmative 
action’ because of the controversy associated with the latter term in the US.33  Therefore 
use of ‘positive action’ within the UK shows that from the outset authorities were seeking 
to distinguish UK provisions from US affirmative action.  Despite this the two terms will 
be used as synonyms in line with Gary Clabaugh’s suggestion that the interchangeable 
use of the different phrases constitutes ‘a harmless idiomatic difference between British 
and American English like lorries becoming trucks’. 34   Clabaugh’s assertion is 
linguistically convenient for the purposes of this thesis and supports the assertion that 
there are superficial similarities between the two legal frameworks, although, as will be 
shown, affirmative action and positive action are very distinct legal and social constructs 
in each country.   
 
2.2 The Legal Framework for Affirmative Action 
 
The popular conception of affirmative action is that it consists of quotas designed to 
award employment and educational access to underrepresented minority groups.  This 
narrow perception, however, does not reflect the broad range of affirmative action 
policies that are legally sanctioned across the US and UK, and which permit a range of 
 
29 As adopted by S. Poulter and J. Montgomery in B. Hepple and E.M. Szyszczak (eds.), Discrimination: 
The Limits of Law op. cit. 
30 As used by R.K. Fullinwider, The Reverse Discrimination Controversy: A Moral and Legal Analysis, 
(Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, N.J., 1980), pp.10 – 13 and C. McCrudden, ‘Rethinking Positive Action’, 
(1986) 15 Industrial Law Journal 219, p. 223. 
31 The first legislative reference to ‘positive action’ in the UK is in the explanatory memorandum for the 
Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Act 2002 (c. 2). 
32 The first US legislative use of the phrase ‘affirmative action’ was in the National Labor Relations Act 
1935, s.10(c) where it was used to define the powers of the National Labor Relations Board to determine 
remedies in labour disputes.    
33 K. Cox, ‘Positive Action in the European Union: From Kalanke to Marschall’, 8 Columbia Journal of 
Gender and Law 101(1998), p. 105. 
34 G. Clabaugh, ‘Positive Discrimination’, Educational Horizon, (Spring 1995). 
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purposive actions in the public and private sector that use race, ethnicity, or gender as a 
consideration in order to expand opportunities or provide benefits to members of groups 
that have suffered discrimination. 35   It is therefore clear that despite the popular 
perception of positive action a wide range of measures fall within its parameters, as will 
be shown in the following paragraphs.     
 
2.2.1 Affirmative Action in the US 
 
US affirmative action plans utilise a broad variety of methods to benefit underrepresented 
ethnic minorities and women.  What the evolution of US action shows, however, is that in 
the absence of clear statutory or regulatory provisions for affirmative action measures 
programmes have often been declared unlawful.  In addition, where clear guidelines do 
exist and affirmative action programmes are implemented this frequently provokes a high 
level of popular condemnation, which may be disproportionate to the actual incidences of 
its use.  The range of available forms of positive action is summarised below.  
 
2.2.1.1 Federal Contract Compliance Programmes 
 
Since the early 1960s executive orders have required federal agencies to actively pursue 
positive action policies.  The largest federal affirmative action programme under US law 
was based on Executive Order 11246 36  and required federal contractors and 
subcontractors with 50 or more employees to develop an affirmative action plan within 
120 days of securing a contract for more than $25,000 or face losing the contract and 
being barred from tendering for future contracts. 37   To fulfil the affirmative action 
obligations contractors had to conduct a utilization study counting women and minorities 
in each department and each occupational category and compare this to their proportion 
 
35 A similar definition was used in G. Stephanopolous, et. al, Review of Federal Affirmative Action 
Programs, Report to the President, 19th July 1995, (Government Printing Press, Washington D.C., 1995).  
The European Commission has also illustrated a  broad understanding of positive action describing it as 
encompassing ‘all measures which aim to counter the effects of past discrimination, to eliminate 
discrimination and promote equality of opportunity between women and men, particularly in relation to 
types or levels of jobs where members of one sex are significantly underrepresented’.   See Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Interpretation of the Judgment of 
the Court of Justice on 17 October 1995 in Case C-450/93 Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen, COM (96) 
88 at 3.   
36 Executive Order 11246 (30 Fed Reg 12319) issued in 1965.  In 1967 Executive Order 11375 (32 Fed Reg 
14303) extended the provisions to women. 
37 Executive Order 11246, op. cit., s. 203. 
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within the ‘availability pool’.38  The affirmative action plan also had to include a set of 
targets for the achievement of minority representation and specify the procedures that 
would be adopted to achieve equal inclusion, although meritocratic hiring was retained 
and quotas were avoided. 39   The requirements of the executive orders were further 
entrenched in 1972 by the Equal Employment Opportunities Act, which required the 
development of equal opportunity goals and a strategy by which to achieve them. 40   
However, whilst the contract compliance requirements placed strict obligations on 
contractors they were subject to minimal enforcement and so, over time, their impact 
lessened.  In 2000, for example, the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programmes 
(‘OFCCP’) conducted only 4,162 compliance reviews from amongst the 192,000 
contractors that fell under its guidelines.41  Irrespective of the lacklustre enforcement the 
action required by US contract compliance programmes is notable within the permitted 
range of affirmative action because it is wholly at odds with other forms of preference in 
that it constitutes the country’s only mandated form of action.  However, by adopting 
such measures the US executive’s use of affirmative action has fuelled its own opposition, 
which argues that such broad-brush programmes have ‘failed properly to consider 
individual differences’ as to the groups benefited and denied.42  The mandatory nature of 
this form of affirmative action has made it central to the debate concerning the 
permissibility of differential treatment and it has therefore had an important formative 
role in shaping the principles, development and uses of US affirmative action.   
 
2.2.1.2 Government Set-Aside Programmes 
 
A further form of executive affirmative action has been the setting-aside of a proportion 
of government contracts for minority-run businesses,43 which arose out of demands for 
 
38 The ‘availability pool’ refers to individuals qualified and potentially available for a vacant position in the 
company, and is used to determine whether underutilization exists and set affirmative action goals, 
Executive Order 11246, op. cit., s. 203. 
39 Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programmes, US Department of Labor, EEO and Affirmative 
Action Guidelines for Federal Contractors Regarding Race, Color, Gender, Religion and National Origin’,  
http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/fs11246.htm.   Accessed 08.10.2009. 
40 Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972, op. cit., s. 4, amending s. 706 of the Civil Rights Act 1964 
(78 Stat. 259 42 USC 2000e – 5(a)-(g)) and ss. 10 and 11, amending ss. 715 and 217 Civil Rights Act 1964.   
41 F. Pincus, Reverse Discrimination.  Dismantling the Myth, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2003), pp. 
24 – 25. 
42 R.A. Lester, Reasoning about Discrimination.  The Analysis of Professional and Executive Work in 
Federal Antibias Programs, (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1980), p. 287. 
43 See, for example, the Public Works Employment Act 1977 which required that ten per cent of federal 
grants awarded by the Department of Commerce be given to minority businesses.  This requirement was 
upheld in Fullilove v Klutznik 448 US 448 (1980). 
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equal opportunity emanating from the minority business community.44  Alongside these 
measures in 1994 the Federal Communications Commission initiated one of the largest 
affirmative action set-aside programmes by reserving half of new radio licenses for small 
businesses, women and minorities.45  However, whilst observers have argued that set-
aside programmes have been a major reason for the expansion of minority-owned 
businesses,46 minorities and women have remained significantly underrepresented among 
government contractors.47  Despite the arguably limited effect of set-asides in creating 
equal opportunities they have prompted lawsuits from white business people, which in 
turn have encouraged the judicial restriction of this form of affirmative action.  In City of 
Richmond v Croson, for example, the Supreme Court severely limited the ability of states 
and local governments to provide minority set-aside programmes by requiring that there 
must be a history of discrimination for which the set-aside programme was the only 
possible remedy. 48   In addition to the evidential difficulties inherent in proving 
discrimination these policies put public authorities in the legally unpalatable position of 
condemning themselves in order to justify and defend set-aside programmes.49  Since 
1995 further restrictions have been placed on this form of affirmative action contributing 
to its increasingly marginalised status.50 
 
2.2.1.3 Hiring and Promotion Quotas 
 
Arguably the most controversial of all US affirmative action policies are employment-
based measures which require a specified minimum or ‘quota’ of minority appointments.   
Under the Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1972 courts were permitted to impose 
 
44 For an account of some of this disquiet see, J.E. Podair, The Strike that Changed New York.  Blacks, 
Whites and the Ocean Hill-Brownsville Crisis, (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2002). 
45 Policy upheld in Metro Broadcasting v Federal Communications Commission 497 US 547 (1990). 
46 See T. Bates and D.L. Williams, ‘Racial Politics: Does it Pay?’, Social Science Quarterly, Vol 74, No. 3 
(1993), pp. 507 – 522; and G. La Noue and J. Sullivan, ‘Race Neutral Programs in Public Contracting’, 
Public Administration Review, Vol. 55, (1995). 
47 For example, in 2000 women-owned businesses secured only 2.3% of federal procurement contract 
dollars and in 2006 minority businesses under the ‘8(a) Program’, which helps companies from socially and 
economically disadvantaged groups obtain federal agency contracts, secured only 2.7% of federal contract 
dollars.   See American Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy, Women in Business, (October 
2001), p. 21 and American Small Business Administration Office of Advocacy, Minorities in Business, 
(November 2007), table 27, p. 27.  For both see http://www.sba.gov/advo.  Accessed 11.08.08.   
48 Justice O’Conor’s opinion in City of Richmond v Croson 488 US (1989), pp. 498 – 506.  The 
requirements of the ‘strict scrutiny’ approach applied in this case are explained below at section 3.4.1. 
49 See Franks v Bowman Transport Co. 424 US 747 (1976) in which the court upheld employer or union 
use of affirmative action to remedy its own discriminatory acts against identified victims. 
50 See Adarand Constructors Inc. v Peña 515 US 200 (1995). 
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hiring and promotion quotas on employers found guilty of discrimination.51   Quotas, 
where imposed by the courts, the executive, in a consent decree or adopted voluntarily, 
have been accused of requiring the rejection of white males with superior work 
experience or qualifications in favour of qualified but less-experienced minority and 
female applicants.52  Affirmative action quotas have also been criticised for constituting a 
significant and unlawful burden for white males to bear,53 and frequently been struck 
down by the courts for failing to fulfil the strict requirements of permissibility.54  The 
reality, therefore, is that court-imposed quotas have remained rare,55 with Barbara Reskin 
estimating that there were only 51 throughout the early 1980s,56 and voluntarily-adopted 
quotas are largely avoided for fear of legal challenge and judicial condemnation.  
Consequently, whilst quotas are central within US discussions around affirmative action 
and represent one of the most radical forms of action their use is confined to a narrow 
field of operation.  The result of this dichotomy is that the impact of affirmative action 
quotas in the legal debate is disproportionate to their influence on the achievement of 
equality.57 
 
2.2.1.4 Race and Gender-Plus Policies 
 
One form of affirmative action utilised within the employment and educational contexts 
in the US are programmes in which race or gender may constitute part of a recruitment, 
promotion or admissions decision, albeit that it may not be the major factor, so-called 
race-plus and gender-plus policies.58  This form of action has been widely used in higher 
education, although the limits to its use were illustrated by the case of The Regents of the 
University of California v Bakke and the subsequent widespread decisions amongst 
 
51 Equal Opportunities Employment Act 1972, s. 4. 
52 For example in the early 1970s the Women’s Equity Action League and the National Organization for 
Women filed charges with the Department of Labor accusing more than 100 universities and colleges of sex 
discrimination.  As a result affirmative action plans were drawn up requiring the use of specific quotas of 
women to be hired and promoted, R.A. Lester, Reasoning about Discrimination, pp. 146 – 147. 
53 See, F.R. Lynch, Invisible Victims. White Males and Crisis of Affirmative Action, (Greenwood Press, New 
York, 1989). 
54 See 3.4.1 for discussion of the different levels of judicial scrutiny applied to affirmative action. 
55 G. Stephanopoulos and P. Edley, Affirmative Action Review: Report to the President, (Government 
Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1995). 
56 B. Reskin, The Realities of Affirmative Action in Employment, (American Sociological Association, 
Washington D.C., 1998), ch. 3. 
57 Although affirmative action in federal contracting has been linked to some improvements, for example, 
see J. Donohue and J. Heckman, ‘Continuous versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Federal Civil Rights 
Policy on the Economic Status of Blacks’, Journal of Economic Literature, 29, (1991), pp. 1603 – 1643. 
58 See Regents of the University of California v Bakke 438 US 265 (1987) in which the University employed 
race as a ‘plus factor’ in determining the outcome of admissions decisions. 
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universities to ban any consideration of race in admissions and hiring.59  The year after 
the Bakke judgment was handed down Californian voters approved Proposition 209 which 
declared that the State could not ‘discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, 
any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin’ thus 
showing the expansion of opposition to these policies.60  Race and gender-plus policies 
were further relegated within affirmative action by the case of Hopwood v Texas in which 
the court upheld the claim of four white students who sued the university on the basis of 
reverse discrimination. 61   The students alleged that they were unlawfully declined 
entrance to the school because black and Hispanic students with lower grade point scores 
were admitted.  The court held that this use of affirmative action was unconstitutional.62  
Therefore, while race and gender-plus policies remain part of the broad spectrum of types 
of affirmative action their legal basis and practical use are increasingly restricted. 
 
2.2.1.5 Targeted Scholarships 
 
Race and gender-based scholarships constitute a further form of affirmative action in the 
US and, like quotas and race and gender-plus policies, have also been the subject of 
criticism and judicial opposition.  In Podberesky v Kirwan, for example, a white student 
sued the University of Maryland because he could not qualify for the all-black Banneker 
Scholarship.63  Despite the university’s formal segregation until 1954 the court struck 
down the scholarship as outside the permitted remit of US affirmative action law.  The 
result of this judgment was that many colleges opened such scholarships to non-minority 
students.64  One of the most debated aspects of targeted scholarships is the extent to 
which the identity of the donor affects the permissibility of the award.65  This area of 
debate illustrates the US’ difficulty in reconciling the unlawfulness of prejudicial 
differential treatment with the potential lawfulness, and even possible desirability, of 
benevolent differential treatment which is a common theme across US affirmative action. 
 
 
 
59 ibid (plurality decision). 
60 Constitution of the State of California, art 1 ss 31, cl. a. 
61 Hopwood v State of Texas 861, F. Supp, 551 (1994).  
62 ibid at 578. 
63 Podberesky v Kirwan 38 F. 3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994). 
64 D. Lederman, ‘Justice Department Urges High Court to Uphold Affirmative Action’, The Chronicle of 
Higher Education, (1996). 
65 See M. Kinsley, ‘Generous Old Lady or Reverse Racist?’, Time, (28th August 1995). 
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2.2.2 Positive Action in the UK 
 
The current framework for positive action in the UK is governed by domestic law, against 
a background of European laws, conventions and treaties, as well as policies and 
initiatives which fall short of having strict legal effect.  The broad range of sources of 
positive action, together with the judicial interpretation of its boundaries, has led to 
relatively unclear parameters for this area of law.66  From the outset it is important to 
distinguish the main forms of positive action from the ‘reasonable adjustment’ 
requirements in relation to disability67 and actions taken to avoid indirect discrimination, 
such as those relating to maternity.68  The distinction between positive action and these 
forms of action are that the latter must be taken to avoid claims of discrimination, 
whereas failure to take positive action measures will not result in any such cause of 
action.69  This thesis will focus on positive action within the narrower sense of purposive 
measures designed to promote equality, as opposed to the mandatory steps required to 
avoid claims of discriminatory treatment.  However, these alternative forms of action 
have done much to confuse the parameters and principles operating behind positive action 
and the effect this has had on UK positive action will be brought out later in this thesis.70  
Apart from these actions a number of forms of positive action may be identified within 
UK law, as will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs. 
 
2.2.2.1 Enabling and Encouraging Equal Participation  
 
The key form of positive action employed under UK law is the use of measures to enable 
or encourage persons who share a protected characteristic to overcome disadvantage 
caused by that characteristic.71  This protection afforded by the Equality Act 2010 applies 
where an employer thinks that people who share a particular protected characteristic 
 
66 See L. Barmes, ‘Equality Law and Experimentation: the Positive Action Challenge’, Cambridge Law 
Journal (2009) 68(3), pp. 623 – 654. 
67 This duty imposes obligations to remove or modify many indirectly discriminatory barriers.  See Equality 
Act 2010, s. 189. 
68  Equality Act 2010, s. 18.  These provisions can require measures to accommodate women in certain 
circumstances by allowing them to work part-time or flexibly, because failure of the employer to do so may 
constitute indirect discrimination against women who act as primary child carers.  See London 
Underground Limited v Edwards (No. 2) [1999] ICR 494; [1998] IRLR 364.  
69 The separation of maternity-related provisions from positive action was also made clear in the Equal 
Treatment Directive 1976 which separately listed them as permitted derogations from the principle of equal 
treatment.  Equal Treatment Directive 76/207 1976 OJ L39/10, art. 2. 
70 L. Barmes, ‘Equality Law and Experimentation’, op. cit, p. 633 – 637.  See section and 5.3.2 below. 
71 Equality Act 2010, s. 158. 
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either suffer disadvantage connected to that characteristic, have needs that are different to 
those of people without it, or that participation of people with that characteristic in an 
activity is disproportionately low.72  In such circumstances employers are permitted to 
take proportionate action to enable or encourage persons who share the protected 
characteristic to overcome the disadvantage they face, to meet their particular needs, or to 
enable or encourage their participation in the relevant activity.73  This provision builds 
directly on the previous ability for employers to offer discriminatory access to training 
and to use targeted recruitment to help and encourage individuals from underrepresented 
groups to access workplace opportunities.74  Corresponding action was also permitted to 
prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to religion or belief, sexual orientation 
and age where it reasonably appeared that the measures prevented or compensated for the 
disadvantages linked to the protected characteristic,75 and is now also incorporated into 
the Equality Act 2010.76   
 
Once fully commenced the Equality Act 2010 will also require public authorities to have 
due regard to the need to advance equality of opportunity, which includes them having 
due regard to the need to encourage persons who share a relevant protected characteristic 
to participate in public life or in any other activity in which participation by such persons 
is disproportionately low.77  This requirement will extend the existing positive obligation 
on public authorities to promote racial 78  and gender equality. 79   In drafting that is 
equivalent to the employer’s authority to take positive action80 the Equality Act 2010 
permits public authorities to take action to remove or minimise disadvantages suffered 
because of a shared protected characteristic; meet the different needs of persons with a 
protected characteristic as a result of that characteristic; and to encourage persons who 
share a relevant protected characteristic to participate in activities in which there is 
disproportionately low participation by people with that characteristic.81  A further effect 
of the Equality Act 2010 is that it helps to clarify the position of nationality-based 
 
72 ibid, ss. 158(1)(a), (b) and (c). 
73 ibid, ss. 158(2)(a), (b), and (c). 
74 See RRA, ss. 37 and 38 and SDA, ss. 47 and 48.   
75 Equal Opportunities (Religious Belief) Regulations SI 2003/1160, reg 25(2) and 25(3); Equal 
Opportunities (Age) Regulations SI 2006/1031;  and Equal Opportunities (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 
SI 2003/ 1161. 
76 Equality Act 2010, s. 4. 
77 ibid, s. 149(3)(c). 
78 Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 s. 2, inserting s. 71 into RRA. 
79 Equality Act 2006, s. 84, inserting s. 76A into SDA. 
80 Equality Act 2010, s. 158. 
81 ibid, s. 159(2). 
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positive action which was confused by the UK’s incorporation of the de minimis 
requirements of the Race Equality Directive 2000 into the Race Relations Act 1976 
(Amendment) Regulations 2003, meaning that the Regulations did not apply to 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality, whilst the RRA did.82  However, the scope 
of the Equality Act 2010 perpetuates the previous limitation affecting employer positive 
action as a result of the expansive drafting of anti-discrimination law83 and the continuing 
lack of clarity over the division between lawful positive action and unlawful direct 
discrimination.84   
 
2.2.2.2 Tie-Break Positive Action 
 
EU law concerning positive action, which determines the permissible parameters of UK 
measures, expressly allows measures ‘intended to eliminate or reduce actual instances of 
inequality which may exist in the reality of social life’.85  This provision was interpreted 
by the ECJ as enabling the fact of an individual’s protected characteristic to act as a tie-
break consideration in recruitment and promotion decisions.86  The Court first explored 
the parameters of the use of ‘tie-break’ positive action in the case of Kalanke v Freie 
Hansestadt Breman in which an employment-related policy required the appointment of a 
female job candidate ahead of an equally qualified male candidate, on the basis of her 
gender.87  The ECJ held that the appointment was outside the scope of positive action 
permitted in article 2(4) of the Equal Treatment Directive 1976 because of the absolute 
priority given to under-represented female applicants.88  The policy therefore ensured 
equality of result, as between women and men, as opposed to equality of opportunity.  
Despite the apparently fatal assessment of the use of a tie-break factor in Kalanke the 
ECJ’s position was marginally softened by the subsequent case of Marschall v Land 
Nordrhein-Westfalen.89  Marschall was factually similar to Kalanke but the policy under 
consideration in the later case contained a proviso permitting a male candidate to be 
 
82 See Race Equality Directive 2000 and Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003.  See 
also Equality Act 2010, s. 9, which ‘race’ is defined as including nationality. 
83 See Equality Act 2010, s. 13. 
84 Human Rights Joint Committee, Twenty-Sixth Report, Legislative Scrutiny: Equality Bill, (October 2009), 
p. 91, para. 285, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200809/jtselect/jtrights/169/16902.htm. 
Accessed 04.08.10. 
85 Equal Treatment Directive (Directive 76/207/OJ 1976 L39/40), art. 2(4). 
86 Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen Case C-450/93 [1995] ECR I-3051. 
87 ibid. 
88 ibid, para 22. 
89 Marschall v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen Case C-490/95 [2001] ECR I- 45; [1998] IRLR 39. 
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appointed ahead of an equally qualified female if there were specific reasons for doing so.  
On this ground the ECJ held that the Marschall policy constituted lawful positive action 
because it avoided automatic preferences.90  These cases show that whilst EU positive 
action includes the potential for race and gender to be used as ‘tie-break’ criterion this 
must not be automatic.  However, the theoretical deficiencies in the two judgments, which 
have been compounded subsequently, mean that the extent of this use of positive action 
has not been clearly delineated.91 
 
In line with the scope of EU law the use of positive action as a tie-break criterion is a key 
principle of the 2010 Equality Act which expressly acknowledges that compliance with 
its duties ‘may involve treating some persons more favourably than others’,92 although 
these measures are currently under consideration by the UK Government.93 Following 
commencement of these provisions employers will be able to use an individual’s 
membership of an underrepresented social group as a tie-break factor in employment 
decisions.94  The tie-break provision provides that where an employer reasonably believes 
that persons who share a protected characteristic suffer a disadvantage connected with 
that characteristic, or participation by them in an activity is disproportionately low,95 the 
employer can treat a person with that protected characteristic more favourably in a 
recruitment or promotion decision, with the aim of encouraging persons with that 
characteristic to overcome or minimise the disadvantage or participate in the activity.96  
In accordance with EU law the new Act will still require that all decisions are based on an 
assessment of the candidates and that there is no general policy of automatically 
appointing any individual from a protected group.97  In addition, all action taken must be 
a proportionate means of achieving the legislative aim.98  These caveats correspond with 
the ECJ’s decision in the case of Abrahamsson and Anderson v Fogelqvist in which the 
 
90 See also Badeck et al v Hessische Ministerprasident Case C-158/97 [2002] ECR I-1875; [2000] IRLR 
432 and  Lommers v Minister van Landbouw Natuurbeheer in Visserij Case C-476/99 [2002] ECR I – 2891. 
91 See section 3.1.2 below for further discussion of this aspect of the ECJ’s jurisprudence.  
92 Equality Act 2010, s. 149(6). The general positive action provisions are contained in Part 11, Chapter 2, 
ss. 158 and 159. 
93 As a result of the formation of a coalition government, following the General Election in May 2010, these 
provisions have been subject to additional scrutiny resulting in some uncertainty as to what form, or in fact 
whether, the provisions will enter into force, particularly as the Coalition Agreement did not commit to their 
passage. See HM Government, The Coalition Agreement: our Programme for Government, (Cabinet Office, 
London, May 2010), p. 18. 
94 ibid, s 159(4). 
95 ibid, s. 159(1). 
96 ibid, s. 159(2) and 159(3). 
97 ibid, s. 159(4). 
98 ibid, s. 159(4)(c). 
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Court stated that a policy permitting the appointment of a less qualified candidate of an 
underrepresented gender above a more qualified candidate of the opposite sex was 
disproportionate and unconcerned with an individual assessment of the candidates. 99   
Following the commencement of these provisions the UK will use positive action to the 
full extent envisaged under EU law, despite the ECJ’s restrictive interpretation of these 
parameters.100 
 
2.2.2.3 Goals, Timetables and Quotas  
 
UK positive action employs numerical goals and targets in its positive action policies 
within Northern Ireland to achieve the ‘fair participation in employment’ by adopting new 
practices or modifying or abandoning ones that may restrict or discourage representative 
participation of Protestants and Catholics.101  The main provisions of the Northern Irish 
approach were set out in the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1989, and 
subsequently replaced by the Fair Employment and Treatment Northern Ireland) Order 
1998 and the Northern Ireland Act 1998.102  These measures were a response to the 
situation in Northern Ireland in which Roman Catholics were twice as likely to be 
unemployed as Protestants with the same educational background,103 and have yielded 
results in terms of remedying this unequal representation.104  On top of monitoring and 
reporting on the workforce composition105 the positive action measures permit public 
authorities to refrain from contracting with employers found to be in default of various 
provisions under the legislation 106  and also include specific provisions designed to 
improve the numerical representation of Catholics within the Royal Ulster Constabulary 
(‘RUC’).107  The importance of the Northern Irish affirmative action provisions within the 
UK is demonstrated by the Government having secured a derogation from the general 
equality requirement in the Employment Equality Directive 2000 to accommodate these 
 
99 Abrahamsson and Anderson v Fogelqvist [2000] IRLR 732 ECJ. 
100 See further section 3.1.2 below. 
101  Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998, SI 1998/3162 (N121) 1998 (‘FETO’). 
art. 4. 
102 See the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act 1989 (c. 32); the Northern Ireland Act 1998 (c. 47); and 
FETO. 
103 See, Fair Employment Commission, ‘The Key Facts: Religion and Community Background in Northern 
Ireland’, (1995) which cites figures from 1991. Further consideration of this form of affirmative action is at 
section 5.3 below. 
104 Equality Commission Monitoring Report No. 19, A Profile of the Northern Ireland Workforce, Summary 
of Monitoring Report for 2008, (2009). 
105 FETO, art. 55. 
106 ibid, art 64. 
107 See Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000 (c. 32). 
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measures.108  Accordingly, article 15(1) excluded from the general non-discrimination 
requirement in article 2(1) recruitment into the police service in Northern Ireland ‘in order 
to protect the quota system introduced to increase Catholic participation’.109  As well as 
affirmative action obligations Northern Irish measures also include incentives for 
employers to engage in positive action,110 for example, by awarding contracts and grants 
upon fulfillment of positive action obligations.111  As will be demonstrated throughout 
this thesis Northern Ireland represents a distinct forum for positive action within the UK, 
and as such has utilised some different types of action than those which are generally 
deployed in the UK.   
 
The range of forms of affirmative action in the US and UK illustrates that the parameters 
of this area of law contain both similarities and differences between the two countries.  
Similarities are present in the use of race and gender-based quotas, and the range of 
contexts in which measures have been used.  Wholesale differences exist, however, in the 
parameters for affirmative action, the judicial treatment of action, and the popular 
responses to such measures.  Substantial differences also exist in which groups the 
policies are directed at in each country and why each group has been identified for 
protection.  Having assessed the range of forms of affirmative action in the US and UK 
the following chapters will explore further the fundamentally different undercurrents 
driving this area of law in both countries, before considering how these different 
experiences could provide the basis for instructive borrowing of ideas relating to positive 
action between the two countries. 
 
108 Employment Equality Directive, 2000/78 EC.  
109 ibid, art 15(1). 
110 FETO, arts 53 – 60. 
111 ibid arts 62 – 4.  
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3. The Principles behind Positive Action and Affirmative Action  
 
The frameworks for affirmative action in the US and positive action in the UK are each 
underpinned by a distinct set of legal and social principles.  These principles are relied 
upon to determine what constitutes permissible action in each country and also form the 
ideological and moral basis upon which the legal movements surrounding affirmative 
action operate.  Substantial differences exist in the content of the core principles upon 
which each country’s equal opportunity efforts are based as well as the various academic 
and popular arguments regarding these principles.  This chapter will explore how the 
varying interpretations of the principles reveal that the US and UK approach positive 
action from very disparate doctrinal backgrounds before showing, in chapters four and 
five, how this has influenced the development and use of affirmative action within each 
country.   
 
In exploring the different principles upon which affirmative action is based this chapter 
will look at the country-specific interpretations of the concept of equality within the 
affirmative action debate.  Whilst equality is at the very heart of positive action its 
interpretation is subject to country-specific influences, and even manipulation, to enable it 
to fit in with the contrasting arguments of both supporters and opponents of affirmative 
action.  In addition, the pressing social need for the achievement of equality means that in 
certain areas the legal basis for action has ‘moved uneasily to questions of detail and 
implementation without reaching fundamental decisions on questions of principle’.112   
The debate surrounding the meaning of equality has also expanded into wider arguments 
in each country including, for example, whether equality within a legal system requires 
that the law be colour-blind.113  The varying permutations of this and other such debates 
have been a primary contributor to the fundamental differences between US and UK 
affirmative action.114   This chapter will also consider the arguments surrounding the 
interpretation of the principle of merit and the country-specific ways in which this has 
developed.  Finally, this chapter will explore how different protected groups are treated 
 
112  G. Rutherglen and D.R. Ortiz, ‘Affirmative Action under the Constitution and Title VII: From 
Confusion to Convergence’, 35 UCLA Law Review 467 (1987 – 1988), p. 468. 
113 For examples of the debate surrounding the notion of colour-blind legal provisions see N. Podhoretz, 
Breaking Ranks: A Political Memoir, (Harper and Row, New York, 1979); S. Hook, ‘Discrimination, Color 
Blindness and the Quota System’ in B.R. Gross (ed.), Reverse Discrimination, (Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 
New York, 1977) and N. Glazer, Affirmative Action, (Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, New York, 1975). 
114 T. Eastland, Ending of Affirmative Action: the Case for Colorblind Justice, (Basic Books, Inc., New 
York, 1997), ch. 2.  
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under positive action in each country, and in particular the unique position of African 
Americans within US equality law.  Firstly, however, this chapter will consider each 
country’s jurisprudence concerning affirmative action, as it is a key means of identifying 
the legal principles at work. 
 
3.1  Affirmative Action Jurisprudence  
Judicially imposed restrictions are a feature of the jurisprudence concerning positive 
action within both the US and the UK.  The jurisprudential regime in the US emphasises 
the abhorrence of discrimination of any kind and consequently requires that all 
differentiations on the basis of individual characteristics, especially race, are stringently 
examined and challenged.  This judicial attitude was notably promulgated by Justice 
Powell following the decision in the case of Brown v Board of Education.115  Despite the 
dissent to Powell’s opinion formal equality has remained stoically central to the US 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on positive duties. 116   Negative judicial treatment of 
positive action is also evident in the jurisprudential guidance offered by the UK judiciary 
and the ECJ which reveals a halting progression from advocating formal equality to one 
supportive of a narrow, and largely unprincipled, interpretation of substantive equality 
that has failed to provide clarity concerning the operation of positive action.117  Therefore, 
while the courts’ role within both countries has been overwhelmingly to strike down 
positive action schemes, the specific rationales behind its approach, and the effect that 
this has had on positive action, differ as will be shown in the following paragraphs. 
3.1.1 US Affirmative Action Jurisprudence  
The evolution of Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning affirmative action has not 
followed a single, monolithic path but instead has reflected the sensibilities of individual 
judges and contemporary legal trends and has consequently resulted in successive judicial 
discontinuities.  For example, the Court’s ruling in The Regents of the University of 
California v Bakke was based upon the judicial principle that it was unconstitutional to 
 
115 Brown v Board of Education 347 US 483 (1954). 
116 J. Rabe, Equality, Affirmative Action and Justice, (Books on Demand, Nordestedt, Germany, 2001), 
p.292.  
117 See L. Barmes, ‘Equality Law and Experimentation: the Positive Action Challenge’, Cambridge Law 
Journal (2009), 68(3), pp. 623 – 654. 
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statutory basis.    
Grutter the Court held that the law school’s affirmative action program was constitutional, 
                                                
operate a rigid quota system reserving a certain number of places for minorities. 118    
Conversely, judicial support for such affirmative action was illustrated by the judgment in 
Fullilove v Klutznick, in which the court upheld a ten per cent minority set-aside provision 
for federally funded public works projects, 119  and through the case of United 
Steelworkers v Weber, in which the court held that a short-term voluntary training 
programme which gave preference to minorities was constitutional.120  These judgments 
illustrate that when faced with clear guidelines the US courts have upheld affirmative 
action, but that they have readily condemned programmes in the absence of an ex
Judicial support for remedially focused affirmative action, as illustrated by the judgments 
in Weber and Fullilove, was subsequently diluted by the Republican court appointments 
of the 1980s and 1990s which resulted in a ‘virtual paralysis’ of civil rights 
development.121   In Wygant v Jackson Board of Education, for example, the court struck 
down a plan which protected junior minority teachers from dismissal at the expense of 
white teachers on the grounds of unconstitutionality.122  Further, in the case of Richmond 
v Croson the court rejected a set-aside programme for minority contractors ruling that 
local government lacked the power to enact such programmes.123  Some judicial support 
for affirmative action did continue during this period, for example, through the upholding 
of federal laws designed to increase the number of minority-owned radio and television 
stations,124 and approval of affirmative action measures that were ‘narrowly tailored’ and 
served a ‘compelling government interest.’125  However, whilst supporting affirmative 
action, these judgments confined it to a very narrow set of circumstances, a strict line that 
was maintained in the 2003 cases of Gratz v Bollinger and Grutter v Bollinger.126  In 
 
118 University of California v Bakke, op.cit.  For further consideration of the US attitude towards numerical 
standards in affirmative action see section 5.2 of this thesis. 
119 Fullilove v Klutznick, op. cit. 
120 United Steelworkers v Weber 443 US 267 (1986). 
121 T.H. Anderson, The Pursuit of Fairness: A History of Affirmative Action, (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2004), p. 169. 
122 Wygant v Jackson Board of Education, 476 US 267 (1986). 
123 The City of Richmond v J. A. Croson Co., op. cit. 
124 Metro Broadcasting v Federal Communications Commission, op. cit. 
125 Adarand Constructors v Peña op cit. 
126 Gratz v Bollinger 539 US 244 (2003) and Grutter v Bollinger 539 US 306 (2003). 
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but in Gratz the Court rejected the affirmative action programme used because it was too 
mechanistic and consequently amounted to an unlawful quota system.127   
The US judiciary has further hampered the achievement of substantive equality through 
the adoption of a dual evidentiary system, which requires that racial minorities and 
women face the burden of proving significant disadvantage to justify positive treatment, 
whilst men and whites only need to point at a slight negative impact for positive action to 
be declared unlawful.128  This development has left only a small area for the operation of 
affirmative action and has effectively ‘reversed the social roles that shaped the history of 
American racism: whites have become the presumed victims and African Americans the 
presumed racists’.129  Although the principles of affirmative action implicitly act to the 
detriment of certain members of the white majority by definition this group is ‘adequately 
represented in the political process and does not, therefore, require Supreme Court 
intervention to protect its interests’.130  Despite this, US jurisprudence has had a role in 
forging the equality principle into a judicial tool for the protection of the majority group 
against the advancement of the rights of minorities and women. The case law surrounding 
affirmative action shows the tendency towards judicial conservatism inherent within the 
country’s courts illustrated by their restrictive reading of the constitutional requirement 
for equal treatment and through the expressed declaration that unlawful discrimination 
can be directed at both minority and majority groups.131  Consequently, successive US 
judiciaries have allowed affirmative action to change from a transformative ideal to being 
sidelined amid promotion of the discriminatory status quo.132   
3.1.2 UK Positive Action Jurisprudence 
The limited legislative provision for positive action in UK law has meant that there has 
been little judicial consideration of positive action by UK domestic courts.  However, 
 
127 The role of these cases in shaping US affirmative action are discussed more fully at sections 3.3.1 and 
5.2.1. 
128 See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust 487 US 977 (1988). See also Wards Cove Packing Company. 
Antonio 490 US 642 (1989) in which the Court held that a plaintiff must demonstrate that a specific 
employment practice created the existing disparity, as opposed to simply showing a disparate impact to 
fulfill a claim of discrimination. 
129 D. Kairys, ‘Unexplainable on Grounds other than Race’, American University Law Review, Vol 45, No.  
3, February 1996, http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/lawrev/45/kairys.cfm.   Accessed 21.10.08. 
130 G.A. Spann, Race against the Court.  The Supreme Court and Minorities in Contemporary America, 
(New York University Press, New York, 1993), p. 132. 
131 City of Richmond v J. A. Croson Co., op. cit. 
132 L.A. Jacobs, Pursuing Equal Opportunities.  The Theory and Practice of Egalitarian Justice, 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004), p. 103. 
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where positive actions have been challenged the courts have treated such measures as 
unlawful discrimination.  In the case of James v Eastleigh Borough Council, for example, 
the House of Lords held that the relevant legal test of permissibility was that applied in 
direct discrimination claims, namely whether the complainant would have received the 
same treatment as the defendant ‘but for’ his or her sex, instead of considering whether 
the measures constituted lawful positive action.133  Although in his dissent Lord Griffiths 
argued that acts designed to redress the effect of unlawful discrimination could not 
themselves be discriminatory, the Court upheld a formal construction of equality.134  This 
case does not concern positive action in the general sense referred to in this thesis, namely 
measures to allow women and minorities to overcome workplace and educational 
underrepresentation and disadvantage, but it does illustrate the Court’s refusal to uphold 
arguably well-intended differential treatment.135  The Court’s lack of support of positive 
action is also evident from the case of Jepson v The Labour Party in which, again, the test 
for direct discrimination was applied to a policy of implementing all-women electoral 
short-lists. 136   These decisions demonstrate that the court has focused on the legal 
prohibition of differential treatment on the basis of direct discrimination, reflecting the 
very limited area of operation for positive action allowed for in UK legislation.  
A further judicial influence on UK positive action has been the European Court of Justice 
(‘ECJ’) because of its importance in interpreting the parameters of action which are 
available to UK law and because these parameters are given a statutory basis in UK law 
through the Equality Act 2010.137  In the ECJ’s first case concerning positive action the 
Court considered the permissibility of a policy which required the appointment of a 
female job candidate ahead of an equally qualified male candidate, on the basis of her 
gender.138  The ECJ held that the policy constituted unlawful discrimination because of 
the absolute priority it afforded female candidates, thus ensuring equality of result, as 
opposed to equality of opportunity.139  The ECJ’s decision in Kalanke was subject to 
immediate criticism for the devastatingly narrow interpretation it applied to article 2(4) of 
the Equal Treatment Directive, which seemed to prevent its use in permitting gender to be 
 
133 James v Eastleigh Borough Council [1990] AC 751 (HL). 
134 ibid, para 768. 
135 The case involved the provision of free swimming to individuals ‘of pensionable age’ which meant that 
women enjoyed the benefit at 60 years old, whilst men had to wait until 65 years.   
136 Jepson and Dyas-Elliot v The Labour Party [1996] IRLR 116 ET. 
137 Equality Act 2010, ss. 149 and 158 – 159. 
138 Kalanke, op. cit. 
139 ibid para 22. 
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a tie-break factor in recruitment decisions.140  So troubling was the apparent conclusion 
reached in Kalanke, together with a judgment that was too brief to shed any light on the 
Court’s rationale,141 that the Commission sought to explain the decision so as to retain the 
possibility of using gender as a tie-break under article 2(4). 142   According to this 
explanation it was the automatic nature of the preference in the Kalanke policy which 
constituted the ‘special feature of the Breman law’ and which was condemned in the 
decision.143  This idea was tested in the case of Marschall, which was factually similar to 
Kalanke, except that the policy allowed the presumption of female appointment between 
two equally qualified candidates to be rebutted in the event of specific reasons favouring 
the male candidate.144   In contrast to its decision in Kalanke the Court held that this 
policy came within the remit of article 2(4) because the preference for women could be 
overridden when an objectively assessed individual criterion favoured the male 
candidate.145  In the same vein as Kalanke the Marschall judgment does not contain any 
in-depth explanation of the ECJ’s rationale behind its decision, and despite offering a 
degree of clarity over the position post-Kalanke the judgment left no indication of the 
necessary content of a policy saving clause or any guidance on policies not premised on 
the existence of equal qualifications.146  
The ECJ’s approach in Kalanke and Marschall has subsequently been applied by the 
Court in the case of Badeck et al v Hessische Ministerpraesident.147  Badeck concerned a 
programme to remedy the under-representation of women in public offices and involved 
the setting aside of half of the posts for qualified women in sectors in which women were 
underrepresented, but included five circumstances in which the presumption of the 
 
140 See, for example, L. Senden, ‘Positive Action in the EU Put to the Test.  A Negative Score? Case C-
450/93 Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen’ [1995] ECR I-3051’, Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law (1996), pp. 146 – 164; D. Schiek, ‘Positive Action in Community Law Case C-450/93 
Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt Bremen [1995]’, Industrial Law Journal, No 25 (1996), pp. 239 – 246 and A. 
Peters, ‘The Many Meanings of Equality and Positive Action in Favour of Women under European 
Community Law  - A Conceptual Analysis’, 2 European Law Journal, 177 (1996), p. 199. 
141 Katherine Cox suggests that the short judgment may reflect the judges’ inability to agree on a more 
substantive document.  See K. Cox, ‘Positive Action in the European Union: From Kalanke to Marschall’ 8 
Colum J. Gender and Law 101 (1998 – 9), p. 123. 
142 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Interpretation 
of the Judgment of the Court of Justice on 17 October 1995 in Case C-450/93, Kalanke v Freie Hansestadt 
Breman, COM(96) 88 final. 
143 ibid, p. 10. 
144 Marschall, op. cit. 
145 ibid, para 35. 
146 E.F. Hinton, ‘The Limits of Affirmative Action in the European Union: Eckhard Kalanke v Freie 
Hansestadt Bremen’, 6 Tex. J. Women and Law, 215 (1996 – 7). 
147 Badeck et al v Hessische Ministerpraesident Case C-158/97 [2002] ECR I-1875; [2000] IRLR 432.  
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advancement of women could be overridden. 148   Although the case provided an 
opportunity for the Court to confirm its stance on the relative prioritisation of individual 
and group interests, as well as the difference between equality of opportunity and equality 
of results, the Court simply applied the two-limb test arising from Kalanke and Marschall 
and found that the Badeck scheme was compatible both with article 2(4) of the Equal 
Treatment Directive and the new article 141(4) EC Treaty. 149   The requirement of 
proportionality in positive action schemes was confirmed in the case of Abrahamsson v 
Fogelqvist. 150  In Abrahamsson the ECJ held that a policy which afforded preference to 
an underrepresented candidate who, despite having the required skills for the position, 
was less qualified than the individual who would have been chosen in the absence of a 
positive action programme was unlawful because it failed to include an objective 
assessment which took account of specific personal circumstances.151  The jurisprudence 
of the ECJ concerning positive action has been subject to a significant amount of criticism, 
particularly in light of its apparent unwillingness to articulate overriding principles for 
permissible positive action schemes, instead confining its decisions to the facts at hand 
and adopting a narrow construction of the principle of equality.152  In particular the ECJ’s 
insistence on construing positive action as a derogation from the general principle of 
equality, and not as a means of achieving equality, limited its scope as a result of 
consequent need for the measure to accord with the principle of proportionality.153   
A further judicial influence on UK positive action is that of the European Court of Human 
Rights (‘ECtHR’) which has held that affirmative action measures are permissible under 
the non-discrimination provision of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (‘ECHR’).154  The ECtHR has, for example, upheld the different 
treatment of widows and widowers in respect of the provision of a special widow’s 
pension, 155   and has approved of tax advantages specifically aimed at women to 
encourage their participation in the labour market, provided such measures are 
 
148 ibid, paras 34 – 5. 
149 The test required that there was no automatic prioritisation of women in the event of equally qualified 
male and female candidates; and the candidates were subjected to an objective, individual assessment.  ibid, 
paras 55 and 63. 
150 Abrahamsson op. cit.  
151 ibid, para 43. 
152 See, for example, D. Caruso, ‘The Limits of the Classic Method’, op.cit.   
153 D. Caruso, ‘Limits of Classic Method’, op. cit., p. 338. 
154 ECHR, art. 14, Nov. 4, 1050, 213 UNTS 221, which is directly incorporated into UK law through the 
HRA 1998. 
155 Runkee and White v United Kingdom, Application no. 42949/98, (5 October 2007). 
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proportionate.156  However, a key weakness of the ECtHR in developing positive action 
case law, which has contributed to the relatively undeveloped nature of the case law, is 
that article 14 ECHR only arises in relation to a claim involving breach of another 
Convention right, and does not give rise to an independent cause of action.  This position 
is in direct contrast to that in the US where the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Constitution may be applied independent of any other constitutional right.  The passage of 
Protocol 12 ECHR was designed to remedy the limitation to article 14, by providing the 
Convention with an independent anti-discrimination provision, along the same lines as the 
Equal Protection Clause, but remains unsigned by the UK. 157   The ECtHR has also 
frequently avoided considering article 14 and instead chosen to use alternative 
Convention provisions, including article 8158 and article 3.159  A further important factor 
in limiting the importance of the ECtHR in shaping positive action is the restrictive nature 
of UK legislation as to what measures may be adopted.  The combined results of these 
factors is that significant ‘[c]complexities and uncertainties remain’ concerning the 
potential role of article 14 in determining the extent of positive action obligations under 
the ECHR.160 
 
The judicial treatment of positive action within the UK and US shows that throughout the 
history of preferences the courts have been a generally reactionary, or at least limiting, 
force.  This similarity has led to direct comparisons between specific cases in the US and 
Europe, including, for example, the accusation that the theoretical deficiencies in the 
Marschall  decision are analogous to Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke and that Kalanke 
and Adarand both had a similarly negative effect on affirmative action.161  However, 
whilst judicial limits to positive action are similarly present on both sides of the Atlantic 
the reasons for this differ between the two countries.  One reason for the different judicial 
treatment of positive action is that the decisions have both influenced, and been 
influenced by, the varying principles upon which affirmative action in each country is 
based, as will now be explored.    
 
 
156 Lindsay v UK (1987) 9 EHRR CD555. See also ACB v UK (1985) EHRR 471, 501. Schmidt v Germany, 
(1994) 18 EHRR 513, 527. Gaygusuz v Austria, 23 EHRR (1996) 364, 381. 
157 ECHR, protocol 12, art. 1. 
158 See Connors 40 EHRR 101 (2005). 
159 See East African Asians v United Kingdom 3 EHRR 76 (173). 
160 C. O’Cinneide, ‘Fumbling towards Coherence: The Slow Evolution of Equality and Anti-Discrimination 
Law in Britain’, 57 Nr. Ireland Legal Quarterly 57 (2006), p. 86. 
161 See S. Pager, ‘Strictness and Subsidiarity’, op. cit. 
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3.2 The Country-Specific Nature of the Conception of Equality 
For both the US and the UK ‘[e]quality is a fundamental part of a fair society in which 
everyone can have the best possible chance to succeed in life’ 162  and is ‘a pivotal 
concept’ linking negative and positive human rights duties.163  However, whilst equality 
is both ‘fundamental’ and ‘pivotal’ its meaning is not without nuance, even if we confine 
‘equality’ to meaning ‘legal equality’.164  The different interpretations of the meaning of 
legal equality have been critical in determining the boundaries of positive action in the 
US and UK.  Two key understandings of equality which have shaped affirmative action in 
each country are ‘formal equality’, which focuses on prohibiting unlawful discrimination 
by requiring identical treatment, and ‘substantive equality’, which recognises that 
differential treatment may be required to achieve equality.  Substantive equality may be 
usefully sub-divided further between actions seeking ‘equality of opportunity’ and 
measures designed to secure ‘equality of result’, albeit that this division is more 
pronounced in theory than in practice.165  
The chronology of legal reform that has taken both the US and UK from permitting 
distinctions between individuals on the basis of race and gender, firstly to a position of 
formal equality and latterly to one in which affirmative action has been demanded, if not 
wholly accepted, suggests an evolutionary similarity in the notion of equality between the 
two countries.166  However, the critical distinction between the dominant principles of 
equality in the US and UK is the extent to which each embraces the notion of substantive 
equality, because it is this form of equality which is at the heart of positive action.  This 
distinction will be explored over the following paragraphs. 
 
 
162 Communities and Local Government Publications, ‘A Framework for Fairness: Proposals for a Single 
Equality Bill for Great Britain’, (Wetherby, June 2007), p. 5. 
163 S. Fredman, Human Rights Transformed, op. cit., p. 175. 
164 Thomas Nagel has identified four types of ‘equality’: legal, political, social and economic and Chris 
McCrudden has identified five different meanings which may be used to describe the legal concept of 
equality.  See T. Nagel in M. Clayton and A. Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality, (Palgrave MacMillan, 
New York, 2002), p. 60 and C. McCrudden, ‘Theorising European Equality Law’ in C. Costello and E. 
Barry (eds.), Equality and Diversity: The New Equality Directives, (Irish Centre for European Law, 2003), 
p. 13. 
165 See D.A. Strauss, ‘The Illusory Distinction between Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Result’ in 
N. Devins and D. Douglas (eds.), Redefining Equality (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998), p. 61. 
166 The progression from slavery to racial enlightenment and then to the use of affirmative action is also 
found in many other jurisdictions.  See T. Sowell, Affirmative Action around the World: An Empirical Study, 
(Yale University Press, New Haven, 2004); and E. Appelt and M. Jarosch (eds.), Combating Racial 
Discrimination: Affirmative Action as a Model for Europe, (Berg Publishers, Oxford, 2000). 
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3.2.1 The US Conception of Equality 
 
The US principle of equality has its foundations in the Fifth and Fourteenth Constitutional 
Amendments which enshrine the guarantee of equal protection of the law,167 and are 
violated by intentional, purposeful and deliberate actions that harm persons because of 
their race, national origin or sex.168  In order to achieve equality the Constitution and 
specific civil rights legislation state that racial minorities must be treated equally with 
majority individuals.  To this end affirmative action in the US has been shaped by a very 
narrow interpretation of the principle of equality as an ‘anti-caste principle’, requiring the 
rejection of all law whose purpose or effect is to subject people to any differential 
treatment, whether minority or majority. 169   Any deviation from the formal equality 
inherent in this parity of treatment, for example in the form of preferences, has been 
criticised for ‘violating the rights of whites and men in the same way that first order, 
prejudicial discrimination, violates the rights of black minorities and women’,170 thus 
popularising the notion that ‘in the distribution of benefits under the laws all racial [and 
gender-based] classifications are invidious’.171  
 
The importance of the Constitution in establishing the principles behind the affirmative 
action debate reflects the centrality of these founding documents within the US legal 
framework.  However, arguments which focus on the strict wording of the constitutional 
documents ignore contrary declarations within international law and conventions that the 
adoption of ‘temporary special measures aimed at the acceleration of de facto equality 
between men and women [and different races] shall not be considered discriminatory’ 
thereby excluding affirmative action from the principle of identical treatment. 172   
Opponents of modern-day affirmative action have seized upon the limited expressed aims 
of early equality promises to insist that the best overall social outcome would result from 
 
167 First articulated in the Civil Rights Act 1866. 
168 US Constitution, Amendment V, ‘Trial and Punishment, Compensation for Undertakings’ (Ratified 15th 
December 1791) and Amendment XIV, ‘Citizenship Rights’ (Ratified 9th July 1868). 
169 An early example of the anti-caste principle may be found in O. Fiss, ‘Groups and the Equal Protection 
Clause’, Philosophy & Public Affairs, 5 (Winter 1976), pp. 107 – 177. 
170 A. Koppelman, Anti discrimination Law and Social Equality, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1996), 
p. 31. 
171 C. Cohen, Naked Racial Preference, (Madison Books, Maryland, 1995), p. 52. 
172 UN Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979, art. 4 and UN 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1969, art. 1(4). Although, it has only 
been in the 1990s that the US has ratified many of the treaties containing guarantees relating to race-based 
equality.  For example, the UN Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, was 
not ratified in the US until 21st October 1994, whilst the UK ratified the Convention on 11th October 1966.    
34 
 
                                                
a regime that does not tolerate any form of discrimination and in which all considerations 
of race are a negative, and therefore unlawful, factor in decision-making. 173   
Concentration on the literal wording of the law also ignores the inherent flexibility in the 
prohibition of racial discrimination174 and that the ‘literal application of what is believed 
to be the plain language of the statute … would lead to results in direct conflict with 
Congress’ unequivocally expressed legislative purpose’.175  In addition, James Jones has 
suggested that because the Constitution does not expressly enforce colour-blindness, 
whilst recognising the existence of slavery, ‘it is irrefutable constitutional history’ that the 
Constitution was not colour-blind.176   
 
The strength of the idea that the US principle of equality calls for identical treatment, and 
therefore necessitates formal equality, is further reinforced by the argument that 
differential treatment of any kind should be regarded with suspicion, so that ‘when whites 
do things that benefit themselves, then we should be suspicious of that; but equally, when 
people of color do the same thing, then we should be suspicious of that’177 to avoid 
causing ‘society serious harm’.178  Supporters of identical treatment also utilise the calls 
for formal equality from early civil rights campaigners as a powerful weapon to defend 
their arguments and protect their social position.179   Consequently, early proponents’ 
criticism of all racial classifications and all differential treatment, in their efforts to 
eradicate prejudicial behaviour, afford supporters of identical treatment a potent source of 
rhetoric which is now utilised to resist measures designed to achieve substantive 
equality.180  The Supreme Court bolstered the arguments for identical treatment in its 
decision that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964 did not require that minorities and 
women receive preferential treatment, only that they not be victimized by illegal 
 
173 See, for example, R.A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination 
Laws, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1992) and R.A. Epstein, ‘Standing Firm, on Forbidden 
Grounds’, San Diego Law Review, Vol. 31, (1994), p. 1. 
174 J. Raskin, in the discussion ‘Beyond Black and White: Race Conscious Policies and the ‘Other 
Minorities’ at American University, Washington College of Law, 21st Sept. 1995.  Viewed on http://www.c-
spanvideo.org/program.67266-iI.   Accessed 13.06.09. 
175 Regents of the University of California v Bakke 438 US 265 (1978) at 341. 
176J.E. Jones, Jr., ‘The Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action’, pp 347 in H. Hill and J.E. Jones (eds), Race in 
America: the Struggle for Equality, (University of Wisconsin Press, Maddison, 1993), pp. 345 – 359.  
177 J.H. Ely, ‘The Constitutionality of Reverse Discrimination’, 41 University of Chicago Law Review 723, 
731 – 733, 739 (1974). 
178 Justice Kennedy in Miller v Johnson 515 US 900 (1995) at 2486. 
179 P. Gottfried and T. Flemming, The Conservative Movement.  Social Movements Past and Present, 
(Twayne Publishers, Boston, 1992), p. 41. 
180 E. Schnapper, ‘Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment’, Virginia 
Law Review, LXXX1, (1985), pp. 753 – 98. 
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discrimination.181  The court’s role in forming the conception of equality is also apparent 
in the cases of Shaw v Reno and City of Richmond v Croson in which it acted on the 
assumption that affirmative action is either explicitly racist or is able to mask racism.182  
The Court’s arguments however ignored that ‘since the [14th] Amendment grew out of the 
Civil War and the freeing of the Slaves, the core prohibition was early held to be aimed at 
the protection of blacks’.183  In addition, the affirmative action cases of the mid-1990s, 
Miller v Johnson, Adarand v Peña and Missouri v Jenkins, which are synonymous with 
the conservative resurgence of the Supreme Court, also demonstrate the significant 
judicial promotion of a formal, colour-blind construction of equality.184   
 
One of the US’ most explicit proponents of the colour-blind principle is Richard Sander 
who has used empirical evidence to argue that colour-based preferences have resulted in 
fewer students belonging to racial minorities in American law schools.185  Sander states 
that minority students who benefit from affirmative action are disproportionately 
clustered at the bottom of their classes, leading to a higher attrition rate and lower rate of 
bar passage amongst them than there would have been in the absence of any 
preference.186  The combined effect of these factors, Sander claims, is that there are fewer 
black lawyers than there would be under a race-blind system.187  Sander’s conclusions 
have, however, been directly challenged by the contrary hypothesis that any differentials 
between minority and majority law students are attributable to embedded discrimination 
within the educational system and other external factors as opposed to any deficiency in 
the minority students themselves or the negative impact of affirmative action.188  Critics 
of Sander have also reworked his data to show that the proportion of minority students 
admitted to the most elite schools would fall dramatically in the absence of affirmative 
 
181 Texas Department of Community Affairs v Burdine 450 US 248 (1981) pp. 258 – 9. 
182 See Shaw v Reno 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993), at 2833 and City of Richmond v Croson, 488 US 469 (1989). 
183 J. Rehnquist, dissenting, Trimble v Gorden 430 US 762 (1977) at 780. 
184 See Missouri v Jenkins 515 US 70 (1995) in which the court limited the remedial use of affirmative 
action by striking down district court efforts to increase minority educational achievement and attract white 
students to public schools; Adarand v Peña  op. cit. which held that congressionally mandated affirmative 
action plans must pass the test of strict scrutiny; and Miller v Johnson 515 US 900 (1995) in which the 
Court applied strict scrutiny to a minority-majority district in which race was a predominant factor in 
creating the district.  
185 R.H.A. Sander, ‘A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools’, 57 Stanford 
Law Review, No. 4 (November 2004), p. 367. 
186 ibid, pp. 449, 460, 478, 479. 
187 ibid, p. 372. 
188 R. Lempert et al, ‘Affirmative Action in US Law Schools: A Critical Response to Richard Sander’s ‘A 
Reply to Critics’, University of Michigan Law School: The John M. Olin Center for Law and Economics 
Working Paper Series, Paper 60 (2006), pp. 21 – 22. 
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action, resulting in virtually no African American students.189  While critics of Sander 
have sought to negate his theories and criticise his methodology190 in so-doing they have 
highlighted the extent to which US affirmative action is affected by conflicting arguments, 
which result in a developmental paralysis in this area of the law and confusion as to the 
interpretation of the legal principles upon which it is based.   
 
For US supporters of affirmative action the principle that equality requires colour-
blindness is ‘structurally insupportable’.191  The impact of the colour-blind approach to 
US affirmative action has also been criticised as being ignorant of the positive value of 
black culture and assuming that white culture represents neutrality.192  However, race is 
so deeply ingrained in the historical background of the US that neutrality of treatment will 
not yield neutral results193 and in this context the Supreme Court’s insistence on colour-
blindness ‘ceases to resemble an admirable social panacea, but rather metastasizes into a 
virulent social malignancy’.194  As Andrew Koppelman has argued the notion of a colour-
blind constitution takes a legal approach to equal treatment which ‘derives its appeal by 
seizing on one valid instance of the process theory’s requirement that the legislator be 
impartial, fetishizing it, and forgetting its basis’.195  Despite such arguments, opponents of 
affirmative action have popularised the notion that the on-going treatment of individuals 
according to their colour delays the achievement of de facto equality, underlining the 
natural inferiority of minority groups, and forestalling the evolution of affirmative 
action.196   
 
 
189 J. Rothstein and A.H. Yoon, ‘Affirmative Action in Law School Admissions: What Do Racial 
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Lawyers?’, 57 Stanford Law Review 1087 (2005); D.L. Chambers et al, ‘The Real Impact of Eliminating 
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A Response to Sander’, Stanford Law Review 57 (May), pp. 1915 – 1961; D.E. Ho, ‘Why Affirmative 
Action Does Not Cause Black Student to Fail the Bar: A Reply to Sander’, Yale Law Journal, 114 (June), 
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Black and White Students?’, Northwestern University Law Review, 101 (Fall 2007), pp. 1759 – 1808. 
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Conflict’, 47 Stanford Law Review, 1059 (1995), p. 1095. 
192 L. Friedman, ‘Brown in Context’, p. 64 in A. Sarat (ed.), Race, Law and Culture.  Reflections on Brown 
v Board of Education, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997), pp. 49 – 73.  See also S.A. Law, ‘White 
Privilege and Affirmative Action’, 32 Akron Law Review 603, (1999).    
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3.2.2 The UK Principle of Equality 
 
UK anti-discrimination legislation is founded on a formal understanding of equality, 
through the definition of direct discrimination, which states that an action is 
discriminatory if ‘but for’ the protected characteristic the two individuals, comprising of 
the person with the protected characteristic and the comparator who does not have the 
protected characteristic, would have been treated the same.197  The implication in this test 
is that identical treatment is lawful treatment whilst any differential treatment, even if 
benevolently motivated, may constitute unlawful discrimination.   
 
The articulation of equality in UK law is closely related to the principle of formal equality 
found in European law, which was founded firstly upon economic aspirations, and in 
particular the ideal of equal pay.198  This required equal pay between men and women 
undertaking the same work, or work of an equal value, and that job categorisation be 
carried out without discrimination.199  The failure of article 119 to expressly refer to equal 
treatment in terms other than pay, however, led to its narrow application.200  The Council 
of the European Union therefore passed the Equal Treatment Directive 1976 which, as 
well as concerning equal treatment in matters other than pay, also permitted ‘measures to 
promote equal opportunity.’201  This small concession to a substantive equality approach 
was drafted as an exception to the general, formal equal treatment requirement,202  thus 
echoing the positive action measures in UK domestic law.203  The European derogation 
for positive action was listed among two other permitted exceptions which could be 
enacted within Member States until ‘the concern for protection which originally inspired 
them is no longer well founded’. 204  Alongside exceptions for occupational 
qualifications205  and maternity-related protection206  were the positive duty provisions 
 
197 See Equality Act 2010, s. 13(1), which replaces RRA, s. 1(1)(a) and SDA, s. 1(2)(a).  See also the Equal 
Pay Act 1970, s. 1. 
198  Treaty of Rome 1957, art. 119 (now art. 141). 
199 Equal Pay Directive 75/117 1975 O.J (L30) 19. 
200 See, for example, Defrenne v Sabena (No. 3) Case C-149/77  [1978] ECR 1365.    
201 Equal Treatment Directive 76/207 1976 OJ L39/10, article 2(4). 
202 ibid, art 2(1). 
203 SDA, ss. 47 and 48 and RRA, ss. 37 and 38. 
204 ibid, arts 3(2)(c) and 5(2)(c). 
205 ibid, art 2(2). 
206 ibid, art 2(3). 
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which permitted the promotion of gender equality by ‘removing existing inequalities’ 
which affect the opportunities of women and minorities.207   
 
A significant development in the EU/UK notion of equality from one of formal equality 
to one of substantive equality arose out of the provisions of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
1997 which stated that equality required ‘full equality in practice’.208  The achievement of 
‘full equality in practice’ has been interpreted as permitting the adoption of specific 
measures to prevent or compensate for disadvantages experienced by the 
underrepresented group and therefore moves on from the requirement that equal treatment 
necessitates identical treatment. 209   On top of the requirements of article 141(4) the 
directives implemented in response to the new non-discrimination provision in article 13 
EC Treaty also reflect the ‘commitment to substantive not merely formal equality’.210  
Article 5 of the Racial Equality Directive 2000, for example, states that ‘the principle of 
equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting specific 
measures to prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to racial or ethnic origin’.211 
Comparable provisions also exist in other Directives, including the Framework Equality 
Directive 2000, the Gender Equality in the Provision of Goods and Services Directive 
2004 and the Equal Treatment Directive 2006.212   
 
The key factor which demonstrates that both article 141(4) and the article 13 directives 
move towards the principle of substantive equality is that they do not frame positive 
action as a derogation from equality, but as an integral part of achieving it.  Pursuant to 
this the provisions put a heightened emphasis on the possible need for specific measures 
to achieve equality, with the implication that these will not be uniformly relevant to all 
individuals.  Implementation of this requirement into UK domestic legislation has brought 
with it a more substantively focused notion of equality. 213   The approach will be 
solidified by uncommenced sections of the Equality Act 2010 which explicitly 
 
207 ibid, art 2(4). 
208 EC Treaty, art. 141(4). 
209 E.F. Dedeis, ‘The Treaty of Amsterdam: The Next Step towards Gender Equality’, 23 B.C. Intl & Comp 
Law Rev 1(1999), pp. 30 – 33. 
210 C. McHugh, ‘The Equality Principle in EU Law: Taking a Human Rights Approach?’ 14 ISLR 31 (2006). 
211 Council Directive 2000/43/EC, art. 5. 
212 Council Directive, 2000/78/EC, art. 7(1) and Council Directive, 2004/113/EC, art. 6 and Council 
Directive 2006/54/EC. art. 2(8). 
213 See, Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003, esp. reg. 26; Employment Equality 
(Religion of Belief) Regulations 2003, esp. reg. 25; Sex Discrimination (Amendment of Legislation) 
Regulations 2008 SI 2008/963; Race Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2003 SI 2003/1626; 
and Employment Equality (Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005 SI 2005/2467. 
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acknowledge that ‘[c]ompliance with the [Act’s equality] duties … may involve treating 
some persons more favourably than others’.214  The Equality Act 2010 also affirms the 
mandatory need for public authorities to exercise their functions with due regard to the 
need to advance equality of o
 
The ECJ has also been instrumental in the developing principle of equality and in 
particular shaping the form of substantive equality that is permitted under European law, 
and which will now, as a result of the Equality Act 2010, be incorporated into UK law.  In 
the Kalanke decision the Court demonstrated the clear distinction between equality of 
opportunity and equality of outcome, holding the former to be permissible, and the latter 
not.216   By contrast, however, Marschall arguably allowed equality of result, subject to 
the inclusion of a savings clause,217 marking a degree of movement towards this form of 
substantive equality.218  Although the savings clause altered the outcome of the choice 
between two candidates on some occasions, when it did not come into effect the outcome 
of the decision was effectively pre-determined in favour of the equally qualified female 
candidate.219  The Court confirmed its acceptance of substantive equality encompassing 
measures which effectively achieve equality of results in Badeck.220  In Badeck the ECJ 
approved of plans which included binding targets for increasing the proportion of women 
in sectors in which they were underrepresented so that more than half of the positions 
arising during the two year duration of each plan were designated for women, except 
where a ‘genuine occupational qualification’ existed, or it was ‘convincingly 
demonstrated that not enough women with the necessary qualifications are available’ in 
which case a smaller proportion of posts could be designated.221  In applying the test it 
had set down in Marschall the ECJ required only that there was no automatic and 
unconditional priority given to women when there were two equally qualified individuals 
 
214 Equality Act 2010, s. 149(6).  See also s. 159(3). 
215 RRA, s. 71 and SDA, s. 76A.  See Equality Act 2010 ss, 149(1)(a) and (b) once in force. 
216 Kalanke, op. cit., para 23,  
217 Marschall, op. cit., paras 24 – 31. 
218 See C. Barnard and B. Hepple, ‘Substantive Equality’, The Cambridge University Law Journal (2000) 
Vol 59, Iss. 3, pp.562 – 585.  See also C. Barnard, ‘The Principles of Equality in the Community Context: P, 
Grant, Kalanke and Marschall: Four Uneasy Bedfellows’, The Cambridge University Law Journal (1998) 
Vol 57, Iss. 2, pp. 353 – 373.   
219 This led to the criticism of the scheme by Advocate General Jacobs who argued that if an absolute rule 
granting women priority is unlawful then a conditional clause merely displaces the rule, without altering its 
discriminatory nature. See Opinion of Advocate General F.G. Jacobs, Case C-409/95 [1997] All ER (EC) 
865 (1997), [1998] CEC, (CCH) 152 (1997), at 161. 
220 Badeck, op. cit. 
221 ibid, para 3. 
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and that there was an individual and objective assessment of the candidates.222  Subject to 
these caveats, therefore, the ECJ approved a construction of equality which assured an 
equal outcome for both genders.  A further indication of the ECJ’s movement towards a 
substantive equality approach is its holding that an employer’s scheme which provided 
subsidised nursery places to female employees was lawful positive action, on the 
reasoning that ‘an insufficiency of suitable and affordable nursery facilities is likely to 
induce more particularly female employees to give up their jobs’. 223   A substantive 
understanding of equality is incorporated into the Equality Act 2010, albeit that the 
relevant sections have yet to commence.224 
 
The European equality provisions illustrate how EU law, in contrast to the US, has 
gradually relinquished its unfettered search for identical treatment and instead has focused 
on the aim of equality of opportunity, with some indication that this is now moving 
towards a principle of equality of outcome, both of which represent a much more 
‘positive and value-laden concept than non-discrimination’ or de facto equality.225  In line 
with this approach UK positive action has been increasingly designed to achieve 
substantive equality between majority and minority groups, under which equality of 
outcome is prioritised over equality of treatment, although this prioritisation is arguably 
more tenuous where market forces are threatened. 226   This difference illustrates the 
contrast between the current EU and UK substantively focused principle of equality, as 
compared to the continuing strength of US arguments for formal equality. 227   
Consequently, despite similar periods of hesitancy and some opposition, as well as some 
similarities in the criticism directed at each country’s legislature and judiciary, the UK is 
now developing a general framework for equality built on substantive equality,228 whilst 
the US continues to grapple with conceptual confusion in the construction of this 
principle. 
 
 
 
 
222 ibid, paras 55 and 63. 
223 Lommers, op. cit., para 370. 
224 Equality Act 2010, s. 159. 
225 E. Ellis, EU Anti-Discrimination Law, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005), p. 3. 
226 See H. Fenwick and T. Hervey, ‘Sex Equality in the Single Market: New Directions for the European 
Court of Justice’ (1995) 32 Common Market Law Rev 443.  
227 As illustrated, for example, by Gilbert v General Electric Co. 1997 S Ct. 401 (1977). 
228 C. O’Cinneide, ‘Fumbling towards Coherence’, op. cit. 
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3.3 The Definition of Merit Utilised in Affirmative Action 
 
The relative degree to which protected characteristics have been used as part of the 
definition of ‘merit’ in US and UK positive action has compounded the differences 
between US and UK affirmative action principles.  Whilst the US legal framework 
permits race to count towards an individual’s merit in narrowly constructed circumstances 
affirmative action critics have maintained that all decisions should be made on the basis 
of objectively assessed merit and determined that any process that takes race into account 
is equally bad whether whites, blacks, men or women are favoured because ‘it departs 
from the norm of a career open to talents’. 229  However, such arguments are starkly 
contrasted by those of critical race theorists who consider merit to be socially constructed 
by the dominant group and used to maintain its social hegemony.230  The tension between 
the legal framework and vociferous popular opinions has left these two highly divergent 
positions to be reconciled by the courts, which has generally sought to restrain the use of 
membership of a protected group in the construction of merit.  The UK by contrast has 
determinedly excluded an individual’s race or gender from constituting any part of their 
perceived ‘merit’ so that even where a protected characteristic is relevant to a decision, 
this is only after an individual’s merit has been assessed.  This was firstly achieved by 
separating the operation of positive action from situations requiring the assessment of 
merit, and latterly by only considering positive action after merit has been determined, 
and even then only in certain circumstances.  The following paragraphs will further 
consider the country-specific influences on the principle of merit in the context of 
affirmative action. 
 
3.3.1 US Interpretations of the Principle of Merit 
 
US affirmative action allows the existence of a minority characteristic to form part of the 
assessment of an individual’s qualifications, or merit, under narrowly defined 
circumstances.231  However, such use has been controversial and fiercely resisted with the 
claims of malcontent litigants frequently being upheld by the courts on the basis that the 
 
229 A. Koppelman, Anti-discrimination Law and Social Equality, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1996), 
p. 35. 
230 R. Delgado, Critical Race Theory, (New York University Press, New York and London, 2000), pp. 
105 – 107.   
231 See Grutter v Bollinger, op. cit. and Gratz v Bollinger, op. cit. 
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policies constitute a departure from the appropriate construction of merit.232  The extent 
to which departures from objectively assessed merit, in terms of academic achievement 
and work experience, are readily accepted within the US is however evident across the 
employment and educational environment.  Outside affirmative action standards of merit 
rely heavily on personal connections, legacies, family contacts and standardized tests, for 
example, all of which are highly discriminatory.233  In addition, many elite schools have 
long used non-academic preferences to encourage a diverse student population, whether 
this is in terms of geographical origin, social background or specific talents, and have 
commended the benefit of these attributes within the learning environment. 234   At 
Harvard University, for example, John Lamb concludes that routinely more white 
students gain entry as ‘legacy admissions’235 than do the total number of Black, Hispanic 
and American Indian students through affirmative action.236  What distinguishes these 
preferences from those made on the basis of race and gender is that they predominantly 
benefit white males and it is therefore in the majority’s social interest that individuals 
benefiting from race and gender-based preferences are more opposed and stigmatised than 
those benefiting through the operation of other group-based programmes.237  Arguments 
supporting an objective assessment of merit also suggest that individuals benefitting from 
affirmative action will be ‘mismatched’, in terms of skills and qualifications, to the 
position they are awarded.238  The argument that affirmative action admittances are not 
based on individual accomplishment, however, disregards the obstacles that are routinely 
in the way of individuals from previously excluded groups entering higher education and 
certain professional jo
 
 
232 See, for example, the comments of Justice Clarence Thomas in cases including Gratz v Bollinger, 
Grutter v Bollinger, Adarand v Pena, and Parents Involved in Community Schools v Seattle School District, 
No. I  Nos 05-908, 426 F.3d 1162, and 05-915, 426 F.3d 513 (2007).  
233 S.A. Law, ‘White Privilege and Affirmative Action’, p. 618 and R.B. Ginsburg and D.M. Jones, 
‘Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue’, 1 Rutgers Race and Law Review, 193, 
(1998 – 1999), p. 618. 
234 R. Post, ‘Introduction: After Bakke’, in R. Post and M. Rogin (eds.), Race and Representation: 
Affirmative Action, (Zone Books, New York, 1998), pp. 13 – 27. 
235 It is common practice in private US universities to give preference in admissions to family of alumni.  
These are called ‘legacy admissions’. 
236 J.D. Lamb, ‘The Real Affirmative Action Babies: Legacy Preferences at Harvard and Yale’, 26 
Columbia Journal of Law and Social Problems 491, 504 (1993). 
237 N. Strossen, ‘Blaming the Victim: A Critique of Attack on Affirmative Action’, 77 Cornell Law Review, 
974, (1991 – 2), p. 978. 
238 R. Sander, ‘A Systematic Analysis of Affirmative Action’, op. cit., pp. 449 – 453. 
239 See R. Zweigenhoft and W.G. Domhoff, Blacks in the White Establishment? A Study of Race and Class 
in America, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1991), especially pp. 145 – 158 concerning the barriers of 
stigmatisation faced by minorities. 
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Merit in the US incorporates a wide range of characteristics and although opponents of 
affirmative action argue for a narrow, objective construction of merit in relation to 
affirmative action measures this does not generally exist across assessments of merit.  In 
the case of Mitchell v Cohen, for example, the Supreme Court justified amending the 
definition of merit to include consideration of an individual’s status as a military veteran 
as a means of helping soldiers readjust to civilian life.240  Whilst race or gender-based 
preferences have been attacked veterans’ preferences have been largely immune from 
criticism and widely protected by the courts.  In fact, veterans’ preferences have been 
considered so important that they have been maintained despite the court labelling them 
as ‘unwise and costly’.241  Veterans’ preferences, unlike affirmative action preferences, 
primarily benefit white males and so illustrate how the white male hegemony in the US 
continues to limit the growth of minority advancement whilst protecting white-benefitting 
programmes, although both forms of action continue to exist within US law.  The US’ 
insistence on sameness for minority treatment while ‘American society is replete with 
preferences and categorical separations of various sorts’ shows the degree to which the 
principles upon which US affirmative action is based are a product of the society and 
historical context in which it exists and that these factors are very significant in 
determining the scope of the legal provisions.242  As these examples show the concept of 
merit gets manipulated by opponents of affirmative action to serve their own interests.  
 
The court’s impact in limiting the use of race as a component in determining an 
individual’s merit is evident in the case of Bakke, in which the university put in place 
qualitative selection criteria under which Alan Bakke expected to be admitted, but then 
departed from this by taking other factors, including race, into account.243  The court’s 
decision did not therefore condemn the consideration of race per se but effectively 
condemned its use on the grounds of what was the appropriate test of merit.  US 
arguments about the role of merit in university-based affirmative action also extend to the 
provision of race and gender-specific scholarships.  The attitude towards these 
endowments can be seen in the case of Proberesky v Kirwan in which the court struck 
 
240 Mitchell v Cohen 33 U.S. 411 (1948) at 418.  See also the Vietnam Era Veterans Act 1974, ss. 4211 - 
4215 which required any employer with a federal contract of $10,000 or more to take affirmative action to 
employ and advance in employment qualified veterans with disabilities and veterans of the Vietnam era. 38 
US Code Chapter 42. 
241 White v Gate 253 F2d 868 (1958) at 869. 
242 J. Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action, op. cit., p. 36. 
243 P. Green, The Pursuit of Inequality, (Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1981), p. 174. 
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down a racially exclusive scholarship at the University of Maryland because the 
programme failed to meet the required level of judicial scrutiny.244  Again this decision 
does not prohibit the consideration of race in assessing merit, but illustrates how the court 
has been instrumental in limiting its use.  The most recent approach of the Supreme Court 
to the use of race as a factor in an individual’s merit maintains the strict level of scrutiny, 
whilst accepting that an individual’s race can add value to the assessment of their 
merit.245 This decision may suggest that the Court is increasingly willing to uphold the 
minority benefitting intentions of affirmative action provisions, against popular 
opposition, or simply that affirmative action schemes are more cautious in their drafting 
and limited in their
 
3.3.2 UK Interpretations of the Principle of Merit 
 
The confinement of UK positive action to specially targeted advertisements and training 
programmes under the RRA and SDA has previously meant that when the decision to 
promote, appoint or dismiss is made, and with it an individual’s merit is being assessed, 
no positive action considerations are simultaneously being taken into account.246  This 
separation between merit and membership of a protected group is continued in the 
Equality Act 2010 provisions enabling employers to help individuals to overcome 
disadvantage caused by a protected characteristic. 247   Consequently the debate 
surrounding the appropriate definition of merit in UK positive action is relatively 
undeveloped compared to the US with official tests of merit not incorporating positive 
action considerations.  This leaves the popular perception of merit as constituting ‘a 
universal concept … generally confined to criteria such as formal qualifications and 
experience’, albeit that in reality the factors taken into account in determining a person’s 
merit may include a wide array of additional considerations.248  The separation of positive 
action from the point of decision-making has also enabled UK positive action to avoid 
some of the most damaging charges directed at US affirmative action including the 
accusation that it results in the recruitment of unqualified and undeserving individuals.249   
 
244 Prodberesky v Kirwan, op. cit. 
245 See Grutter v Bollinger, op. cit. 
246 SDA, s. 48 and RRA, s. 38. 
247 Equality Act 2010, s. 158. 
248 N. Jones, ‘Positive Action and the Problem of Merit: Employment policies in the National Health 
Service’, Critical Social Policy (2005) Vol 25: 139, p. 153. 
249 See, for example, A. G. Mosley and N. Capaldi, Affirmative Action: Social Justice or Unfair Preference?, 
(Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, Maryland, 1996), p. 32. 
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Even within Northern Ireland adherence to selection on the basis of merit still requires 
objective and systematic recruitment of the most qualified individual for the position.250  
This means that an individual’s membership of a protected group is considered separately 
from their ‘merit’. 251 
 
In uncommenced changes to UK positive action that are included in the Equality Act 
2010 the UK construction of merit will continue to be unaffected by affirmative action 
considerations. 252   In its latest developments UK law has adopted the background 
parameters for positive action as set out in European case law, which espouse a definition 
of merit which is explicitly race and gender-neutral, despite recognition that this 
definition can in fact have a biased impact in practice.  In Marschall, for example, the 
ECJ acknowledged that merit cannot be objectively measured and that ‘where male and 
female candidates are equally qualified, male candidates tend to be promoted in 
preference to female candidates particularly because of prejudice and stereotypes 
concerning the role and capabilities of women in working life’.253  Despite this the ECJ 
has refused to sanction the use of an individual’s race, gender, or other protected 
characteristic in the assessment of their merit, and instead, such characteristics have only 
been flexibly applied to determine a tie-break decision. 254   The principle of merit, 
therefore, is shaped without refer to protected characteristics, albeit that the outcome of a 
decision choosing between two equally meritorious candidates may be determined on the 
basis of the presence of such a characteristic.  The Court’s judgment in the case of 
Abrahamsson clarified the separation between the permitted consideration of an 
individual’s minority characteristic and the appropriate definition of merit by holding that 
an individuals’ lack of qualifications could not be bolstered by their membership of an 
underrepresented, protected class.255  In other words, the Court held that an individual’s 
membership of a protected group did not count towards their qualification for the position, 
relative to any other candidate.  Because the Equality Act 2010 will insert the judicial 
findings of the ECJ into UK law the principle of merit employed in making appointment 
 
250 Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, Code of Practice Fair Employment In Northern Ireland, 
(2003), para 5.1.1.  See also paras 5.3.2 – 5.3.5. 
251 B. Hepple, ‘Discrimination and Equality of Opportunity – Northern Irish Lesson’, Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 10 [1990] 408, p. 413. 
252 This does not mean that the assessment of merit will be more or less objectively assessed, only that 
positive action will continue not to have a role in its determination. 
253 Marschall, op. cit. para 29. 
254 As discussed in section 3.1.2 in relation to the ECJ’s decisions in Kalanke and Badeck. 
255 Abrahamsson, op. cit., para 56. 
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and promotion decisions will continue to avoid consideration of an individual’s race, 
gender or other protected characteristic, and only add this factor into the decision-making 
process in the event of a tie-break situation and subject to strict legislative criteria.256    
 
Despite the UK’s failure to incorporate positive action considerations into an individual’s 
assessment of merit commentators have argued that such a development would not 
deprive the assessment of merit of its legitimacy.  For example, Albert Weale has 
suggested that an individual’s gender and race could reasonably constitute part of their 
‘merit’ because there is no definite agreement as to what factors may form part of this 
assessment.257  Therefore, departing from the typical criteria, albeit that they themselves 
are frequently and systematically ignored, need not invalidate a decision.258  Building on 
support for the implementation of an explicitly flexible construction of merit Bhikhu 
Parekh has suggested that what forms merit at any one time is a ‘social decision and a 
matter of social policy’. 259   It should therefore not be promulgated as a fixed and 
inviolable factor in decision-making, but recognised as historically contingent.260  This 
debate displays similarities with US views about the inappropriateness of considering 
minority status as part of merit, although the legal provisions in the two countries remain 
distinct.   
 
Both the US and UK have rejected the use of a minority characteristic as an inflexible or 
decisive factor in assessing an individual’s merit.261  Beyond this, however, the role of 
merit in affirmative action differs between the two countries.  The US has permitted the 
use of a range of minority characteristics, including race and gender, to bolster an 
individual’s merit and has also departed from what are perceived as merit-based decisions 
to benefit underrepresented groups.  Despite this use opponents of affirmative action have 
heavily criticised these measures, whilst ignoring their similarity to other forms of 
majority-benefiting action.  By contrast UK law has excluded positive action 
considerations from the assessment of merit, with the only possible role for a minority 
 
256 See Government Equalities Office.  ‘A Fairer Future.  The Equality Bill and Other Action to Make 
Equality a Reality’, (April 2009), part 2, pp. 29 – 37. 
257 A. Weale, Political Theory and Social Policy, (MacMillan, London, 1983), p. 165. 
258 ibid. 
259 B. Parekh, ‘The Case for Positive Discrimination’ in B. Hepple and E.M. Szyszczak (eds.) 
Discrimination: The Limits of the Law, (Mansell Publishing Limited, London, 1992), pp. 261 – 280. 
260 ibid, pp. 272 – 5. 
261 See, for example, Kalanke, op. cit., para 22, Badeck, paras 28 – 29 and Bakke, op. cit.  
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characteristic being to distinguish between equally qualified individuals in the event of a 
tie-break.   
 
3.4 Affirmative Action across Different Protected Groups 
 
Underlying positive action is the ideal of creating a ‘level playing field’ in which all 
individuals can enjoy equal access to education, employment and general societal 
opportunities.  Supporters of a range of political creeds predominantly accept these 
arguments and acknowledge that while slavery and female disenfranchisement overtly 
prohibited equal access continuing discrimination prejudice and stereotyping has meant 
that the achievement of equality has remained elusive.262  However, the legal and social 
consensus evaporates when the question turns to the principle behind how to combat the 
different forms of societal inequality variously experienced by women and minorities, 
with the US and UK adopting different approaches which will be explored below.   
 
3.4.1 US Affirmative Action across Different Groups  
 
In US affirmative action the categorisation of individuals on the basis of race is treated as 
more inherently pernicious than classifications based on gender.263  Consequently, the 
treatment of racial minorities and women under affirmative action have developed along 
different paths meaning that ‘[i]t is not right to observe without qualification that men and 
women and “black” and “white” people, are “opposite sides of the same coin”’.264  The 
most striking difference between the histories of the emancipation of US women and 
African Americans is the role of slavery and the decades of uneasy race relations that 
followed its abolition.  The presence of slavery has conditioned the development of 
minority-based positive action and resulted in the differing permutations and distinct 
judicial treatment of each form of affirmative action.265    
 
 
262  See, N. MacLean, Freedom is Not Enough.  The Opening of the American Workplace, (Harvard 
University Press, London, 2006). 
263 S. Mayeri, ‘A Common Fate of Discrimination: Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical 
Perspective’, in The Yale Law Journal, (2000 – 1), 110.2, p. 1050. 
264 K. Monaghan, Equality Law, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007), p. 15. 
265 See M.E. Levin, ‘Is Racial Discrimination Special?’, 15 Journal of  Value Inquiry 225, (1981), pp. 227 – 
8. 
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One indication of the different principles affecting race and gender-based affirmative 
action in the US is the application of varying levels of judicial scrutiny.  From early in the 
history of affirmative action the US court has made it clear that all governmental action 
that rests solely on distinctions drawn according to race has to be subjected to ‘the most 
rigid scrutiny’ 266  and that racial classifications must be ‘necessary, and not merely 
rationally related, to the accomplishment of a permissible state policy’.267   The strict 
scrutiny test also specifies that there must be a ‘compelling state interest’ to justify the 
deployment of race-based quotas, which is usually interpreted as meaning that it must be 
intended to combat intentional discrimination when no other form of action is likely to 
work.  Finally the quota itself must be ‘narrowly tailored’ and finite in duration so that 
once the number of minorities in the workforce has reached a representative level the 
policy should be terminated.268  By contrast, preferences based on an individual’s gender 
only need to satisfy an intermediate level of scrutiny, which requires that they are fairly 
and substantially related to the achievement of an important government interest.269  The 
application of ‘strict scrutiny’ to all race classifications and ‘intermediate scrutiny’ to 
gender classification cemented the legitimacy of differential treatment between race and 
gender-based affirmative action in the US and has resulted in a greater propensity for the 
courts to uphold gender-based affirmative action, as explicitly stated in the case of 
Danskine v Miami Dade Fire Department.270  US gender-based preferences are therefore 
less vulnerable to constitutional condemnation than preferences based on an individual’s 
race.271  
 
A further example of the more lenient US judicial treatment afforded to gender-based 
affirmative action cases, as compared to race-based preferences, is the case of Califano v 
Webster in which the court rejected a male worker’s challenge to a social security 
provision which treated women more favourably than men by allowing women to exclude 
more low-earning years for the purposes of calculating benefit.272  In Califano the policy 
was subjected to an intermediate level of scrutiny under which it was justified on the basis 
 
266 Korematsu v United States 323 US 214, 216 (1944) quoted in Loving v Virginia 388 US 1 (1967) at 11. 
267 McLaughlin v Florida 379 US 184, 196 (1964) at 197 (J. Harlan, concurring). 
268 Justice O’Conor in Adarand v Peña , op. cit., paras 212 – 239.    
269 Craig v Boren 429 US 190 (1976), para 197. 
270 Danskine et al. v Miami Dade Fire Department et al., 1999, (6/12/2001, No. 99-14493), part III. 
271 R.B. Ginsburg and D.J. Merritt, ‘Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue’, 1 
Rutgers Race and Law Review, 193 (1998 – 1999), p. 213.  See also R.B. Levinson, ‘Gender Based 
Affirmative Action and Reverse Gender Bias: Beyond Gratz, Parents Involved, and Ricci’, 34 Harv J.L. 
and Gender (2010). 
272 Califano v Webster 430 US 313 (1977). 
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of the general need to ‘remedy discrimination against women in the job market’, without 
the need to identify a particular instance of discriminatory treatment of the individual 
involved.273  By contrast, the stringency of the court’s scrutiny of race-based programmes 
was illustrated in the Seattle Schools case where the plaintiff’s attempt to negate the lack 
of a finding of past discrimination by relying on complaints made against the school 
district was rejected as an inadequate basis upon which to justify the particular race-based 
affirmative action plan.274     
 
Some US commentators have argued that instead of requiring racial preferences to pass a 
test of strict scrutiny the US should have adopted the policy rejected in the Bakke 
whereby the court would allow consideration of generalised societal racial discrimination 
to justify affirmative action programmes.275  The rejection of this approach signified the 
end of a range of affirmative action programmes unable to meet this higher standard.276  
Further arguments against the different principles supporting race and gender-based 
action suggest that the application of strict scrutiny ‘confuses benefit, equal opportunity, 
and inclusion with burden, discrimination, and exclusion’. 277   The Court’s natural 
conservatism and suspicion of race-based measures has meant rejection of the lesser 
standard of scrutiny for race-based preferences, allowing the differential treatment of race 
and gender to exemplify the divisive and divided nature of the affirmative action 
movement in the US.278  
 
3.4.2 UK Positive Action across Different Groups 
 
Whilst US affirmative action is forced to deal with the residual influences of slavery, 
societal racism and the consequently cautious approach to dealing with racial 
classifications, the UK has adopted a more uniform approach to the implementation of 
positive action across different protected groups.  Under the Equality Act 2010 the level 
 
273 ibid, at 319. 
274 Parents Involved in Community Schools v Seattle School District, op. cit. on writ of Certiorari to the 
United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit.  
275 Bakke, op. cit. 
276 S. Douglas-Scott, ‘Affirmative Action in the US Supreme Court: the Adarand Case – the Final Chapter’, 
Public Law 43 (1977). 
277 Angela Davis, Key note address at Race, Law and Justice Conference, ‘The Rehnquist Court and the 
American Dilemma’, American University Law Review, (February 1996), 
http://www.wcl.american.edu/journal/lawrev/45/kahlen.cfm.   Accessed 10.08.10. 
278 C. Cunningham and N.R. Madhava Menon, ‘Race, Class, Caste…? Rethinking Affirmative Action’, 97 
Michigan Law Review 1296 (1999). 
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of scrutiny to be applied to tie-break positive action, once commenced, is comparable 
across all cases and requires that the positive action programme must be proportionate.279  
 
In determining whether a positive action policy fulfils the proportionality principle 
European law has established three requirements for permissibility: the suitability of the 
measure for attainment of the desired objective; the necessity of the disputed measure; 
and the proportionality of the measures to the restrictions involved. 280   The 
proportionality test was first applied in relation to positive action by the ECJ in 
Abrahamsson in which the Court held that the scheme under consideration was not 
proportionate because it failed to consider the candidates individually.281  The application 
of the proportionality requirement was confirmed and developed in Lommers in which the 
ECJ considered the provision of subsidised nursery places to women employees, which 
had been provided in an attempt to remedy the under-representation of women where 
there were insufficient and inadequate childcare facilities. 282   The ECJ held that the 
scheme was in principle acceptable, provided that male employees with childcare 
responsibilities were also given access to the benefits.283  Importantly, the Court held that 
the fact that the policy did not guarantee access to nursery places to employees on an 
equal-footing was not contrary to the principle of proportionality.284  This was based on 
the limit of places in the nursery, together with the waiting list for female employees to 
gain a place for their child, as well as the fact that the scheme did not entirely deprive 
male employees from access to nursery places.285  In the case of Serge Briheche the ECJ 
confirmed that proportionality was the test against which the lawfulness of any positive 
action was to be assessed stating that ‘derogations [from anti-discrimination law] must 
remain within the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the aim 
in view’ and requiring that ‘the principle of equal treatment be reconciled as far as 
 
279 Parallel treatment for all subjugated groups was first proposed by the White Paper, Racial 
Discrimination, Cmnd. 6234 (HMSO, London, 1975) and is incorporated into positive action in the 
Equality Act 2010, s. 159(4)(c). 
280 A version of the proportionality principle is now enshrined in Article 5 EC Treaty, which provides that 
action by the European Community may not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
Treaty. 
281 Abrahamsson, op. cit., para 53. 
282 Lommers, op. cit. 
283 ibid, paras 44 – 5. 
284 ibid, para 43. 
285 ibid, paras 37 and 43. 
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possible with the requirements of the aim thus pursued.’ 286   The ECJ has therefore 
continued to reaffirm the proportionality requirement confirming that contemporary 
developments in positive action programmes maintain the use of this single test of 
permissibility, offering equivalent protection across protected groups.  
 
However, despite the existence of a single test of proportionality the principle may be 
applied with different levels of stringency ‘ranging from a very deferential approach, to 
quite a rigorous and searching examination’ of the reasons given for the measure under 
consideration.287   In this respect both the US and the UK employ different levels of 
judicial examination in relation to varying affirmative action targets, and therefore afford 
varying levels of protection.  However, whilst the US has formalised the principle of 
unequal scrutiny for gender and race-based programmes UK positive action retains a 
single test that may be applied by the judiciary in accordance with the specific factors 
involved in the case under consideration.  This affords the UK a greater degree of 
flexibility in dealing with positive action challenges while the US, by contrast, is bound 
by its own strict, inflexible precedent. 
 
As well as being one of the markers of the fundamental differences between US 
affirmative action and UK positive action the different principles upon which the laws are 
based and their various interpretations have also influenced the development of positive 
action law in both countries. Following the same pattern that has been set out in this 
chapter the development of affirmative action laws in each country can be characterised 
as consisting of superficial similarities which give way to fundamental differences on 
closer inspection.  The range of influences affecting the development of affirmative action 
in the US and UK will be explored in the next chapter. 
 
286 Serge Briheche v Ministre de l’Interieu, Ministre de l’Education Naitonale et Ministre de la Justice Case 
C-319/2003 [2004] ECR I-8807, para 24.  See also R (Wilkinson) v Inland Revenue Commissioners [2005] 
1 WLR 1718; and Stec v UK (2006) (App Nos. 6573/01 and 65900/01) for recent applications of the test. 
287 P. Craig and G. De Burca, EU Law. Text, Cases and Material (3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2003), pp. 371 – 379. 
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4. The Differing Development of Affirmative Action and Positive Action 
 
One important factor in creating the fundamental distinctions between positive action in 
the UK and affirmative action in the US are the different developmental courses of each 
country’s equal opportunity laws.  These differences reflect the fact that the nature of any 
socio-legal campaign is affected by its protagonists and their own social, economic and 
political priorities.288  These priorities in turn are specific to the background within which 
the campaigns exist, making ‘context critical’ to the formulation of affirmative action 
laws.289  This chapter will consider how political forces have had a palpable impact on the 
development of affirmative action and meant that it has at times found itself as much 
subject to the priorities and ambitions of individual politicians as to any holistic legal 
ideology.290  The judiciary’s role in the development of each country’s legal provisions 
will also be considered, especially the way in which the nature, power and personnel of 
the judiciary has affected affirmative action.  This chapter will go on to show that the 
development of affirmative action matches each country’s contemporary social needs and 
objectives as well as the priorities of different social movements and that even where 
there are apparently similar social aims behind affirmative action policies these are 
pursued in country-specific ways.   This chapter will end by considering the role of the 
executive in shaping the development of affirmative action law.   Firstly, however, this 
chapter will explore how the different routes of legal development have contributed to the 
fundamental differences between the affirmative action in the US and UK.   
 
4.1 Similar, but Diverging Roads of Legal Development 
The unique developmental routes of US and UK positive action, which incorporate legal, 
administrative, popular and academic influences, have had a significant impact on how 
the relevant laws have been used, interpreted and changed, although this does not mean 
that there has been no transatlantic cross-referencing in the development of anti-
 
288 For example, Charles Ogletree cites the different, but complementary, paths of affirmative action forged 
by Justice Thurgood Marshall and Martin Luther King Jr., C.J. Ogletree Jr., All Deliberate Speed, (W.W. 
Norton & Company, New York, 2005), p. 135. 
289 J. Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action, op. cit., p. 232. 
290 J. Solomos, ‘The Politics of Anti-Discrimination Legislation; Planned Social Reform or Symbolic 
Politic’, p. 30, in R. Jenkins and J. Solomos (eds.), Racism and Equal Opportunity Policies in the 1980s, 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1987). 
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discrimination law.291  Indeed, the direct political and executive interaction between the 
US and UK regarding race relations law meant that US law had an important influence on 
the 1976 Race Relations Act.292  Some cross-referencing between the US and European 
sources is also evident including, for example, in Advocate General Tesuaro’s opinion in 
Kalanke, in which he mentioned a number of US cases. 293   Despite this the legal 
development of positive action has taken a different course in each country.   
The original basis for the development of affirmative action within Europe was the notion 
of equal treatment for men and women and in line with this the Treaty of Rome provided 
that both genders should enjoy equal pay for work of equal value.294  Europe’s early 
commitment to equal wages did not, however, stem from a ‘lofty desire’ to promote 
gender equality.295  Instead, the Treaty provision reflected the more practical fear that 
cheap, mobile, female labour in some countries would undercut the price of goods in 
other nations.296  On the UK’s accession to the European Union in 1973 it amended 
existing legislation to fulfil the Treaty’s goals,297  although even before this the UK had 
similarly espoused the benefit of opening up access to the labour market to all individuals, 
particularly women.298  In addition, the UK legal development of positive action had 
already moved on from wholly economic motivations to more social considerations,299 
which were later enshrined in the SDA and RRA and now the Equality Act 2010.300  This 
is a course of development which Europe has subsequently followed, and arguably 
 
291 See, for example, H. Street, G. Howe and G. Bindman, Street Report on Anti-Discrimination Legislation, 
(PEP, London, 1967) which recommended basing the UK’s anti-discrimination system on US experiences.    
292 C. McCrudden, ‘Racial Discrimination’ in C. McCrudden and G. Chambers (eds.), Individual Rights and 
the Law in Britain, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994), p. 427. 
293 Opinion of Advocate General Giuseppe Tesauro, Case C-450/93, 1995 ECR I-3051, [1996] 1 C.M.L.R. 
175 (1995) at 183. 
294 Treaty of Rome 1957, art. 141 (previously art. 119). 
295 R.B. Ginsberg, ‘The Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture: Affirmative Action an International Human Rights 
Dialogue’, The Record (May/ June 1999), vol 54, No. 3, pp. 275 – 309, p. 305. 
296 ibid.  See also A. Heritier, Policy-Making and Diversity in Europe.  Escape from Deadlock, (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1999), p. 70. 
297 The requirements of article 141 EC Treaty and Directive 76/207 were incorporated into UK law through 
amendment to the Equal Pay Act 1970 (c. 41). 
298 Mr Boyd-Carpenter, Official Report Hansard HC 13 March 1952 Vol 497 ccl 1786 – 1794, 1791. 
299 This was clear through the passage of the Race Relations Act 1968 (c. 71), which extended the 
provisions of the Race Relations Act 1965 (c. 73) and made employment-based discrimination unlawful, 
even before the UK joined Europe. 
300 SDA, ss. 37 and 38, RRA, ss. 47 and 48 and Equality Act 2010, ss. 149, 158 and 159. 
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overtaken the UK in pursuing, most recently through the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.301  
From the foundation of positive action in Europe, in terms of equal pay, however, its legal 
development has been marked by a cycle of implementation of outline provisions, judicial 
consideration, and subsequent enactment of further legal clarification of the judicial 
decisions. 302   This pattern is evident in the replacement of article 2(4) of the Equal 
Treatment Directive303 with article 2(8) of the Equal Treatment (Amendment) Directive 
after a number of ECJ judgments which clarified the parameters of acceptable positive 
action.304  The measures referred to under article 2(8) are interpreted in conjunction with 
article 141(4) which was inserted into the EC Treaty by the Treaty of Amsterdam and 
which was the first primary European legislation to refer to positive action.305  Article 
141(4) upholds the permissibility of positive action countenancing that ‘with a view to 
ensuring full equality in practice between men and women in working life the principle of 
equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting 
measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it easier for the under-
represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent or compensate for 
disadvantages in professional careers’.306  The importance of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 
advancing positive action is underlined by article 13 which enabled the Council to ‘take 
appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion 
or belief, age disability and sexual orientation’.307  On the basis of this article the Council 
has subsequently adopted a range of directives, including the Racial Equality Directive,308 
the Framework Equality Directive,309 the Gender Equal Treatment Directive310 and the 
 
301 See C. O’Cinneide, op. cit., p. 57.  See also C. McGlynn, ‘Families and the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: Progressive Change or Entrenching the Status Quo?’, European Law Review 26(6), 
(2001), pp. 582 – 598. 
302 The impact of this pattern of development on the UK is important because of the role of European 
positive action parameters in setting the parameters for permissible action that may be incorporated into UK 
legislation. 
303 Equal Treatment Directive, art 2(4). 
304 Equal Treatment (Amendment) Directive 2002/73/EC OJ L268/15. 
305 EC Treaty, art. 141(4). 
306 ibid. 
307 ibid, art. 13. 
308 Council Directive 2000/43/EC, art. 5, requiring the equal treatment between persons irrespective of 
racial or ethnic origin, [2000] OJ L180/22, incorporated into UK law by the Race Relations Act 1976 
(Amendment) Regulations 2003. 
309 Council Directive 2000/78/EC, art. 3, establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation, [2000] OJ L303/16, incorporated into UK law by the Employment Equality 
(Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003. 
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Equal Treatment Directive,311 which contain positive action provisions.  To bring the 
cycle of EU/UK positive action development round again the most recent legal 
developments are incorporated into UK legislation through the Equality Act 2010.312  The 
Equality Act is designed to streamline existing equality law and ‘replace th[e] thicket of 
legislation with a single Act, which will form the basis of straightforward practical 
guidance for employers, service providers and public bodies’.313  This pattern of legal 
development demonstrates how, with the EC Treaty in the background, legal measures 
have gradually increased the coverage of UK positive action, and as a result of the 
Equality Act 2010 UK law will include the full range of positive action measures 
permitted by the Treaty, once the Act is fully in force. 
In contrast to the UK development of positive action law the US legal foundations for 
anti-discrimination law, and consequently for affirmative action, are enshrined in the 
decree that ‘all men are created equal’314 and as such are guaranteed the equal protection 
of the law.315  From this basis of formal equality the move towards legalised affirmative 
action has always sat uncomfortably between the legislative documents and the demands 
of the related popular social movement and throughout its development the US has 
struggled to apply constitutional documents drafted for one purpose to achieve another 
resulting in a ‘constitutional analysis [that] is not based on reason, logic, facts or even 
history’.316  US affirmative action therefore embodies a conflict between the aspirational 
notion of equality and the reality of its development which has led to an apparent 
mismatch between the Constitution and the various Executive Orders requiring 
differential treatment between people on the basis of their membership of a protected 
group.  Aside from Executive Orders the specific legal basis for affirmative action is 
vague and this has afforded an important role in determining the shape of the legal 
development of affirmative action to the courts.  In this way the courts have had an 
 
310 Council Directive 2004/113/EC, art. 6, requiring equal treatment between men and women in the access 
to and supply of goods and services, [2004] OJ L373/37, incorporated into UK law by the Sex 
Discrimination (Amendment of Legislation) Regulations 2008. 
311 Equal Treatment Directive 2006/54/EC, art. 2(8) incorporated into UK law by the Employment Equality 
(Sex Discrimination) Regulations 2005. 
312 Equality Act 2010, ss. 148 and 158 – 159. 
313 Government Equalities Office, A Fairer Future.  The Equality Bill and Other Action to Make Equality a 
Reality, (April 2009), p. 7. See also: Government Equalities Office, Equality Bill: Making it Work. Policy 
Proposals for Specific Duties.  A Consultation, (June 2009), p. 4. 
314 Declaration of Independence written by Thomas Jefferson in 1776. 
315 U.S. Constitution, Amendment 14 (1).  See also Civil Right Act 1866. 
316 S. Reinhardt, ‘Remarks at UCLA Law School Forum on Affirmative Action: Where have you gone, 
Jackie Robinson?’, 43 UCLA Law Review, (1995 – 6), p. 1731. 
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important role in setting and interpreting the limits of affirmative action each time a 
particular policy is subjected to judicial review.  This has allowed it, at various times to 
fashion affirmative action to fit strictly determined, even predominantly majority-
benefitting parameters,317 as well as rare instances of enlightened creativity in developing 
the scope of permissible action.318 
A further influence on the legal development of affirmative and positive action is the 
divergent constitutional traditions within each country. 319   Unlike the US the UK is 
unhindered by the need to reconcile contemporary legal developments with a static 
constitutional document written for very different purposes to those of affirmative action 
legislators.  The potential for a written constitution to influence the evolution of a legal 
system is illustrated by US claims and counter-claims regarding constitutional 
interpretations which have pervaded much of the modern discourse concerning 
affirmative action.320  In contrast the UK’s lack of a written constitution and system of 
conventions means that the law can be adapted to fit in with parliamentary preferences 
and priorities.321  One of the risks inherent in reliance on an unwritten constitution is that 
the flexibility of Parliamentary conventions makes them susceptible to the changing 
agendas of successive governments.  Consequently ‘any new House of Commons can 
despotically and finally resolve a policy matter,’ including that of positive action. 322   
However, the absence of either the political or popular will for such decisive action, 
together with the influence of European legislative development, has prevented this from 
becoming the fate of UK positive action.  To the extent that UK positive action law is 
governed by written constitutional documents, through the applicability of European 
legislation and directives, these ordinances constitute less of a barrier to the progress of 
positive action than the US Constitution because they have been informed by the more 
 
317 See, for example, the cases of Missouri v Jenkins 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995), Board of Education of 
Oklahoma v Dowell et al. 498 US 237 (1991), Milliken v Bradely 418 US 717 (1974), Knight v Nassau 
County Civil Services Commission 454 US 818 (1981) and Wittmer v Peters 515 US 1111 (1997). 
318 See, for example, the cases of Grutter v Bollinger, op. cit., Fullilove v Klutznik 448 US 448 (1980) and 
Metro Broadcasting v Federal Communications Commission, op. cit. 
319 Christopher McCrudden suggests that the UK and US exemplify the two main approaches which 
dominate constitution building, with Britain utilizing the pragmatic empiricist approach, whilst the US 
follows a constitutional idealist approach.  See C. McCrudden, ‘Northern Ireland and the British 
Constitution’ in J. Jowell and D. Oliver, The Changing Constitution, op. cit., pp. 323 – 375. 
320 See A. Kelly, ‘The School Desegregation Case’, in J. Garraty (ed), Quarrels that have Shaped the 
Constitution, (Harper and Row, New York, 1987), pp. 307 – 334. 
321 There is significant discourse which argues that the UK is moving towards a written constitution, though 
this debate is outside the scope of this thesis.  For further consideration see, for example, V. Bogdanor, The 
New British Constitution, (Hart Publishing, London, 2009). 
322 W. Bagehot, The English Constitution, (1st edn. 1873), (rev. edn. Cosimo Books, New York, 2007), pp. 
130 – 175. 
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enlightened modern-day views on the achievement and meaning of equality.  In addition, 
the widespread understanding and approval of the positive action requirements of the 
European Treaty has removed significant scope for arguments, of the type that clutter the 
US affirmative action debate, concerning its legality and which solidify the different 
impact of each country’s legislative framework on the development of affirmative action.   
4.2 The Development of Affirmative Action as a Political Tool 
 
As well as the differing impact of US and UK legal structures on the development of 
positive action it has also been affected by political forces in each country.  Indeed, 
positive action has at times more easily fitted within matters of politics than within the set 
of fundamental human rights.323  Affirmative action has been used as a political tool in 
two key ways: firstly as a campaigning tool, by which affirmative action policies are 
promoted as a means of attracting voters; and secondly as a policy tool, by which the 
electorate’s choice of candidate or voting district is changed to fulfil positive action 
aspirations.  For example, the US has explicitly used affirmative action to amend voting 
districts and as a means of rallying popular political support so that while ‘[i]n the mid-
1950s overt racial discrimination was widespread and often unapologetic by the mid-
1970s anyone who would not publicly condemn racial discrimination was outside the 
boundary of acceptable political debate’.324   In the UK, the use of positive action as a 
policy tool has predominantly been limited to the selection of candidates for 
parliamentary positions,325 whilst the ‘scant support’ traditionally afforded to positive 
action has limited its significance as a campaigning tool.326  Therefore, both countries 
have used positive action as a political tool, but there have been significant differences in 
the nature and outcome of these uses, which will be explored in below.   
 
4.2.1 The Role of Political Personnel 
 
Part of the overarching influence of politics on the development of affirmative action, 
both in the US and UK, has been through the role of the changing characters and priorities 
of individual political protagonists, which have served to differentiate affirmative action 
 
323 S. Fredman, Human Rights Transformed, op. cit., p. 66. 
324 D. Strauss, ‘The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical 
Standards’, Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. 79 (1991) pp. 1619 – 1657, p. 1619. 
325 For example through legislation intended to achieve more gender-representative electoral shortlists, Sex 
Discrimination (Election Candidates) Act 2002 (c. 2). 
326 A. McColgan, Discrimination Law: Text, Cases, Law, (2nd ed. Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2005), p. 131. 
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in the two countries. US politicians have gained political capital from variously defending 
and rejecting affirmative action and this use of affirmative action as an overtly political 
tool has meant that it has been promoted when the political consensus supports this but 
sidelined, and even actively criticised, when popular sentiment changes.327  The approach 
of UK politicians has been more muted so that positive action has largely remained at the 
margins of British political thinking, although this has changed where economic 
developments have converged with the demands of equality campaigners. 328   These 
differences will be explored further in the following paragraphs. 
 
4.2.1.1 Political Personalities within US Affirmative Action 
 
It is arguably one of the greatest ironies within US affirmative action that it owes much of 
its liberal and explicitly race-based character to a Republican President who otherwise 
focused his political campaigning on appealing to the socially conservative South.329   
Although it was not anticipated that Richard Nixon’s election would mark any substantive 
development of affirmative action he helped to popularise affirmative action and also 
defended it in Congress.  In addition, through Executive Order 11478, Nixon created the 
mechanisms that enabled its widespread implementation and enforcement, including the 
establishment of the Equal Opportunities Commission.330  Nixon’s actions bolstered the 
efforts of the Department of Labor to address workplace underrepresentation of minority 
workers,331 following the publication of statistical evidence showing the extent of such 
under-representation in six key trades.332  It is easy to argue that Nixon’s efforts failed to 
make significant inroads into the white hegemony within the skilled construction trades 
but his actions gave affirmative action a heightened sense of direction and political 
prioritisation as well as making strategic political sense in light of threatened racial 
violence and Nixon’s own narrow presidential victories.333  Kevin Yuill has similarly 
argued that Nixon used affirmative action to attract the support of minorities hoping to 
 
327 N. MacLean, Freedom is Not Enough, op. cit., pp. 300 – 332. 
328 C. McCrudden, Racial Discrimination, op. cit., p. 439. 
329 J. Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action, op. cit., p. 177. 
330 Executive Order 11478, s. 4, as amended in 1987 by the Executive Order 12106, in 1998 by Executive 
Order 13087, and in 2000 by Executive Order 13152. 
331 Through the implementation of the Philadelphia Plan. 
332 The trades surveyed were: ironworkers, pipe fitters, steam fitters, sheet-metal workers and electrical 
workers.  Code of Federal Regulations, Title 41, chapters 1–100, ‘Public Contracts and Property 
Management.’ July 1, 2000. Chapter 60, Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, Equal 
Employment Opportunity, Department of Labor. (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 
2000). 
333 J. Skrentny, The Ironies of Affirmative Action, op. cit., pp. 175 – 182.  
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benefit from the preferences before utilising it to divide black communities and capitalise 
upon the feeling of injustice amongst poor white voters once the effects of the economic 
downturn began to be felt.334  By appealing to “you, the great silent majority of my fellow 
Americans” Nixon explicitly sought renewed support from non-protesting white 
Americans. 335   These calculated actions echoed President Roosevelt’s earlier use of 
affirmative action, for example through Executive Order 8802, to quell public unrest 
including a threatened march on Washington, during the Second World War.336   
 
Political use of affirmative action has been repeated by a succession of US presidents and 
politicians, Republican and Democrat alike.337  It is therefore clear that the development 
of US affirmative action has been influenced by the political need to gain support from 
minorities and other marginalised social groups whilst ensuring that this is not at the 
expense of majority commitment.  Consequently, majority economic interests and 
concerns have consistently usurped those of minorities.338  For example, although Bill 
Clinton openly supported affirmative action principles and measures, stating that ‘[t]he 
purpose of affirmative action is to give our nation a way to finally address the systematic 
exclusion of individuals of talent on the basis of their gender or race from opportunities to 
develop, perform, achieve, and contribute’,339 he decreased active promotion of minority 
interests during the economic downturn of the early 1990s.340   The ease with which 
affirmative action is demoted in the political agenda illustrates the extent to which within 
ordinary politics it has been normalised as a subject of constant presence but of varying 
importance, which might derive from either support for, or criticism of, affirmative action 
policies, within the US.341   
 
334 K. Yuill, Richard Nixon and the Rise of Affirmative Action.  The Pursuit of Racial Equality in an Era of 
Limits, (Rowman and Littlefield, Maryland, 2007), pp. 224 – 229. 
335 Richard Nixon, ‘Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam, 3rd November 1969’, (Public Papers of 
the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969), pp. 901 – 909. 
336 See Executive Order 8802 and N. Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination. Ethnic Inequality and Public 
Policy, (Basic Books, Inc., New York, 1975), p. 169. 
337 For example see the description of Ronald Regan’s use of affirmative action as a political tool in B.K. 
Landsberg, Enforcing Civil Rights.  Race Discrimination and the Department of Justice, (University Press 
of Kansas, Kansas, 1997), p. 147.  
338 See J.E. Podair, The Strike that Changed New York, (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 
2002), p. 193 and more generally see pp. 192 – 200 and pp. 206 – 214. 
339 Bill Clinton, Remarks by the President on Affirmative Action, (Office of the Press Secretary, The White 
House, The Rotunda National Archives, 19th July 1995). 
340 See W.L. Taylor, and S.M. Liss, ‘Affirmative Action in the 1990s: Staying the Course’, The Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (1992), 523, pp.  30 – 37. 
341 However, the election of President Obama has been cited as an event that could lead to progress in the 
attainment of racial equality, although it being too early to draw such a concrete conclusion.  See. A.M. 
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4.2.1.2 Political Personalities within UK Positive Action 
 
The fundamental difference in the role of US and UK political personalities in shaping 
affirmative action is the extent and nature of their involvement, as opposed to the simple 
fact of their involvement, with much more explicit political wrangling over affirmative 
action in the US than in the UK.  In support of this analysis it has been suggested that the 
UK political interest in fostering a ‘general rights consciousness’ has long been 
limited, 342  and that matters concerning positive action and non-discrimination have 
consistently been of a low political priority.  However, although the long-term explicit 
party-political use of affirmative action is not so evident in the UK as in the US the 
pattern of its use does show variation between different governments, while overall its 
prominence has been increasing with the importance of equality and positive action 
measures being given a more visible role within government policy and rhetoric.   
 
The question of measures to achieve racial equality emerged during a period of political 
consensus concerning anti-discrimination law, from 1965 until the mid-1970s, and was 
adopted as a policy of all the main political parties.343  However, between 1979 and 1997 
the Conservative government was openly hostile to a number of positive action-type 
policies, in particular the use of contract compliance policies under which government 
contractors were required to institute fair wages and promote freedom of association as a 
condition of their contracts.  In 1983, for example, the Conservative government repealed 
the Fair Wages Resolutions and incorporated provisions into the Local Government Act 
1988 to ‘prevent abuse of the contractual process’.344  The political disinclination to use 
positive action in connection with government contracts was continued by the Labour 
government through the requirement that employment practices of potential contractors 
could only to be taken into account in awarding contracts if their actions directly related 
to the provision of the relevant services and if they could form part of the ‘best value’ 
 
Kupenda, ‘The Obama Election and a Blacker America: Lawfully Creating Tension for Change’ 1 Faulkner 
Law Review 187 (2009-10). 
342 C. McCrudden and G. Chambers (eds.), Individual Rights and the Law in Britain, op. cit., p. 8. 
343 I. Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities: Race, Politics and Migration in the United States, 1900 – 1930 
and Britain, 1948 - 68, (Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, London, 1973), pp. 
125 – 126. 
344 Nicholas Ridley, Secretary of State for the Environment, Official Report Hansard HC Debs, vol 119, col 
86 (6 July 1987). 
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drive. 345   These developments reveal that whilst positive action has been subject to 
varying prioritisation by different political parties it has been subject and subordinate to 
the consistent prioritisation of economic concerns, which have trumped aspirations 
relating to social justice.  Arguing along these lines Joni Lovenduski has suggested that 
the succession of ‘Conservative governments…succeeded in replacing a political 
discourse which could accommodate social justice with one which emphasized market 
forces and therefore could not’.346  Bringing this argument up to date Colm O’Cinneide 
has concluded more generally that ‘successive governments have…set their face against 
the use of preferential treatment’.347  The lack of governmental interest in positive action 
is also suggested by the fact that the major legislative provisions have remained in place 
since the 1970s and remained largely unchanged, until the changes instigated by the 
Equality Acts of 2006 and 2010.   
 
The relative lack of political interest in UK positive action, as compared to the significant 
political mileage that has been gained out of US affirmative action both by its critics and 
supporters, has however been slowly changing as a result of development of the increased 
‘mainstreaming’348 of equality issues and rights-based legislative developments such as 
the Human Rights Act 1998.349  Mainstreaming, in relation to gender-based policies, has 
been defined as ‘the systematic integration of the respective priorities and needs of 
women and men in all policies … with a view to promoting equality between women and 
men and mobilising all general policies and measures specifically for the purpose of 
achieving equality by actively and openly taking into account, at the planning stage, their 
effects on the respective situation of women and men in implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation’350 and has emerged in response to political demands for more measures to 
achieve substantive equality from across Europe.351  In particular mainstreaming has been 
associated with the relative openness of the EU equality regime to the involvement of 
 
345 Local Government Best Value (Exclusion of Non-Commercial Considerations) Order 2001 SI 2001/99. 
346 J. Lovenduski, ‘Implementing Equal Opportunities in the 1980s: An Overview’, Public Administration 1, 
(1989), 67. 
347 C. O’Cinneide, ‘Fumbling towards Coherence’, op. cit., p. 98. 
348 The principle of gender mainstreaming was launched at the UN Conference on women in Beijing in 
1995and was adopted as part of the UK’s gender policy in 1998.  See Cabinet Office, Policy Appraisal for 
Equal Treatment Guidelines, (1998).   
349 See J. Shaw, Mainstreaming Equality in European Union Law and Policymaking, (European Network 
Against Racism, Brussels, 2004). 
350 Communication from the Commission, Incorporating Equal Opportunities for Women and Men into all 
Community Policies and Activities, COM(96)67, p. 2 
351 See M.A. Pollack and E. Hafner-Burton, ‘Mainstreaming Gender in the European Union’, 7 Journal of 
European Public Policy (2000) 432. 
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campaigners and non-governmental organisations, both from the UK and elsewhere 
within Europe.352  In the UK the New Labour Government made a number of policy 
initiatives mainstreaming equality,353 and thereby raised it up the political agenda.354  In 
particular, in Northern Ireland the political search for an end to dispute between Catholics 
and Protestants has been attributed with centralizing the importance of equality and 
human rights.355  Even amid these developments, however, the nature of the political 
response to positive action in the UK is in stark contrast to the emotive and oscillating 
attitude of US political forces to affirmative action.  The UK’s political commitment to 
positive action has also been brought into renewed question by the possibility that 
following the formation of a Liberal Democrat/ Conservative coalition government some 
of the provisions of the Equality Act 2010 will be ‘watered down’ to the extent that they 
are rendered ‘toothless’. 356   The different use of affirmative action by political 
personalities in the US and UK therefore largely remains. 
 
4.2.2 The Role of Affirmative Action in the Development of Political Structures 
 
In both the US and the UK the elimination of racial and gender barriers to voting and 
voter registration has allowed minorities and women to achieve de jure political equality.  
Despite this, both groups have continued to be numerically underrepresented in national 
and local legislative bodies357 and both the US and the UK have looked to affirmative 
action to provide a way to remedy this situation.  However, as will be shown below, the 
two countries’ use of affirmative action to reform political structures differ with the US 
concentrating on altering voting districts in pursuance of its affirmative action goals and 
the UK using gender-based electoral short-lists.   
 
4.2.2.1 The Role of Affirmative Action in the Development of US Political Structures  
 
 
352 See C. Hoskyns, Integrating Gender; Women, Law and Politics in the EU, (Verso, London, 1996). 
353 See J. Squires and M. Wickham-Jones, ‘New Labour, Gender Mainstreaming and the Women and 
Equality Unit’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol 6 (2004), pp. 81 – 98 who 
considered the work of the Women and Equality Unit as having exemplified New Labour’s approach to 
gender mainstreaming. 
354  E. Breitenbach et al (eds.), The Changing Politics of Gender Equality in Britain (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 
2002). 
355 C. McCrudden, ‘Mainstreaming Equality in the Governance of Northern Ireland’ 22 Fordham 
International Law Journal 1696 (1998 – 9), p. 1698. 
356 A. Hill, ‘Equality Law Rendered “toothless” by Coalition Review’, The Guardian, 30 September 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2010/sep/30/equality-law-gender-pay-gap.  Accessed 30.09.10. 
357  See appendix 1 and appendix 5.   
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In the US the implementation of structural changes to the voting system has been 
promoted as ‘the most precisely tailored and least drastic means of implementing the 
political inclusion principle’. 358   In addition the historic impact of discrimination on 
electoral districts has meant that these can perpetuate continuing de facto discrimination, 
the presence of which may be suggested by the continuing underrepresentation of women 
and minorities in both Congress and the House of Representatives.359  Despite this use of 
affirmative action to create fair representation by engineering voting districts US courts 
have delivered inconsistent judicial conclusions regarding its legality and these have 
prevented significant development of affirmative action in this area.360  In the case of 
Shaw v Reno, for example, the Court found that the creation of a majority-black 
congressional district was ‘bizarre’ and ‘unexplainable on grounds other than race’.361  
The Court consequently held that this was unlawful stating also that the practice of 
district manipulation bore an ‘uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid’ 
irrespective of its positive aims.362   This case supported an earlier court decision which 
held that the Constitution ‘does not entail the right to have a Negro candidate elected’, 
even though the existing electoral scheme meant that despite one third of the population 
being African American they were consistently represented by an all-white commission 
and white mayor.363   The judgments in Shaw and Bolden do not, however, reveal the full 
judicial picture of the US’ use of affirmative action to promote minority political 
representation because the courts have not uniformly disapproved of the revision of voter 
districts to increase minority representation.  However, even amid judicial approval of 
schemes, they have been subject to stringent conditions. 
 
The case of Thornburg v Gingles is an example of how judicial support for affirmative 
action has in reality not allowed the use of such measures, because the court has imposed 
restrictive conditions on the permissibility of affirmative action to alter political 
structure.364  In this case, African American voters successfully challenged one single-
member district and six multi-member districts claiming that they violated the Voting 
 
358 ‘Note on Affirmative Action and Electoral Reform’, Vol. 90 Yale Law Journal 1811 (1980 – 1981), pp. 
1811 – 1812. 
359 See appendix 5, tables 3 and 4. 
360 See R. Sander, ‘Reconsidering Shaw: The Miranda of Race-Conscious Districting’, The Yale Law 
Journal (2000), 109.3, pp. 1603 – 1637. 
361 Shaw v Reno 113 S Ct. 2816, 2833 (1993) at 2825. 
362 ibid at 2827. 
363 City of Mobile v Bolden 446 US 55 (1980) at 65. 
364 Thornburg v Gingles 478 US 30 (1986). 
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Rights Act by effectively impairing their ability to elect candidates of their choice.365  
However, in the judgment Justice Brennan articulated three demanding preconditions for 
establishing a minority vote dilution claim, that: the minority group needs to be 
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single member 
district; the minority group must politically cohesive; and whites must vote as a bloc often 
enough that the minority’s candidate usually loses. 366   While the answer to these 
questions inevitably varies according to the particular context, like all judicial decisions, 
they represent a high level to fulfil, and have increased the level of ‘racial reification and 
rigidity’ within district restructuring cases.367  Such cases have discouraged minorities 
from challenging apparently unfair practices, for fear that even if the court accepts that 
affirmative action could in theory be applied to remedy the situation, the circumstances 
allowing for its operation would be so unattainable that the judgment would be 
deleterious for future affirmative action use.368 
 
4.2.2.2 The Use of Positive Action in the Development of UK Political Structures  
 
In contrast to the US’ use of affirmative action to alter electoral areas the UK has used 
positive action to restrict voters’ choice of candidates through the use of all-women 
electoral shortlists, 369  a development which marked the recognition amongst many 
feminist groups that institutional representation was important in securing equality.370  
The UK has adopted this form of action relatively recently, compared to other European 
countries, with the Labour party first using all-women shortlists in 1993.371  However, 
despite an unprecedented number of female Members of Parliament having been returned 
after the 1997 election this form of action was challenged and declared to be unlawful 
discrimination, contrary to the SDA.372  This judgment is interesting because the court 
 
365 ibid, at 34 citing the Voting Rights Act 1965, s. 2. 
366 ibid, at 49 – 51. 
367 R.F. Moran, ‘Rethinking Race, Equality and Liberty: The Unfulfilled Promise of Parents Involved’ 69 
Ohio State L.J. 1321 (2008), p. 1477.  Most recently the court has only upheld unlawful redistricting claims 
in relation to intentional minority-vote dilution, as opposed to supporting redistricting for affirmative action 
purposes.  See League of Latin American Citizens v Perry 548 US 399 (2006). 
368 Even where minorities have challenged discriminatory practices the risk of an unfavorable judgment, 
even if supportive of affirmative action, has been attributed to the likelihood of claims settling out of court.  
See for example Taxman v. Piscataway Township Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547 (3d. Cir. 1996). 
369 See SDA, s. 49(1), as superseded by Equality Act 2010, ss. 104 – 106.   
370 J. Lovenduski, Feminizing Politics, (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2005). 
371 M. Russell and C. O’Cinneide, ‘Positive Action to Promote Women in politics: Some European 
Comparisons’, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 3 (July 2003), pp. 587 – 
614, p. 590. 
372 Jepson and Dyas-Elliot v The Labour Party [1996] IRLR 116 ET. 
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failed to consider any significant arguments concerning the legitimacy or importance of 
positive action and simply applied the test for direct discrimination, which was, 
unsurprisingly, found.373  The controversy surrounding this form of positive action has 
continued to fuel political opposition to its use amidst arguments of tokenism and 
unlawful quotas.  For example, the former Conservative Member of Parliament Anne 
Widdicombe stated whilst in office that the suffragettes themselves ‘would have thrown 
themselves under the King’s horse to protest against positive discrimination and all-
women shortlists’.374  Despite the controversial nature of all-women shortlists within the 
UK the European Commission has itself adopted a Council recommendation which aims 
to promote a more balanced participation of women in decision-making bodies of all 
kinds, demonstrating the perceived importance of this form of positive action within the 
Community.375  Such measures may have been a factor in all-women shortlists being 
reinstated as lawful positive action, and under the Equality Act 2010 being made 
permissible until 2030.376    
 
Regardless of this reversal in attitude, however, the underrepresentation of women and 
ethnic minorities in politics is a persistent trend within the UK.377  Examples of this 
underrepresentation include that following the 2010 election the number of women in the 
Commons increased to the record level of 143, but despite this improvement women only 
make-up 22 per cent of the House.378  According to the 2001 census figures women make 
up 51.3 per cent of the UK population379 meaning that a representative number of female 
MPs would have been 338, a number more than double that of the present female 
contingent.  A similar pattern of underrepresentation of ethnic minorities amongst UK 
MPs is also clear.  Even after the most recent elections only 27 non-white politicians were 
returned, representing 4.2 per cent of House of Commons members, 380  whilst a 
representative figure would have required 52 non-white members.381     
 
 
373 ibid, at 117. 
374 Anne Widdicombe, House of Commons Debate, 7 May 2008, para 895, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk.  Accessed 14.07.08.  
375 Council Recommendation 694/96 EC on the balanced participation of women and men in the decision-
making process (OJ L319, 10 December 1996, P. 0011-0015). 
376  Equality Act 2010 ss. 104(1), 104(2) and 105(2). 
377 See appendix 5, table 1. 
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379 See appendix 1, table 1. 
380 See appendix 5, table 2. 
381 B. Smith, Ethnic Minorities in Politics, Government and Public Life, (House of Commons Library, 
November 2008). 
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Both the US and UK have used politically-based affirmative action to tackle the under 
representation of women and minorities in politics but have done so in different ways.  
This reemphasises once again that there are both similarities and differences between US 
and UK affirmative action law.  It is interesting to consider, however, why the use of 
positive action to manipulate political structures has met with political opposition in both 
countries, and maybe hints at the existence of a similar conservatism marking US and UK 
political use of affirmative action.  However, the impact of this similar reluctance to 
support the political use of affirmative action has differed in each country because of 
other distinguishing factors in the use and nature of positive action measures, including 
the differing level to which the judiciary has influenced positive action development, as 
will be considered below. 
 
4.3 The Impact of the Judiciary on the Development of Affirmative Action  
 
The role of the judiciary in the development of affirmative action in the US and UK has 
served to compound the differences between this area of law in the two countries.  The 
extremely emotive and socially important nature of the subject in the US has afforded the 
courts a key formative role in the development of the law.  This role has been mainly 
characterised by US judicial reluctance to rule on issues surrounding positive duties 
resulting from a sense of a lack of judicial legitimacy for making such rulings382 and 
judicial hostility where such issues do come before the courts because the ‘judges, who 
are mostly white, reflect many of the attitudes of other whites’ including a cynicism 
towards colour-conscious laws.383  In the UK, by contrast, positive action has attracted 
relatively little domestic judicial consideration because of the extremely limited 
parameters for positive action within UK law.  Therefore, the judicial influence on UK 
positive action has been predominantly that of the ECJ which has interpreted the 
European parameters of positive action within which UK action exists.  The nature of 
each country’s judicial influence, together with their changing personnel and political 
biases, has also differentiated the development of affirmative action in the US and UK.  
These differences and their impact on affirmative action will be considered below.  
 
 
 
382 San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez 411 US 959, 93 S Ct 1302. 
383 K. Holt and B.W.H. George (eds), Race, Culture, Psychology and Law, (Sage Publications, Inc, London, 
2005), p. 82. 
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4.3.1 The Role of the Judiciary in US Affirmative Action 
 
Whilst the US courts have fleetingly styled themselves as a protective force for 
affirmative action, nurturing and promoting it in its more liberal deliberations,384 such 
examples are most notable as exceptions to the general trend of judicial opinion which 
has increasingly insisted that affirmative action must find social and political acceptance 
without its paternalism. 385   The judicial inclination towards conservatism has 
consequently contributed to the erratic manner in which US affirmative action has 
developed with liberal progress frequently followed by a rapid retreat amid a conservative 
backlash.  The impact of the judiciary on the development of US affirmative action and 
its attempts to reconcile its conservative nature with its early protectionist instinct is 
exemplified by three Supreme Court rulings between 1978 and 1980: Regents of the 
University of California v Bakke, United Steelworkers of America v Weber and Fullilove v 
Klutznik.386  These cases enabled the court to uphold affirmative action plans in a number 
of different contexts and to explore the question of whether the Equal Protection Clause 
of the 14th Amendment could be used to advance the welfare of one class of individuals 
for compelling social reasons, even when that advancement may infringe the life or 
liberty of another. 387   However, the cases attracted significant popular criticism, 
particularly from some members of the white majority who claimed that the ‘reverse 
discrimination’ under consideration was directly contradictory to the 14th Amendment 
right that ‘no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and 
immunities of citizens of the US; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of law’. 388    The opposition shows that even rare instances of judicial 
liberalism have been impeded by popular hostility towards positive measures.  The 
judicial hesitancy in supporting affirmative action that has been a feature of such policies 
 
384 For example in Brown v Board of Education 347 US 483 (1954). 
385 See J.H. Wilkinson III, From Brown to Bakke: The Supreme Court and School Integration 1954 – 1978, 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979).  See also G. Spann, ‘Pure Politics’ 88 Michigan Law Review 1971 
(1990). 
386 Bakke, op. cit., United Steelworkers of America v Weber, op. cit., and Fullilove v Klutznik, op. cit. 
387Bakke op. cit., at 307 – 316. See also D. Bishop, ‘The Affirmative Action Cases: Bakke, Weber and 
Fullilove’, The Journal of Negro History, vol 67, no 3, (Autumn 1982), pp. 229 – 244 for early 
consideration of the implications of these decisions on affirmative action. 
388 U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, op.cit, s. 1. 
68 
 
m.   
                                                
since their inception also reflects the competing personalities making up the bench and 
their willingness to acquiesce to personal and popular conservatis
 
By the 1990s the personnel of the Supreme Court demonstrated the increasingly polarised 
popular views towards affirmative action, as the liberal bloc, composed of Justices 
Blackmun, Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, gave way to a more unanimously 
conservative outlook within the Court.  This neo-conservatism was most singularly 
personified by Justice Antonin Scalia whose appointment in 1985 signalled the start of the 
move away from the ‘liberal Constitutional interpretation of the ‘Warren era’ to a stricter 
concern with the letter of the law’. 389   Such was the staunch nature of this judicial 
conservatism that Justice Blackmun, in a dissenting judgment, opined that ‘[o]ne wonders 
whether the majority still believes that race discrimination, more accurately, race 
discrimination against non-whites is a problem in our society, or even remembers that it 
ever was’.390  The importance of the views of individual members of the judiciary is most 
clearly shown in the adjoining cases of Gratz and Grutter.391  In these cases the court’s 
wavering decision swung on the opinion of a single judge – Justice O’Connor – who 
supported the affirmative action policy in Grutter but ruled that the policy in Gratz was 
unlawful.392   It can therefore be seen that the nature of the US judiciary has had an 
enduring role in controlling the development of affirmative action and its tendency 
towards conservatism has been a consistent and increasing presence.  Consequently, ‘to 
ask them [the judiciary] to produce significant social reform is to forget their history and 
ignore their constraints’.393   
 
4.3.2 The Role of the Judiciary in UK Positive Action 
 
In contrast to the position in the US the UK judiciary has remained relatively uninvolved 
in the development of positive action because it has been confined to such a limited scope 
 
389 P.I. Weizer, The Opinions of Justice Antonin Scalia: The Caustic Conservative, Teaching Texts in Law 
and Politics, Vol 13, (Peter Lang Publishing, New York, 2004). 
390 Ward’s Cove Packing v Antonio 490 U.S. 642 (1989) at 662, Blackmun dissenting. 
391 Gratz v Bollinger, op. cit and Grutter v Bollinger, op. cit. 
392 For further consideration of O’Connor’s rationale behind the two judgments see C. Estland, ‘Putting 
Grutter to Work: Diversity’, 26 Berkeley, U.J. Employment and Labor Law, 3, (2005), p.18. 
393 G.N. Rosenburg, ‘African American Rights after Brown’, Journal of Supreme Court History, 24, pp. 
201 – 225, (1999), p. 221.  See also G.N. Rosenburg, The Hollow Hope: Can Court Bring About Social 
Change?, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1991) and for comment which reaches the converse 
conclusion see E. Chemerinsky, ‘Can Courts Make a Difference?’ in N. Devin and D.M. Douglas, 
Redefining Equality, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998), pp. 191 – 204. 
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of operation,394 and in particular has not operated in relation to recruitment or promotion 
decisions.395  Instead, its involvement in positive action law has been secondary to that of 
the ECJ.396  The ECJ’s case law concerning positive action has, however, been the subject 
of a significant amount of criticism as a result of its cautious approach to allowing 
positive action programmes and failure to explicitly set out the parameters of permissible 
action,397 coupled with its insistence in ruling on questions deemed to be highly context-
dependent.  The case of Griesmar v Ministere de l’Economie, des finances et de 
l’Industrie, for example, demonstrates the ECJ’s inability, or unwillingness, to assess 
Member State rationales behind positive action measures.398   In the case, as well as 
simply applying a straightforward, formal understanding of equality, the Court refused to 
approve Member State discretion in framing policies to fulfil social policy aims, 399  
according to which female civil servants were awarded special pensions credit to 
compensate for time they may have taken off to care for children. 400   The case of 
Abrahamsson also demonstrates the tension between ECJ and Member State views as to 
the parameters of positive action because, while the Swedish authorities considered the 
use of gender as a tie-break criteria inadequate to address female underrepresentation, and 
consequently used it as a ‘value adding’ factor in a person’s qualifications, the ECJ 
rejected this reasoning.401   
 
Criticisms of the role of the ECJ in positive action have concluded that its judgments 
should be restricted to the protection of minorities from negative discrimination. 402   
Daniela Caruso, for example, has argued that in assessing the permissibility of positive 
action national courts are far better equipped than the ECJ particularly in terms of 
balancing equal rights with redistributive policies, as they are able to take into account 
local context, culture and national welfare policies.403  Caruso goes on to argue that ‘the 
 
394 SDA, ss. 47 and 48 and RRA, ss. 37 and 38. 
395 Although this will change following the commencement of Equality Act 2010, s. 159, in April 2011. 
396 The role of the ECJ in the development of UK positive action has been in establishing the parameters 
within which UK law may operate.  However, its role is now even more important because the Equality Act 
2010 incorporates positive action to the full extent permitted by the ECJ, and so gives the ECJ’s decisions a 
role in shaping UK positive action. 
397 As was considered at sections 3.1.2 and 3.2.2 of this thesis. 
398 Griesmar v Ministere de l’Economie des Finances et de l’Industrie, Case C-366/99 [2001] ECR I-9383. 
399 ibid, paras 39 – 46.  
400 ibid, paras 51 – 56. 
401 Abrahamsson, op. cit, para 56. 
402 S. Pager, ‘Strictness and Subsidiarity: An Institutional Perspective on Affirmative action at the European 
Court of Justice’, 26 BC Int’l 7 Comp L. Rev. 35 (2003).  
403 D. Caruso, ‘The Limits of the Classic Method: Positive Action in the European Union after the New 
Equality Directives’, 44 Harvard Int’l Law Journal 331 (2003), p. 343 – 4. 
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variables at stake in local positive action schemes are too complex and too far-reaching, 
to fit comfortably within the scope of the ECJ’s jurisprudence’.404    Such arguments 
conclude that whilst the ECJ may be well-placed to assess the proportionality of some 
national measures affecting, for example, free movement of goods, its competence to 
assess the proportionality of social policy measures, and in particular positive action, is 
more questionable.405  Limiting the ECJ’s role in developing the parameters of positive 
action, and assessing individual schemes, would allow for greater State autonomy in the 
formulation of positive action schemes which would then be assessed by national courts, 
able to closely assess individual needs in light of the background context experienced 
within the Member State.   
 
One cause for possible optimism concerning the ECJ’s impact on the development of 
positive action is that much of its case law has been based on its interpretation of the 
Equal Treatment Directive.406  Now that this has been replaced the ECJ may consider that 
there is a broader scope of admissibility for positive action measures and consequently for 
Member State autonomy in defining positive action schemes.407  However, this will not 
occur if the ECJ continues to monopolise authority to rule on positive action, despite it 
being intrinsically linked to the domestic situation within Member States.   The ECJ’s 
approach contrasts with that of the ECtHR which has stated that the role of the ECHR in 
protecting human rights is subordinate to the role of the national legal system,408 and that 
because Member States are better placed than the international judge to balance 
individual rights and state interests the Court will operate a limited review of the balance 
struck.409    
 
Affirmative action in both the US and UK has, therefore, been significantly influenced by 
its judicial treatment, and in each case the judiciary’s role has been seen to limit the 
parameters of positive action.  However, the reasons behind this similar influence are 
different.  In the US the reactionary stance of the courts towards affirmative action seems 
to be a result of the conservative inclinations of the judiciary and their willingness to 
 
404 ibid, pp. 336 – 7.  
405 G. De Burca, ‘The Principle of Proportionality and its application in EC Law’, 13 Y.B. Eur. L. 111 - 2 
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407 Equal Treatment (Amendment) Directive, art. 2(8). 
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409 See D.J. Harris, M. O’Boyle, and C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention of Human Rights, 
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respond to popular opposition to minority-benefiting policies.  By contrast the UK courts 
have had an extremely limited role in forming UK positive action.  At the same time the 
ECJ’s limiting influence on positive action is arguably attributable to the Court 
adjudicating on matters outside its main area of competence and knowledge and rigid 
adherence to its own limiting precedents.  A further difference between the two countries 
lies in their present ability to move towards a more favourable treatment of positive action 
because while the US continues to oscillate between progressive and regressive decisions, 
and has consequently failed to make any steady progress in mainstreaming affirmative 
action, the ECJ may be more able to accommodate a wider range of positive action 
programmes, as a result of its gradually broadening understanding of equality which has 
now been incorporated into UK law.410 
 
4.4 The Role of Society in the Development of Affirmative Action 
 
In both the US and UK the development of affirmative action policies has been heavily 
affected by the shifting political power of different social groups and the changing 
historical concepts of minorities. 411   Consequently in each country there is a clear 
interaction between affirmative action and social change, with the particular impact that 
social developments have on each country’s equal opportunities programmes reflecting 
the different minority interest groups lobbying government whose support is considered 
to be sufficiently politically important to merit action.  In the US, for example, calls for 
new forms of affirmative action have been increasingly raised by the growing Hispanic 
community on the grounds of social prejudice suffered due to the prevalence of ‘a 
defective culture of broken families, lack of motivation, welfare abuse, and criminal 
subcultures’.412  Conversely, other minority groups have claimed that affirmative action 
measures which include Hispanics are ‘an historical accident for which there is no 
possible justification’ because this group has not faced the historical discrimination 
experienced by African Americans.413   Similarly, the UK has sought to promote the 
interests of newly-protected social groups.  Whilst the growing prominence of new social 
 
410 As discussed previously at section 3.2.2 of this thesis. 
411 A.K. Appiah, ‘Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections’, in A.K. Appiah and A. Guttman 
(eds.), Color Conscious: the Political Morality of Race, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996). 
412 F.L. Pincus, Reverse Discrimination.  Dismantling the Myth, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2003), 
p. 83 and p. 141.  See also appendices 3 and 4 which illustrate the poor relative academic and occupational 
attainment of the US Hispanic population compared to the general population. 
413 L.H. Fuchs, ‘What Do Immigrants Deserve?’ Washington Post, (29th Jan 1995). 
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groups through positive action is similarly evident in both the US and the UK the 
resultant impact on the development of affirmative action is different and affected by the 
distinct social backgrounds in each country, as will be shown in the following paragraphs. 
 
4.4.1 The Social Influences on the Development of US Affirmative Action  
 
US society and race-relations are intrinsically linked, so much so that increasingly race 
and racism are characterised as social constructs. 414   The result of this is that social 
history has been a potent influence on the development of anti-discrimination law and in 
particular the development of affirmative action, which is inextricably linked with slavery 
and the Civil Rights Movement.  Slavery has been influential both in creating a society 
that is highly stratified along racial lines and in the societal attitudes that grew out of the 
slave trade and the wealth it generated.415   These two factors have meant that long after 
slavery was made illegal society’s vested interest, as represented by that of the white 
majority, has been in retaining the social structure through which it had economically, 
socially and politically flourished.  Consequently the US is still dealing with ‘the problem 
of the color-line’.416   
 
Against the unique and pervasive background of slavery and racial segregation the 
importance of US society in the development of affirmative action may be characterised 
as consisting of two key periods of formative influence: the first beginning around 1972, 
and centring on the controversy surrounding gender and racial preferences that arose out 
of the deployment of affirmative action in employment, government contracting and 
education; and the second beginning in the 1990s and continuing to grow until the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in the summer of 2003. 417   The first period of direct 
interaction between equal opportunities, including affirmative action, laws and society 
witnessed the development of a powerful social movement fuelled by legislation and case 
law which acknowledged the need for ‘conscious efforts … to balance any conscious or 
 
414 Although consideration of this is outside the remit of this thesis see, for example, R. Delgado and 
Stefancic, J., Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge, (2nd ed. Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 2001). 
415 As illustrated by the development and continued relevance of the ‘New Negro’, A. Locke (ed.), The New 
Negro: An Interpretation (1925) (rev. edn. Atheneum, New York, 1992). 
416 W.E.B. Du Bois (auth), N. Huggins (ed.), The Souls of Black Folk: Essays and Sketches, (Library of 
America Publishers, New York, 1986), p. 425. 
417 See, T. Anderson, The Pursuit of Fairness: A History of Affirmative Action, (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2004), esp chs 4 and 5. 
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unconscious prejudice on the part of employers’.418   This period of the Civil Rights 
Movement and the events such as the Vietnam War inspired minorities to argue 
collectively for increased equality and opportunity under the 14th Amendment, in 
particular by seeking equal access to education and employment.419  The success of the 
popular movement in developing affirmative action in the US was, however, limited by 
its need for widespread social support.   The impasse caused by the polarity of US societal 
views towards affirmative action is illustrated by the opposition to social change from 
people who felt ‘strongly that they are being asked to bear the burden for old wrongs in 
which they have played no part at all; and in that they see rank injustice’.420   The impact 
of the diverging nature of popular opinion on the development of affirmative action is 
exemplified by the split in attitudes during this period towards the policy of ‘busing’.   
 
From the late 1960s busing was a widely-used response to the right of the Department of 
Justice to withhold funding from school districts maintaining segregation,421  and was 
used to overcome school segregation caused by residential patterns which allowed a 
neighbourhood schooling policy to transform one type of discrimination into another.422  
Critics of busing argued that it contravened both the rights sought by the anti-slavery 
movements and those enshrined in the US Constitution423 and that instead of ensuring the 
rapid desegregation of schools it simply encouraged a rapid ‘white flight’ from public to 
private schools.424  Conversely, supporters of busing advocated it as a means of avoiding 
the negative racial stereotypes perpetuated by segregated schools 425  and assuring all 
 
418 J.A. Baer, Women in US Law: The Struggle toward Equality from the New Deal to the Present (2nd ed. 
Holmes and Meier, New York, 1996), p. 101. 
419 See, for example, S. Curry, Silver Rights, (Algonquin Books of Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1995), 
which recounts the attempts of black parents to place their children in white schools in Mississippi. 
420 A. Williams, ‘Color-Coded Scholarships’, Washington Times, 25th May 1995, at A27.  In this article 
Williams equates minority-only scholarships to ‘reverse Jim Crow laws’.  See also D. D’Souza, Illiberal 
Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus, (MacMillan Inc, New York, 1999), pp. 27 – 28 who 
attributes white opposition to affirmative action to the extent that the white majority felt ‘victimised by the 
machinations of social planners’. 
421 Civil Rights Act 1964, op. cit., title IV. 
422 D.J. Armor, Forced Justice, School Desegregation and the Law, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1995), pp.117 – 153.  
423  N. Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination: Ethnic Inequality and Public Policy, (Basic Books, Inc., New 
York, 1975), p. 119. 
424 J. Coleman, S. Kelly and J. Moore, Trends in School Segregation 1968 – 1973, (The Urban Institute 
Press, Washington, D.C., 1975).  ‘White flight’ refers to the practice of white students withdrawing from 
public schools following the implementation of a policy of busing and moving to private sector education. 
425 Kimberlé Crenshaw, for example, has considered the existence of polarized images of black and white 
individual that perpetuate negative stereotypes regarding racial minorities in which they are viewed as lazy, 
unintelligent, immoral and criminal whilst their white counterparts are seen as industrious, intelligent, moral 
and law-abiding.  K. Crenshaw, ‘Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimization in 
Antidiscrimination Law’ 101 Harvard Law Review 1331 (1988). 
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children the benefits inherent in mixed educational environments.426  The court’s early 
support of busing is illustrated by the cases of Thompson v School Board of Newport 
News in which it upheld a busing policy which required a travelling time of between forty 
minutes and one hour each way427 and in Northcross v Board of Education of Memphis 
City Schools in which the Supreme Court approved a plan for the transportation of 14,000 
children every day.428  The impact of busing on the racial composition of desegregated 
schools has been explored by Welch and Light who drew mixed conclusions as to the 
benefits of such policies but found overwhelming evidence of white flight. 429    The 
conflicting views towards busing typify the divergent societal attitudes to, and influences 
on, affirmative action that have resulted in many discontinuities in its development within 
the US.430  The schism between the beneficiaries and ‘victims’ of affirmative action has 
for some people re-emphasized the dangers inherent in differential treatment which have 
been so apparent in the country’s history, and has consequently split old societal 
alliances.431  Supporters of affirmative action dismiss these arguments as protectionism of 
the status quo which, by virtue of past injustices, enables white males to enjoy a 
privileged social pre-eminence routinely unavailable to minorities and women.   
 
The second period of heightened social influence on affirmative action was dominated by 
arguments concerning the use of race in higher education and the extent to which 
preferences should be the exclusive preserve of African American students.  Stephen 
Thernstron, for example, has pointed out that whilst African American and Latino 
enrolment at Boalt Hall dropped considerably in 1997 for a full view of the growth of 
equal opportunities for minorities this should be seen in the context of a marked increase 
in Asian American enrolment.432  Consequently the nature of the US debate has in part 
become more closely aligned with the UK, which espouses equal action for all protected 
groups, but US legal measures fail to reflect this.  Therefore, fundamental differences 
 
426 See for example K.B. Clark, ‘The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation: A 
Social Science Statement’, presented to the court in Brown, reprinted Minnesota Law Review 37 (1953) 427.  
The stated benefits included improved self-esteem, academic achievement and long-term educational, 
occupational and psychological outcomes, as well as improving race relations. 
427 Thompson v School Board of City of Newport News 498 F. 2d 195 (1974). 
428 Northcross v Board of Education of Memphis City Schools 412 US 427 (1973). 
429 F. Welch and A. Light, New Evidence on School Desegregation, (USCCR, Clearinghouse Publications 
92, Washington D.C, 1987).  The survey covered 125 school districts with enrolments of over 15,000 
students and a racial composition of 10 – 15% African American students.    
430 This split in attitudes, however, is almost entirely consistent across race divisions. See, for example, C. 
Rossell, ‘Black and White Attitudes on School Desegregation Issues’ in N. Devins and D.M. Douglas, 
Equality, op. cit., pp. 120 – 138.  
431 P. Green, The Pursuit of Inequality, (Martin Robertson, Oxford, 1981), p. 166. 
432 S. Thernstron, ‘Farewell to Preferences?’, The Public Interest, (Winter 1998), p. 42.    
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continue to exist between the two countries because the US is unable to escape the 
historical baggage surrounding slavery and systemic discrimination of black Americans 
and its impact on affirmative action developments.   
 
A further illustration of the predominantly hostile popular views of US society towards 
affirmative action is the passage of referenda requiring that affirmative action policies are 
abandoned.  The passage of California’s Proposition 209,433 for example, shows that there 
are significant sections of the US population which are not just apathetic to affirmative 
action but are actively opposed to such preferences, often as a result of prejudice based on 
inaccurate, but widely propounded, stereotypes of minorities.434  Even where individuals 
are not opposed to affirmative action on directly prejudicial grounds the white majority 
seeks to protect its position within society, both at individual and group level, and in so 
doing creates social, political, economic and legal barriers to the advancement of positive 
action.435  Against this background the perceived detrimental impact of affirmative action 
on the white public is both a result of the white resistance to the promotion of equal rights 
and factors in its continuation.436 
 
4.4.2 The Social Influence on the Development of UK Positive Action   
 
The social influences shaping the initial development of positive action in the UK can be 
characterised as progressing along two separate lines, one in relation to racially targeted 
positive action and one relating to gender-focused measures.  However, one important 
characteristic of the social influence on UK positive action is the disparity of emphasis 
between race and gender-based measures, which in part reflects the uneven nature of EU 
action.437  In relation to race-based measures, whilst the UK has had an involvement in 
the slave trade it would be erroneous to see any degree of historical continuity between 
 
433 Proposition 209, op. cit., sought the prohibition of racial preferences in public employment, public 
contracting and in admissions to public education.  It also banned gender preferences, and so may be seen as 
more symptomatic of opposition to preferences per se than continuing racial discrimination, although it still 
illustrates the unwillingness of the white, male hegemony to alter the status quo. 
434 L.M. Baynes, ‘Paradoxes of Racial Stereotypes, Diversity and Past Discrimination in Establishing 
Affirmative Action in FCC Broadcasting Licensing’, 52 Administrative Law Review 979, (2000), p. 985.  
Baynes argues that the disproportionate increase in news coverage of homicides either extends the 
prevailing stereotype to those viewers who are unaware of it, or reinforces the stereotype to those viewers 
who already hold it. 
435 For an example of white protectionist view in academic discourse surrounding affirmative action see B.R. 
Gross, Discrimination in Reverse.  Is Turnabout Fair Play?, (New York University Press, New York, 1978). 
436 L.A. Graglia, Disaster by Decree.  The Supreme Court decisions on Race and the Schools, (Cornell 
University Press, London, 1976), pp. 277 – 278. 
437 C. Hoskyns, Integrating Gender, op. cit, p. 181. 
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legalized slavery in the country and the contemporary development of positive action.  
Instead, racial diversity within the UK is largely a post Second World War 
development.438  This disjunction has contributed to existence of ‘the profoundly different 
contexts of racial disadvantage in the two continents’.439   In the UK the initial motivation 
for race-based anti-discrimination legislation was as a response to immigration so that 
legislation limiting the right to enter the UK was enacted firstly alongside legislation 
prohibiting discrimination against minorities,440 and then legislation which contained the 
UK’s first positive action provisions.441  At a similar time the growth of social interest in 
equality directly influenced the executive’s use of positive action and the British 
government’s use of public contracting to counter race-based discrimination. 442   In 
contrast to the specific motivations for race-based action gender-based positive action was 
a legislative achievement of the convergence of popular calls for greater gender equality 
with European concern about the impact of cheap female labour.443  Consequently, the 
first wave of social debate surrounding the progression from anti-discrimination to 
gender-based positive action in the UK followed its entry into Europe and implementation 
of Europe’s largely economically motivated requirements for equal treatment of both 
genders.444   
 
The second resurgence of the positive action debate in the UK began in the late 1990s and 
marked the culmination of ‘a cultural shift which has taken decades to begin to take 
hold’.445  This more recent surge of interest in equality and positive action links anti-
discrimination law, human rights and social policy goals which target a wide range of 
underrepresented groups, and is exemplified by the scope of the Human Rights Act 1998 
which incorporates the provisions of the ECHR into UK domestic law. 446   Such 
developments illustrate the increased importance being placed on social inclusion, in 
addition to the need to remedy particular types of inequality, arising from particular 
 
438C.  McCrudden, ‘Racial Discrimination’ in C. McCrudden and G. Chambers (eds.), Individual Rights and 
the Law in Britain, op. cit., p. 410. 
439 B. Hepple, ‘The European Legacy of Brown v Board of Education’, 2006 U. Ill. Rev. 605, p. 620. 
440 See Race Relations Act 1965, op. cit. and Race Relations Act 1968, op. cit. 
441 RRA, ss. 37 and 38.   
442 B. Hepple, Race, Jobs and the Law in Britain, (2nd ed. Penguin Books, London, 1970), p. 276.  See also 
section 4.5 below. 
443 See C. Hoskyns, Integrating Gender, op. cit, ch. 2. 
444 EC Treaty, art 141 (previously art. 119). 
445 F. Klug, Value for a Godless Age.  The Story of the United Kingdom’s New Bill of Rights, (Penguin 
Books, London, 2000), p. 48. 
446 One of the implications of this is that domestic legislation is interpreted as far as possible as compatible 
with the ECHR, which means that the Convention requirement of non-discrimination is centralised within 
all domestic legislation. See ECHR, art. 14 and Human Rights Act 1998 (c. 42), s. 3 and sch. 1, art. 14. 
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instances of past discrimination.447  This trend can be seen in the development policy, 
interest groups and activists seeking to promote equality and diversity by advocating the 
benefits of ‘community cohesion’ and ‘strength in diversity’.448  Whilst these initiatives 
did not constitute legally enforceable duties they did seek to create a supportive social 
context which, in turn, helped to create the political good-will upon which the success of 
positive action and other equality-based policies depends.449   
 
Although the social influence on UK positive action arguably demonstrates a greater 
acceptance of the social utility of de facto equality than is present in the US some of the 
wider societal responses to developments in positive action hint at some similarities in the 
context between the US and UK.  Katherine Cox, for example, cites newspaper headlines 
following the handing down of the Marschall decision by the ECJ as revealing a social 
context receptive of criticism of positive action as an unfair and negative development.450  
Cox argues that headlines such as ‘Court allows Jobs for the Girls’451 and ‘Court Strikes 
Blow for Career Women’452 demonstrate the readiness with which relative successes for 
positive action progress are decried as representing a negative development.  The problem 
of an unsupportive social context to the development of positive action is also recognised 
by the UK government in their decision to use the label ‘positive action’ instead of 
‘affirmative action’ because of the hostility these measures had aroused in the US.453  The 
desire to avoid such a response seems to confirm the potential impact of an unsupportive 
social context on the development of affirmative action, and also explains why the UK 
has sought to avoid the divisive measures which have provoked the hostile context within 
which US affirmative action exists.   
 
Where the UK has used more severe forms of positive action, such as in Northern Ireland 
and in tackling institutional racism, it has sought to maintain the largely supportive social 
context by initially targeting such measures at circumstances demonstrating a particular 
and significant need.   The positive action used to tackle racism within the UK police 
 
447 See H. Collins, ‘Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion’ 66(1) MLR (2003), pp. 16 – 43. 
448 See, for example, the diversity-focused aims of publications such as Home Office, ‘Improving 
Opportunity, Strengthening Society’, (2005) and Home Office, ‘Strength in Diversity’ (2004). 
449 G. Mills, ‘Combating Institutional Racism in the Public Sector’ 31 ILJ (2002), pp. 96 – 8. 
450 K. Cox, ‘Positive Action in the European Union: From Kalanke to Marschall’, op. cit. 
451 Financial Times (25 November 1997), quoted in ibid. 
452 Independent (12 November 1997), quoted in ibid. 
453 As stated at section 2.1 of this thesis. 
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force, for example, was a direct response to the findings of the MacPherson Report.454  
The finding of institutional racism was used to implement a stronger positive race 
equality duty on public authorities under the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000.455  
This duty was later expanded to gender under the Equality Act 2006456 and demonstrates 
how the UK has used specific instances of particular public support for positive action as 
a basis from which to expand the remit of legislative provision.  Similarly, whilst the UK 
has used the situation in Northern Ireland as the context for enacting its most sweeping 
positive action provisions, it has subsequently extended these to the Welsh Assembly, 
albeit without the same systematic process for target setting and monitoring, along with 
more limited enforcement.457   Consequently, the UK’s use of less intrusive forms of 
positive action, except where there is a particular acknowledged need, has encouraged a 
more supportive social setting than has existed in the US.  In addition, the absence of a 
painful and recent history of invidious racial discrimination and the need for 
compensatory discrimination to remedy this reinforces the differing nature of social 
influences on the development of US and UK affirmative action and their role in 
maintaining the distinctions between the two sets of legal measures.458   
 
4.5 The Development of Executive-Based Affirmative Action 
 
Differences between the development of US and UK positive active are also present in 
the development of the executive’s use of these policies.  Here, the US has adopted an 
uncharacteristically hard core position regarding this form of action, requiring mandatory 
action to be taken by all public authorities and some private companies involved in 
government contracting. 459   By contrast, the UK has primarily taken a less severe 
approach by encouraging voluntary action within public authorities and withholding 
contracts from person engaging in discrimination in employment.460  Along the same 
lines as this analysis Christopher McCrudden has identified two models of procurement 
 
454 Home Office, ‘Report of the MacPherson Inquiry’, Cm 4262 (24th February 1999). 
455 Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, s. 2.    
456 Equality Act 2006, s. 84.  Once commenced, in April 2011, this duty will be contained in Equality Act 
2010, s. 149.   
457  P. Chaney, A Report Commissioned by the Equality and Human Rights Commission Equal 
Opportunities and Human Rights: The First Decade of Devolution in Wales, (April 2009).  The same 
accusation is made of the expansion of the measures to the Welsh and Greater London Assemblies, in C. 
O’Cinneide, ‘Fumbling towards Coherence’, op. cit., p. 90, fn. 163. 
458 See E. Phillips, ‘A Comparative Study of Compensatory Discrimination - Cautionary Tales for the 
United Kingdom’ in B. Hepple and E.M. Szyszcak (eds), Discrimination: The Limits of Law, op. cit. 
459 Executive Order 11246, of 24th September 1965 (30 Fed. Reg. 12319) reprinted in 42 USC 2000e (1982). 
460 A. Lester and G. Bindman, Race and Law, (Longman, London, 1972), p. 207. 
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regulation used in affirmative action, namely the market access model and the efficient 
procurement model.461  McCrudden observes that the US has primarily used the market 
access model whilst Europe has prioritised the alternative model and the respective 
adoption of each model has had important consequential effects on the operation of this 
area of affirmative action in each country.462  This section will consider how these models 
have characterised the evolution of executive-based affirmative action in the US and UK 
and driven one tranche of the country-specific manifestations of the law. 
 
4.5.1 US Development of Executive-Based Affirmative Action 
 
The convergence, during the Second World War, of the social aspiration of ending 
employment-based discrimination with the economic imperative of achieving this aim 
prompted the executive’s use of government contracting as a key forum for affirmative 
action.463  Consequently, through executive action, as exemplified by Executive Orders 
8802 and 9326, non-discrimination became a mainstream policy and greater social 
reality.464  Even after the Second World War the approach of the Roosevelt government 
to contracting was maintained by successive Presidents and the existence of permanent 
committees, with broad legislative powers, continued to follow Roosevelt’s model of the 
Fair Employment Practices Committees. 465   The executive’s role in promoting non-
discrimination and latterly positive action efforts to increase minority representation in 
government contracting can therefore be seen as an important developmental building-
block within US affirmative action.  Executive-based action is also unique among US 
affirmative action measures because it represents a means of implementing non-
discrimination requirements without the need for statutory authority.  It was, for example, 
the affirmative action requirement within President Johnson’s Executive Order 11246 that 
took it beyond the remit of Title VII. 466   Consequently, a key rationale for the 
development of affirmative action within the executive has been to enable political forces 
 
461 C. McCrudden, Buying Social Justice, op. cit., p. 301.   
462 ibid, see generally chs 6 – 8.   
463 See M.E. Reed, Seedtime for the Modern Civil Rights Movement: the President’s Committee on Fair 
Employment Practice, 1941 – 1946, (Louisiana State University, Louisiana, 1991). 
464 Executive Order 8802 (1941) prohibited discrimination in the employment of workers in the defense 
industries or government because of race, creed, colour, or national origin.  Executive Order No. 9346 
(1943) increased the budget of the Committee to half a million dollars and replaced its part-time staff with 
full-time employees. 
465 By 1965 at least 20 large cities had adopted Fair Employment Practices Committees ordinances.  See J.P. 
Witherspoon, Administrative Implementation of Civil Rights, (University of Texas Press, Texas, 1968). 
466 30 Fed Reg 12319 (24th September 1965). 
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to fulfil economic and social priorities without legislative approval, thereby 
circumventing the influence of judicial conservatism and uncertain constitutional 
provisions. US executive-based affirmative action is highly intertwined with the influence 
of political priorities in driving the development of affirmative action and so this section 
has been kept intentionally short so as not to unnecessarily restate the influences already 
cited concerning the importance of politically inspired affirmative action programmes.  
Nevertheless it is important to appreciate that executive-based action has been a 
consistently important formative basis for the development of US affirmative action. 
 
4.5.2 UK Development of Executive-Based Positive Action 
 
The executive’s use of positive action in the UK can be directly linked to the popular 
demands for equal opportunities in late 1960s Britain and the demographic changes 
resulting from post-colonial immigration. 467   This use was supported by influential 
reports such as the Street Report which recommended that a non-discrimination clause 
should be included in all government contracts.468  The hesitant legislative attempts to 
enact this requirement,469 and its outright rejection in relation to gender,470 illustrate that 
the UK executive’s use of contract compliance to implement meaningful positive action 
provisions has remained limited, weakly enforced and of only peripheral significance.471  
The key exception to this is the role of the executive in promoting and implementing 
affirmative action in Northern Ireland and in recent developments in UK positive action. 
 
The executive’s use of positive action within Northern Ireland has yielded significant 
results in increasing religious diversity within the employment context. 472   The Fair 
Employment Act 1989, for example, imposed executive-based positive duties on 
employers to take measures to achieve fair and representative economic participation of 
Roman Catholic and Protestant employees so that ‘anything lawfully done in pursuance 
 
467 See B. Hepple, Race, Jobs and the Law in Britain, (2nd ed., Penguin Books, London, 1970), p. 276. 
468 H Street et al, Street Report on Anti-Discrimination Legislation, (Political and Economic Planning, 
London, 1967), paras 192 – 194.     
469 Official Report, Hansard HC Vol 788, 22nd October 1969, cols. 296 – 297. 
470 Official Report, Hansard HC Vol. 893, 18th June 1975, cols. 1478 – 1482. 
471 C. McCrudden, Buying Social Justice, op. cit., pp. 301 – 360. 
472 R. Cormack, and R. Osborne, ‘Disadvantage and Discrimination in Northern Ireland’, in R.J. Cormack 
and R.S. Osborne (eds.), Discrimination and Public Policy in Northern Ireland, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1991). 
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of affirmative action’ was within anti-discrimination law. 473   To ensure the 
implementation of these legislative requirements the Equality Commission was permitted 
to make recommendations of affirmative action measures and impose sanctions on 
employers who failed to fulfil their positive duty obligations474 as well as prohibiting 
executive public authorities from entering into contracts with employers who did not 
comply with the positive action provisions.475  Christopher McCrudden, Robert Ford and 
Anthony Heath have explored the link between the development of positive action within 
the executive and the religio-political composition of the employers’ workforces.476  Their 
analysis found that firms reaching agreements with the Commission as to the 
implementation of positive action programmes demonstrated significant evidence of 
improvement in the proportion of minority workers and that the positive action 
requirements were likely to have been integral to the processes driving change in the 
Northern Ireland labour market in the 1990s.477  Having established positive action as an 
acceptable and accepted means of executive action within Northern Ireland the UK 
government has recently sought to broaden its use.   
 
The use of positive action by the UK executive may be set to expand as a result of the 
provisions of the Equality Act 2010 which builds on the public positive action duty in the 
Equality Act 2006.478  Uncommenced sections of the 2010 Act permit the implementation 
of duties on public authorities in relation to their public procurement functions. 479   
Although there is as yet no current experience of the potential scope of these provisions, 
the fact that the government retained the use of executive-led positive action in the Act, 
despite some on-going opposition to these proposals,480 suggests its desire to increase the 
use of measures in this area.481  Such a development could, in turn lead to a greater 
 
473 FETO, art 5(3). 
474 ibid, arts 62 – 66. 
475 ibid, art 64. 
476 C. McCrudden, R. Ford and A. Heath, ‘Legal Regulation of Affirmative Action in Northern Ireland: An 
Empirical Assessment’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2004) 24(3), pp. 363 – 415. 
477 The findings, however, were caveated by the need for further evidence regarding non-monitored firms, 
ibid, p.414. 
478 Equality Act 2006, s. 84. 
479 Equality Act 2010, ss. 153 – 4, and s. 155(3). 
480 For example from David Frost, the Director General of the British Chamber of Commerce and Petra 
Wilton, of the Chartered Management Institute, see R. Prince, ‘Positive Action for Recruitment to be 
Enshrined in Law’, The Telegraph, 3rd December 2008 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/politics/labour/3546305/Positive-action-for-job-recruitment-
to-be-enshrined-in-law.html.  Accessed 23.10.09. 
481 However, some warnings have been stated that such duties may simply be used as a ‘technocratic tool in 
policymaking’ to retain the discriminatory status quo.  See, C. O’Cinneide, ‘Fumbling towards Coherence’, 
op. cit., p. 92. 
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alignment between US and UK policies in this area.  Despite this potential for greater 
coordination fundamental differences between each country’s provisions are likely to 
remain because of the different contexts and legal frameworks within which the measures 
are enacted. 
 
The developmental influences on positive action in the UK and on affirmative action in 
the US have been broad-ranging, and have varied according to legal, political, economic 
and societal context.  The specific nature of the background influences in each country 
has, therefore, led to fundamentally different forms of positive action law developing, 
despite them showing superficial similarities.  The different developmental factors in each 
country have also had an impact upon the uses to which affirmative action has been put, 
as will be explored in the next chapter.  
83 
 
                                                
 
5. The Different Uses of Affirmative Action in the US and UK 
 
This chapter will consider the different uses of positive action and explore how these 
relate to the legal systems and societies out of which they have developed and to the 
principles upon which they are based.  The uses of positive action will be considered in 
conjunction with the various models for action present in the two countries including: the 
relative use of voluntary and mandatory action, exclusionary and opportunity-creating 
measures, and the use of explicitly numerically-focused positive action.  These different 
uses of positive action extend to the permissibility of policies that seek numerical 
outcomes, as well as to the different use of affirmative action either as a means of 
determining a tie-break situation between two equally qualified candidates or as a value-
adding factor for minority applicants, as will be shown in this chapter.   This chapter will, 
however, begin by exploring the different degrees to which affirmative action has been 
used to encourage and train underrepresented individuals as compared to actions to the 
exclusion of non-minority and male individuals, for example through recruitment and 
promotion.   
 
5.1 Exclusionary Uses of Affirmative and Positive Action  
 
The remedial principle behind affirmative action has been important within both the US 
and UK, whether it has been in the context of remedying particular instances of 
discriminatory treatment or overturning general societal prejudice.  Despite this similarity 
country-specific differences mark the uses of affirmative action to compensate victims of 
discrimination as well as the relative ease with which such programmes have been 
implemented and upheld in each country.  One key difference in the compensatory use of 
positive action is the extent to which each country has adopted affirmative action methods 
that result in the exclusion of non-benefited individuals.  US affirmative action has 
included measures which exclude non-minority males, although the impact of this burden 
on affected individuals has meant that these forms of affirmative action have been 
controversial and thus confined to a narrow field of use.482  By contrast, exclusionary 
forms of action have been generally avoided by UK legislation in favour of efforts 
 
482 For example EEOC v US Tel & Tel Co. 556 F. 2d 167 (3rd Cir.) 1977 and United Steelworkers of 
America v Weber, op. cit. 
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intended to increase opportunities for previously excluded groups of society, for example, 
by offering training and using minority-targeted advertising, without directly favouring 
minorities over majority individuals, but this approach may be changing.  These different 
uses of exclusionary affirmative action will be considered below.   
 
5.1.1 US Use of Exclusionary Affirmative Action 
 
Alongside narrow operational justifications for affirmative action in the form of ‘bona 
fide occupational qualification[s]’,483 which are only applicable to essential gender-based 
preferences484 where no less-restrictive or reasonable alternative is available,485 US use of 
exclusionary affirmative action can be identified in the Supreme Court’s judgment in 
United Steelworkers v Weber.486  Weber transformed the Civil Rights Act from ‘what was 
publicly heralded as a statute that prohibits the use of sexual or racial categories into one 
that mandates the use of racial and sexual quotas in hiring, firing and promotion 
decisions’487 and consequently secured the role of exclusionary affirmative action in US 
case law.  Alongside Weber there has been some further judicial support for exclusionary 
affirmative action, for example from Justice Powell, who has argued that such measures 
place only a small burden on the excluded groups and that ‘their [the excluded group’s] 
burden is not so great that the set aside must be disapproved’.488  However, the US Court 
has not consistently supported the use of exclusionary action, particularly when the 
burden placed on the excluded group relates to employment-based recruitment or 
dismissal. 489   In such circumstances exclusionary programmes have been accused of 
effectively ‘impos[ing] the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular 
individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives’.490  In assessing the US use 
of exclusionary affirmative action it is immediately clear that such programmes have only 
been promoted in judicially tailored circumstances designed to prevent ongoing and 
 
483 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964, codified as Subchapter of Chapter 21 of 42 USC ss 2000e. 
484 Dothard v Rawlinson 433 US 321 (1977) 97 S.Ct. 2720. 
485 Automobile Workers v Johnson Controls Inc. 499 US 187 (1991) 111 S.Ct. 1196. 
486 United Steelworkers v Weber, op. cit. 
487  D.F.B. Tucker, The Rehnquist Court and Civil Rights, (Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 
Aldershot, 1995), pp. 191 – 2. 
488 Fullilove v Klutznik op. cit. at 514 – 5. 
489 USCCR, ‘Affirmative Action in the 1980s: Dismantling the Process of Discrimination’, (Clearing House 
Publication 70, Nov 1980) declared that balancing ‘the national interest in eliminating discrimination 
against minorities and women and the interests of individual white men is especially difficult when 
employers lay off worker’, p. 36. 
490 Wygant v Jackson Board of Education op. cit., at 283. 
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future discrimination.491  Through its decisions the US courts have reflected the perceived 
need to balance the national interest in eliminating discrimination against minorities and 
women with the interests of non-minority individuals492 thereby upholding the notion that 
affirmative action programmes are ‘extrinsically morally wrong if their social costs are 
large, relative to the costs of eliminating or frustrating’ the discriminatory treatment.493   
This schism in judicial approach shows how US use of affirmative action is affected by 
conflicting priorities and principles which may be contrasted to the UK’s cautious 
approach to positive action that has enjoyed more consistent judicial and societal approval. 
 
A further characteristic of the US’ use of exclusionary affirmative action is that where 
such decisions are unavoidable, for example in the case of economically required 
redundancies, affirmative measures have been more readily deployed to protect minorities 
who would otherwise disproportionately suffer.494  Thus through its use of exclusionary 
affirmative action the US Court has again expressly balanced the need to ‘break down old 
patterns of … segregation and hierarchy’495 whilst ensuring that the positive action does 
not ‘unnecessarily trammel the interests’ of non-benefited workers in avoidable 
circumstances.496   Despite the controversy around exclusionary affirmative action the 
support shown by the court also illustrates instances of severely punishing past 
discrimination through the awarding of exclusionary remedies in favour of persons who 
are not themselves identifiable victims of discrimination. 497   On such occasions the 
Supreme Court has ruled that ‘a sharing of the burden of the past discrimination is 
presumptively necessary’498 and that the apparent expectations of ‘arguably innocent’ 
white male employees cannot act as a barrier to measures eliminating the present effects 
of past discrimination.499    
 
 
491 For a list of Circuit Court decisions embracing this theory, see R.K. Fullinwider, ‘Achieving Equal 
Opportunity’, pp. 106 – 108 in R.K. Fullinwider and L. Mills (eds.), The Moral Foundations of Civil Rights, 
(Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, 1986), pp. 99 – 114. 
492 Wygant v Jackson Board of Education, op. cit., at 292. 
493 L. Alexander, ‘What makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong?  Biases, Preferences, Stereotypes and 
Proxies’, University of Pennsylvania Law Rev, Vol 141: 149 (1992), p.219. 
494 See Tangren v Wackenhut Services, Inc. 480 F. Supp 539 (D. Nev), (aff’d No. 79 – 3796) (9th Cir. Oct. 5, 
1981) which approved the manipulation of redundancy procedures to protect minority workers. 
495 United Steelworkers v Weber op. cit, at 208, quoted in Johnson v Transport Agency, op. cit., at 628. 
496 ibid at 208. 
497 For example the case of EEOC v US Tel. & Tel. Co. op. cit. 
498 Franks v Bowman Transportation Co. Inc. op. cit. at 777. 
499 ibid at 774. 
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Whilst some judicial support has been shown for unavoidable exclusionary policies the 
US court has been generally more willing to uphold non-exclusionary programmes and 
remedies.  For example, the court has sought to circumvent the displacement of majority 
males by awarding remedial action which provides financial compensation for the victims 
of discrimination, without displacing the present majority incumbent. 500  The use of such 
‘front pay’ remedies has been a means of ‘shifting to the employer the burden of the past 
discrimination’ as opposed to it being wholly borne by employees.501   An additional 
difficulty encountered in the US’ use of exclusionary positive action arises where 
standards that impartially measure skills disqualify more minorities and women than 
white men. 502  The pervasive and cumulative effects of discriminatory processes, for 
example, frequently mean that few minorities and women possess the experience, skills or 
aspirations that certain positions demand.503   US arguments surrounding exclusionary 
affirmative action have also been influenced by the fact that such policies are necessarily 
both under-inclusive and over-inclusive and employers are consequently ‘trapped 
between the competing hazards of liability to minorities if affirmative action is not taken 
to remedy discrimination and liability to non-minorities’ if it is, together with the sense of 
injustice of the rejected white applicants.504  The controversial nature of exclusionary 
affirmative action has been described by the Courts as ‘precisely the sort of government 
action that pits the races against one another, exacerbates racial tension, and provoke[s] 
resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged by the government’s 
use of race’.505  Such views have encouraged the use of non-exclusionary affirmative 
action within the US and confined exclusionary measures to circumstances of 
unavoidable action and uncharacteristic judicial liberalism. 
 
5.1.2 The UK’s Use of Exclusionary Positive Action  
 
Whilst the US’ attempts to use exclusionary affirmative action in a broad range of 
circumstances have been curtailed by popular opposition, UK use of this form of positive 
 
500 For example, in 1980 Ford Motor Company had to pay back pay of $13 million to women and minorities, 
lost as a result of the company’s discriminatory practices,  W. McElroy, ‘Affirmative Action: What does it 
Affirm?, op. cit., pp. 181 – 188. 
501 Franks v Bowman op. cit., at 38. 
502 Griggs v Duke Power Co. 401 US 424 (1971). 
503 International Brotherhood of Teamsters v The United States of America 431 US 329 (1977). 
504 Justice O’Connor in Wygant v Jackson Board of Education, op. cit., at 291.  See also P.G. Polyviou, The 
Equal Protection of the Law, op. cit., p. 361 concerning the impact of exclusionary affirmative action 
policies on white males. 
505 Justice Thomas, Adarand v Peña, op. cit. at 241.  
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action has been confined at the outset by the limited scope for positive action within non-
discrimination legislation.  In fact, prior to the Equality Act 2010, UK legislation had not 
countenanced the use of positive action to make a decision which resulted in the 
exclusion of one individual in favour of another, such as in a recruitment or promotion 
choice, instead restricting action to the provision of training and encouragement.506  The 
narrowness of these clauses meant that even the training that could be offered was limited 
because it was not permitted to lead straight into a job, so that ‘on the job’ training and 
apprenticeships were excluded because they were seen as closing the gap between 
training and appointment too much to constitute permissible positive action. 507   The 
limited scope of these provisions was upheld by the employment tribunal in the case of 
Hughes and others v London Borough of Hackney in which the reservation of three local 
authority employment positions for ethnic minorities was found to constitute unlawful 
discrimination.508   
 
It is from the European framework for positive action, as interpreted by the ECJ, that the 
first use of exclusionary positive action that has been influential in the UK has derived.  
Despite illustrating a narrow construction of permitted exclusionary action the ECJ has 
approved of the use of positive action as a tie-break factor in determining a recruitment or 
promotion decision.509  The position of exclusionary positive action within UK law is 
brought into line with ECJ jurisprudence by the Equality Act 2010 which permits positive 
action at the point of recruitment subject to the preconditions established by European 
case law, namely that both candidates are equally qualified, that there is no blanket policy 
of preferring the underrepresented individual, and that the measures are a proportionate 
means of enabling individuals from the underrepresented group to overcome or minimise 
disadvantage or participate in the relevant activity.510  Although the relevant provision in 
the Equality Act has not yet commenced it reflects the full extent of the permitted use of 
exclusionary positive action advocated by the ECJ, whilst continuing to maintain the 
distinction between the UK’s use of exclusionary positive action, in the event of a tie-
break, and the wider use of exclusionary affirmative action in the US, where it can be a 
 
506 RRA, ss. 37 and 38 and SDA, ss 47 and 48 as amended. 
507 See Commission for Racial Equality, Code of Practice on Racial Equality in Employment (November 
2005), p. 40, para 3.44. 
508 Hughes and others v London Borough of Hackney (unreported) [1986] EAT/1288/99.  See also 
Tottenham Green Under-Fives’ Centre v Marshall (No. 2) [1991] IRLR 162 (EAT). 
509 See, for example, Kalanke, op. cit and Marschall, op. cit. 
510 Equality Act 2010, s. 158. 
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factor in a decision, regardless of the existence of a tie-break situation, subject to the 
fulfilment of specific conditions.511  The different uses of exclusionary positive action in 
the US and UK are demonstrated by the judicial decisions in Johnson and Marschall.512  
In Marschall the ECJ only permitted gender to be used to justify exclusionary positive 
action in the event of a tie-break situation.  By contrast the court in Johnson allowed a 
protected characteristic to be one of a number of factors in making a recruitment or 
promotion decision, irrespective of whether two individuals were considered to be equally 
qualified before the protected characteristic was considered.  The Supreme Court’s 
decision illustrates its apparent unwillingness for a decision to turn decisively upon the 
existence of a protected characteristic, whilst permitting its potential relevance in all 
decisions.  The ECJ by contrast has limited when the protected characteristic can play a 
role in decision-making, but allows it to be decisive, although not automatically so, when 
it is considered.  This distinction in use of exclusionary affirmative action has led to 
commentators holding up Marschall as more beneficial to protected groups than the 
decision in Johnson.513 
 
Where the US and UK in positive action are similar in their use of exclusionary positive 
action is in their rejection of automatic preferences.  This is demonstrated by the decision 
in Marschall which utilised the same line of reasoning as Justice Powell in Bakke in 
which he stressed the need for individual consideration of positive action policies on a 
case by case basis, and the unlawfulness of automatic preferences.514  In addition, two 
areas in which the UK has used exclusionary positive action in ways that is particularly 
similar to the US is in relation to police recruitment, where it has been seen as a potential 
means of meeting government targets for the recruitment and retention of minority and 
female employees, and in Northern Irish measures to achieve the religious integration of 
Protestants and Catholics.515  It is clear, therefore, that the limited use of exclusionary 
action in US and UK has some similar aspects to it, particularly in Northern Ireland, 
 
511 See, for example, Harriet Harman, House of Commons Daily Debates, 11 May 2009, Hansard HC, col 
548 who confirmed that the positive action provisions of the Equality Bill 2009, now the Equality Act 2010, 
did not constitute positive discrimination. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/pahansard.  Accessed 
21.08.10. 
512 Although the Marschall decision is an ECJ judgment this articulates the position under UK law 
following the implementation of the Equality Act 2010, and can therefore be used to compare the US and 
UK position. 
513 See Needham, ‘Leveling the Playing Field – Affirmative action in the European Union: A Comparison 
of Marschall v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen and Johnson v Transportation Agency of County Santa Clara’, 19 
N.Y.L Sch. J. Int’l & Comp L. 479 (1999 – 2000). 
514 Bakke, op. cit., pp. 287 – 320 and Marschall, op. cit., para 33. 
515 See FETO as amended. 
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although this use is treated in terms of exceptionalism as compared to positive action 
elsewhere in the UK.  The fundamental differences however arise in the precise forms of 
use that are made of exclusionary actions, which in turn are attributable to the different 
influences affecting US and UK provisions.   In the US, for example, limitations to the 
use of exclusionary action are promoted by judicial conservatism and popular opposition 
to such measures; whereas, in the UK the restrictive legal framework for positive action 
holds a tighter rein on the use of exclusionary positive action.  The different impacts of 
these influences on the operation of exclusionary action can be seen particularly clearly in 
relation to measures aimed at achieving a pre-determined numerical outcome, which will 
now be considered. 
 
5.2 The Different Approaches to Numerical Affirmative Action 
 
Affirmative action programmes based on numerical considerations can be seen as a 
natural extension of exclusionary affirmative action because both uses require one 
individual to be excluded in favour of another who fulfils the particular statistically-
desired outcome.  Both the US and the UK have employed some form of numerically-
framed positive action measures, but the extent to which each country prioritises the 
achievement of a particular numerical outcome 516  over that of individually assessed 
equality of opportunity differs, as will be shown below. 
 
5.2.1 US Numerical Affirmative Action 
 
The legal basis for US numerical preferences for minority students first came under 
judicial attack in the case of Bakke v The Regents of the University of California517  where 
the Supreme Court held that a policy which set aside a specific number of places for 
minority students contravened the 14th Amendment’s commitment to equal protection of 
 
516 Such measures are often considered to be seeking the creation of ‘diversity’, the benefits of which have 
been widely accepted in both the US and UK.   See USCCR, The Benefits of Racial and Ethnic Diversity in 
Elementary and Secondary Education, (November 2006), R. Hero, Face of Inequality: Social Benefits of 
Workforce Diversity, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000), EHRC, Talent not Tokenism.  The Benefits 
of Workforce Diversity, (2008) and Office for Official Publications for the European Commission, 
Continuing the Diversity Journey: Business Practices, Perspectives and Benefits (2008).  However, the use 
of affirmative action to achieve diversity through the deployment of numerical targets has attracted country-
specific responses. 
517 Bakke op. cit.  The Court had previously accepted for decision a similar case at the University of 
Washington but it was later dismissed as the plaintiff who had been admitted to the Law School was about 
to graduate.  See DeFunis v Odegaard 416 US 312 (1974). 
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the laws for all citizens.  The judgment was responding to a policy under which the 
university reserved a set quota of places for minority students so that majority students, 
including the plaintiffs, were refused admission whilst minority students with lower 
marks were able to enrol.  The decision of the Supreme Court served to limit the use of 
affirmative action based on numerical goals holding that whilst race could be used as a 
flexible factor in university admissions strict quotas were illegal. 518   Although this 
judgment ‘sharply divided opinions’519 within the US affirmative action debate for the US 
judiciary it defined the acceptable limits to exclusionary quotas in affirmative action as 
requiring that each policy be applied with reference to the relative qualities of individual 
applicants. 
 
The controversial nature of numerically-couched policies within US affirmative action 
was further illustrated by the case of Hopwood v Texas in which the plaintiff argued that 
the admissions policy judged African Americans and Hispanics against more lenient 
criteria than other applicants.520  Under the scheme the court found that a score at which 
minorities were categorized as ‘presumptive admits’ would result in a white applicant 
being categorized as a ‘presumptive denial’.521  The policy was criticised by the court on 
the basis that ‘the use of race to achieve a diverse student body … simply cannot be a 
state interest compelling enough to meet the steep standard of strict scrutiny’.522  The 
quotas used in affirmative action programmes concerning admissions reveal how judicial 
attitudes as to what constitutes a lawful and unlawful program have influenced the use of 
exclusionary affirmative action, and how numerical targets have been marginalised within 
permitted action.  US treatment of numerical considerations, and the line between their 
permissibility and impermissibility, is also clearly shown by the contrary judgments in the 
cases of Gratz v Bollinger523  and Grutter v Bollinger. 524   Both cases concerned the 
admissions policy of the University of Michigan which was managed for undergraduates 
and members of the law school so that between six and seven per cent of successful 
 
518 Bakke, op. cit., part III 
519 C.E. Anderson, ‘A Current Perspective: The Erosion of Affirmative Action in University Admissions’, 
32 Akron Law Review 181, (1994), p. 183. 
520 Hopwood v Texas, op. cit. 
521 ibid, at 561 – 2, 563, 575. 
522 ibid, at 948.  For more recent application of the Hopwood judgment see Messer v Meno 130 F.3d 130 (5th 
Cir. 1997). 
523 Gratz v Bollinger 539 US 244 (2003).   
524 Grutter v Bollinger 539 US 306 (2003). 
91 
 
                                                
applicants were African American.525   In Gratz the Supreme Court struck down the 
undergraduate admissions practices, holding that the points system used, which operated 
on the basis of factors including race, was too rigidly applied.526   The system in place 
made a total of 150 points available for each candidate, out of which 40 points could be 
awarded for non-academic factors that the university felt would add to the experience of 
the university campus.527   The court found that the effect of this system was to make race 
a potentially decisive factor in determining the admission decision, as opposed to it being 
one of several factors.528   
 
Public interest in Gratz is illustrated by the remarks made by President Bush who, whilst 
expressly supporting ‘diversity of all kinds, including racial diversity in higher education’, 
condemned the university’s method of seeking this goal as ‘fundamentally flawed’ and 
amounting to an illegal system of quotas.529   By contrast to the decision in Gratz, in 
Grutter the court narrowly upheld the use of race in determining admissions to the 
university’s law school, finding that it was employed with sufficient flexibility to satisfy 
the state’s compelling interest in increasing the proportion of minority students 
admitted.530  In its decision the court supported the preference afforded to disadvantaged 
minorities, holding that it did not automatically violate the Equal Protection Clause and 
the importance of the programme in enabling the cultivation of ‘a set of leaders with 
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry’.531  In addition the law school employed race as a 
‘plus factor’ ensuring that the policy had a degree of flexibility and evaluated each 
applicant on their individual merits, as well as being operative for a finite period.532   The 
cases of Gratz and Grutter exemplify the trend of the 1990s and early 2000s towards 
 
525 ibid, at 367 – 369 (Rehnquist, dissenting) and 374 (Kennedy, dissenting). 
526 Gratz v Bollinger, op. cit., at 269. 
527 The non-academic factors included up to 20 points for: socioeconomic disadvantage, membership of an 
underrepresented minority group, attendance at a predominantly minority or socially disadvantaged high 
school, recruitment for athletics, or at the Provost’s discretion ibid, at 9. 
528 ibid, at 272. 
529 Office of the Press Secretary, ‘President Bush Discusses Michigan Affirmative Action Case. Remarks by 
President George W. Bush on the Michigan Affirmative Action Case’, (The Roosevelt Room on 15th 
January 2003).  See http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/2003115-7.html.  Accessed 
21.05.08.   Further criticism of the use of numerical targets to create diverse educational and employment 
environments includes See A. Kronman, ‘Is Diversity a Value in American Higher Education?’, 52 FLA 
Rev. 861 (2000), D. D’Souza, Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus, (MacMillan, 
Inc., New York, 1999), J. Wrench, ‘Diversity Management Can be Bad for You’, 46(3) Race and Class 
(2005), 73 – 84 and K. Daniel, D. Black, and J. Smith, ‘Racial Differences in the Effects of College Quality 
and Student Body Diversity on Wages’, pp. 221 – 232 in G. Orfield (ed)., Diversity Challenged, (Harvard 
Education Publishing Group, Cambridge, Mass, 2000). 
530 Grutter v Bollinger, op. cit., at 327 – 333. 
531 ibid, at 332. 
532 ibid, at 337 – 339 and 343. 
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affirmative action in the context of university admissions founded on past discrimination 
and whilst Gratz seems to have marked the demise of Bakke’s diversity rationale, 
arguably first signified by Hopwood, Grutter shows an important shift from a ‘backward-
looking and inward-looking perspective on voluntary affirmative action to forward-
looking and outward-looking perspectives’ subsequently characteristic of the US’ use of 
numerical standards for affirmative action.533 
 
As well as its use in an educational context numerically-based affirmative action 
obligations have also been imposed on firms engaged in federal contracts,534 and such use 
has resulted in increased representation of minority workers.535  These measures have, 
therefore, had an important role in increasing workplace diversity where passive non-
discrimination was ineffective.536  However, this form of affirmative action has been 
subject to shifting political priorities which have seen a significant decrease of funding for 
the OFCCP where the political climate has required.537  Despite this one example of 
numerically-based measures being successful the US affirmative action has been unable 
to widely embrace numerically-based action because it represents an unpopular 
progression from de facto equal treatment to engineering the representation of minorities 
within the workplace and educational environment.  In addition, it is argued that ‘once 
affirmative-action plans are loosed from their remedial moorings…an operational-needs 
defense can benefit the historically favoured as well as the historically disfavoured’ and 
should therefore be avoided.538  Consequently, the US’ early use of numerical goals for 
affirmative action within federal contracting has been demoted and criticised among the 
 
533 C. Estland, ‘Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration and Affirmative Action in the Workplace’, 
26 Berkeley UJ, Employment and Labor Law, 3, 2005.  See also A.L. Antonio, et al., ‘Effects of Racial 
Diversity on Complex Thinking in College Students’, Psychological Science, Vol. 15, (2004), pp. 507 – 510. 
534 See F.L. Pincus, Understanding Diversity.  An Introduction to Class, Race, Gender and Sexual 
Orientation (Lynne Rienner, London, 2006), pp. 75 – 6 which gives examples of companies who have used 
diversity training and positive action policies to settle discrimination claims. 
535 J. Leonard, ‘The Impact of Affirmative Action Regulation and Equal Employment Law on Black 
Employment’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4 (1984), pp. 47 – 64 cites a study conducted in the early 
1980s which showed that the proportion of black males employed in contractor companies increased from 
5.8 per cent in 1974 to 6.7 per cent in 1980 whilst in non-contractor companies the increase was only from 
5.3 per cent to 5.9 per cent. 
536 Potomac Institute, Affirmative Action: The Unrealized Goal.  A Decade of Opportunity, (The Potomac 
Institute, Inc., 1973), pp. 6 – 7. 
537 For example, the Energy Department, the Federal Highway Administration and the Commerce 
Department, amongst others, all cut back their set-aside programmes during the 1990s.  See C. McCrudden, 
Buying Social Justice, op. cit., pp. 172 – 175.  
538 K.R. Browne, ‘Nonremedial Justifications for Affirmative Action in Employment: A Critique of the 
Justice Department’s Position’, 12 Labour Law 451, (1996 – 7), p. 452. 
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range of affirmative action programmes which in turn this has encouraged the limitation 
of its operation. 
 
5.2.2 UK Numerical Positive Action 
 
Whilst the US’ commitment to numerically-framed goals and timetables in affirmative 
action has been broad-based but controversial, and with mixed success, the UK’s 
approach may be characterised as allowing for such programmes in response to a 
particular, acute need.  The two key forms of numerically based positive action which 
have developed within the UK are those implemented as narrow exceptions to the general 
avoidance of numerical goals within positive action, such as the measures used within 
Northern Ireland,539 and the non-legally enforceable initiatives, such as those intended to 
diversify public authority workforces.540   
 
Northern Irish measures, particularly under the FETO, are clearly aimed at achieving 
numerically measured results.  The explicit nature of the numerical aims of the Northern 
Irish measures are clear from the Patten Report which set targets for 50 per cent 
recruitment of Catholic RUC officers over a 10 year period, in an attempt to redress an 
imbalance in the religious composition of the force which meant that whilst 40 per cent of 
the population of Northern Ireland was Catholic only 8 per cent of RUC Officers were 
Catholic. 541   Instead of provoking criticism for being unlawful discrimination these 
measures were promoted as ‘essential to gaining widespread acceptability’ of the force’s 
legitimacy.542   A further example of the narrow use of numerical forms of positive action 
are the measures implemented following the conclusion of the McPherson Report,543   
which indicated that the UK was in breach of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racism,544  because public institutions were engaging in acts 
and practices of racial discrimination.545  Consequently, the police were charged with 
achieving targets to increase the numbers of ethnic minority officers and adopted positive 
 
539 Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000, s. 46(1). 
540 See G. Mills, ‘Combating Institutional Racism in the Public Sector’, op. cit., pp. 96 – 98. 
541 C. Patten, A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland.  The Report of the Independent Commission 
on Policing in Northern Ireland (1999). 
542 Official Report, Hansard HC Debs 19 January 2000, col 847. 
543 Home Office, ‘Report of the MacPherson Inquiry’, Cm 4262 (24th February 1999), para 46.27. 
544 See International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racism, art 2(1)(a). 
545 Report of MacPherson Inquiry, op. cit., para 46.27. 
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action measures in an effort to fulfil these.546  These measures enabled the conclusion that, 
ten years after the publication of the Report, ‘tremendous strides’ had been made in 
countering racism within the police force, despite the continued underrepresentation of 
black and ethnic minority officers and failure to meet the original targets. 547   These 
measures are also in accordance with the ECJ’s endorsement of quotas in Badeck and 
Abrahamsson, in which quota-based schemes were accepted as permissible provided that 
the individuals were equally qualified.548   However, because these numerically-based 
positive action programmes were instigated before UK law had incorporated the 
principles espoused in the Badeck and Abrahamsson decisions such use of positive action 
measures has faced some opposition.  For example, the Somerset and Avon Police faced 
an investigation by the Commission for Racial Equality, a predecessor organisation to the 
EHRC, after rejecting 186 white applicants in favour of minority and female candidates 
on the basis that the force was ‘overrepresented by white men’.549  This action followed 
the receipt of 242 applicants from white men, which represented over 40 per cent of all 
applications received, in response to a recruitment drive.550 
 
In contrast to the numerically-framed positive action measures used in Northern Ireland 
and in response to the MacPherson Inquiry the UK has experienced less success with such 
measures when they have been based on governmental initiatives, as opposed to 
legislative changes. 551   One reason for the limited success of non-legislative use of 
numerical targets in positive action is that the measures are arguably in excess of what 
can be lawfully attained in the current framework.552   In the absence of specific legal 
provisions mandating these measures organisations risked being ‘steered, not only 
towards positive action, but to legally questionable measures’. 553   The position of 
numerical considerations in UK positive action is, however, currently undergoing a 
 
546 ibid, Recommendation 64, which set a target of 7% black and minority ethnic police officers by 2001.    
547 House of Commons, Home Affairs Committee, ‘The MacPherson Report – Ten Years On’ (14 July 
2009), pp. 5 – 7.   See also EHRC, Police and Racism: What has been achieved 10 years after the Stephen 
Lawrence Inquiry Report?, (January 2009). 
548 See Badeck, op. cit, para 33 and Abrahamsson, op. cit, para 62. 
549  See ‘Force accused of Discrimination’, BBC News, 28th Nov 2005, 
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/ bristol/4479276.stm.   Accessed 26.11.08. 
550  ibid.  
551 S. Rutherford and S. Ollerearnshaw, The Business of Diversity – how organizations in the public and 
private sectors are integrating equality and diversity to enhance business performance, (Schneider-Ross, 
Andover, 2002). 
552 L. Barmes with S. Ashtiany, ‘The Diversity Approach to Achieving Equality: Potential and Pitfalls’ 
(2003) Industrial Law Journal 32(4), 274 – 296.  
553 L. Barmes, ‘Equality Law and Experimentation: the Positive Action Challenge’, op.cit. 623 – 654   See 
also J. Wrench, ‘Diversity Management Can be Bad for You’, 46(3) Race and Class (2005), 73 – 84.   
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change in line with the ECJ’s implicit approval of the use of quotas in positive action 
policies, provided that there is not an unconditional benefit afforded to the 
underrepresented individual and that they are ‘designed to eliminate the causes of 
women’s reduced opportunities of access to employment and careers and intended to 
improve the ability of women to compete on the labour market and pursue a career on an 
equal footing with men’.554  Further, provided the sections are enacted in their present 
form, under the Equality Act 2010 targets and goals will constitute lawful positive action, 
as long as they do not form part of a blanket policy for appointing underrepresented 
individuals.555   
 
Overall, therefore, the US has tried to use quotas widely, resulting in on-going challenges 
to their legal basis as well as judicial and popular opposition.  Subject to judicially 
imposed criteria for permissible quotas, however, they continue to be used in government 
contracting and in university admissions.  UK numerically-based positive action targets 
are hesitantly increasing in their field of operation, from having being solely deployed in 
circumstances where there are specific legislative derogations, such as Northern 
Ireland,556 and as non-legally binding initiatives.  Such use confines this controversial 
form of action to narrow circumstances in which there is the greatest need for reform, 
matching the type of measures employed to the particular problem they are required to 
remedy.  However, the extremely limited scope for numerically-based action within UK 
law has led to some discrepancy between legally mandated and actual practice, though 
this may reconciled through the Equality Act 2010.   
 
5.3 Voluntary and Mandatory Affirmative Action in the US and UK 
 
Alongside the different uses of numerically-aimed affirmative action the US and UK have 
also adopted different approaches to voluntary and mandatory forms of action.  This is 
despite the apparent similarity between the two countries whereby both have similarly 
focused on voluntary policies while marginalising mandatory action, because despite this 
similarity wholly different views exist between the two countries concerning the legality 
of each form of action, as will be considered below.   
 
 
554 See Lommers, op. cit., paras 24 – 50, esp. para. 33. 
555 Equality Act 2010, s. 159(4). 
556 See the Employment Equality Directive, art. 15(1).   
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5.3.1 The US’ Use of Voluntary and Mandatory Affirmative Action 
 
Within the US both voluntary and mandatory affirmative action has been justified as a 
means of remedying the existing segregation and exclusion of women and minority 
groups, although the permissibility of each use has been variously supported and rejected 
where there is a lack of clarity in the legal permissibility of each form of action.  One area 
in which there has been a progression from voluntary to mandatory measures is in the 
desegregation of school districts, which was pioneered in the four decades following the 
decision in Brown v Board of Education.557  In Brown, the Supreme Court rejected the 
notion of a ‘separate but equal’558  educational system, stating that ‘separate educational 
facilities are necessarily unequal’.559 Although Brown declared segregated schools to be 
unlawful it did not create mandatory mechanisms to eliminate existing discriminatory 
practices or their effects, so that a decade after Brown voluntary action had prompted 
virtually no action towards the achievement of educational integration.560   Consequently, 
while the judgment delivered in Brown was a ground-breaking legal precedent its impact 
was limited by failing to require more than for voluntary desegregation to proceed with 
‘all deliberate speed’.561  Instead, further court judgments were required to set out specific 
obligations on States to pursue desegregation.  One such case was Green v County School 
Board which stated that school boards had an ‘affirmative duty to take whatever steps 
might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be 
eliminated root and branch’. 562   The reluctant move from voluntary to mandatory 
affirmative action is illustrative of the US social mindset against affirmative action, which 
limits both forms of affirmative action by avoiding voluntary positive action measures, 
whilst confining mandatory action to very restricted circumstances.  
 
The US’ application of mandatory affirmative action to overcome segregation was 
demonstrated by the judgment in Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education 
which required the implementation of a range of measures, including altering school 
districts, pairing and clustering of schools, and the positive racial assignment of pupils, in 
 
557 Starting with Executive Order 10730: Desegregation of Central High School, 1957. 
558 Plessy v Fergusson 163 US 537 (1896). 
559 Brown v Board of Education op. cit. at 494 – 495. 
560 G. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, (University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago, 1991), p. 51. 
561 Brown v Board of Education, op. cit. at 301. 
562 See Justice Brennan in Green v County School Board of New Kent County 391 US 430 (1968) 437 –438.   
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order to eliminate the educational segregation arising from segregated housing.563  The 
Swann judgment showed that the Supreme Court was making efforts to spread the judicial 
use of affirmative action by setting out specific guidelines to assist school districts and the 
lower courts.564  Whilst the Supreme Court acknowledged that de facto segregation did 
not necessarily imply the existence of de jure discrimination, and that the Equal 
Protection Clause did not automatically require year by year adjustment to achieve 
representative racial composition,565 it left no doubt that racially neutral plans would not, 
in the majority of cases, be constitutionally or socially sufficient to remedy 
segregation. 566    The early cases concerning school desegregation show that the US 
resorted to mandatory affirmative action in response to judicial findings of actual 
discrimination where voluntary action failed to yield sig
 
In the employment context mandatory affirmative action has been predominantly used to 
punish unlawful discrimination as in the case of Carter v Gallagher, in which, following 
a finding of discrimination, the Federal Court ordered that one out of every three 
employees hired by the department should be a suitably qualified minority worker, until 
at least 20 minority workers were employed.568  The court has also ruled that positive 
action may be mandated despite the absence of any finding of past discrimination, as in 
the case of Keyes v School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado.569  In Keyes the court cited 
the indirect impact of slavery and race discrimination as the basis upon which to promote 
affirmative action, although this marked an atypical departure from the generally limited 
punitive use of mandatory affirmative action.570  US affirmative action has therefore been 
squeezed by the dual effects of the limited mandatory use sanctioned by the courts 
combined with criticism of voluntary positive action on the grounds that it violates civil 
rights laws and is ineffective in achieving equality.571  The constitutional reality of the 
 
563 Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education 402 US 1 (1971). Swan saw the court apply the 
duty of desegregation which in Green had been applied to a two-school, 1,300 pupil county, to a school 
system of 107 schools and over 80,000 pupils. 
564 ibid, at 18 – 19. 
565 ibid, at 28 – 31. 
566 R.S. Markovits, Matters of Principle Legitimate Legal Argument and Constitutional Interpretation, 
(New York University Press, New York, 1998), p. 255. 
567 See also Albermarle Paper Co. v Moody 422 US 405 (1975) at 418. 
568 Carter v Gallagher 452 F. 2d 315 (8th Cir.). 
569 Keyes v School District No. 1 Denver, Colorado 413 US 189 (1972). 
570 See, for example, Dayton Board of Education v Brinkman 433 US 406 (1979) which stated that ‘because 
racial imbalance is not inevitably linked to unconstitutional segregation it is not unconstitutional in and of 
itself’, at 413. 
571 USCCR, ‘Affirmative Action in the 1980s: Dismantling the Process of Discrimination’, (Clearing House 
Publication 70, November 1980). 
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argument against voluntary affirmative action has been largely avoided by the courts,572 
which have only looked at the question of whether Title VII forbids voluntary affirmative 
action. 573   Opponents of voluntary affirmative action have used the lack of judicial 
comment on its legality as a basis for arguing that it is contrary to the equality principles 
within the Civil Rights Act.574  However, where the court has commented on voluntary 
forms of affirmative action it has indicated some support for them on the grounds that the 
Civil Rights Act was implemented to ‘eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an 
unfortunate and ignominious page in this country’s history […and] cannot be interpreted 
as an absolute prohibition against all private, voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action 
efforts to hasten the elimination of such vestiges’.575   
 
It would be wrong to characterise the US as wholly rejecting voluntary preferential 
treatment.  The Supreme Court has held, for example, that an agency acted appropriately 
when it voluntarily promoted a female employee over her male colleague, who achieved a 
slightly higher test score, because a manifest imbalance existed in the workforce and the 
employer had properly used a ‘moderate, flexible, case-by-case approach to effecting a 
gradual improvement in the representation of minorities and women’. 576   However, 
examples of such judicial support stand out against the general trend of hostility towards 
voluntary affirmative action which has influenced affirmative action use because of the 
lack of clarity regarding its permissibility in the legal framework.577  This inconsistency is 
indicative of the non-linear progress made by US affirmative action whereby the rapid 
gains, as illustrated by the Johnson judgment, have been frequently followed by a judicial 
and legal retreat that is ‘stunningly successful in changing the terms of the debate by 
erasing public memory’. 578   Such cycles of advancement and regression show the 
conflicting influences on US affirmative action and how the competing principles within 
the US have acted as counter-balances preventing any significant and continued period of 
expansion.   
 
 
572 See Minnick v California Dep’t of Corrections 452 US 105 (1981) which the court refused to hear 
because of ambiguities in the court records and legal developments since the lower court’s ruling despite 
this meaning that an important opportunity to clarify the permissible extent of voluntary affirmative action 
was missed.    
573 United Steelworkers of America v Weber op. cit. 
574 ibid, at 120. 
575 Albermarle Paper Company v Moody, op. cit. 
576 Johnson v Transport Agency 480 US 616, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 94 L. Ed. 2d 615 (1987). 
577 See L. Alexander, ‘What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? op. cit., pp 162 – 3.  
578 N. MacLean, Freedom is Not Enough, op. cit., p. 34. 
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5.3.2 The UK’s Use of Mandatory and Voluntary Positive Action 
 
In the UK arguments concerning the legality of mandatory and voluntary affirmative 
action are diametrically opposed to those in the US.  This means that whereas in the US 
voluntary measures are criticised for being unconstitutional and mandatory action legal 
but unpopular, in the UK voluntary positive action is accepted as coming within the letter 
and spirit of the law through the permissible positive action in the Equality Act 2010.  By 
contrast, mandatory measures have generally been considered to constitute unlawful 
discrimination.  The key exceptions to the avoidance of mandatory action have been the 
range of specific obligations imposed on employers and service providers to avoid claims 
of discrimination, which include the requirement for employers to make reasonable 
adjustments to accommodate disabled workers and to enact certain positive measures, for 
example, by changing shift patterns or allowing flexible workers to avoid a claim of 
indirect discrimination.579  These measures may require substantial action to be taken to 
accommodate the needs of specific individuals, and represent a significantly different 
approach from the highly restricted forms of action permitted within the key positive 
action provisions, but it is contested that these forms of action are more properly part of 
non-discrimination law than positive action because they are needed to prevent a claim of 
discrimination, and are subject to separate legislative provisions.580    
 
Aside from these measures the UK has adopted a mandatory action approach in the 
positive duty placed on public authorities to actively promote gender and race equality.581  
However, this duty is only mandatory in terms of processes the authority must go through, 
as opposed to being mandatory in terms of achieving a particular outcome or taking any 
particular action, meaning that the likelihood of substantial advances in equality being 
achieved by this provision is limited.582  The public authority requirement for ‘due regard’ 
also gives little indication of the importance that should be placed on this duty, and in 
particular when positive action considerations may be overridden by other policy 
considerations.  The proposed duty has consequently faced criticism that it should be 
replaced by an obligation for public bodies to take specific mandatory steps to achieve 
 
579 See, for example, London Underground Limited v Edwards (No. 2) [1999] ICR 494; [1998] IRLR 364 
which reached this conclusion.  See also Caruso, ‘The Limits of the Classic Method’, op. cit. 
580 See before at section 2.3.2 of this thesis. 
581 Equality Act 2010, s. 149. 
582 S. Fredman and S. Spencer, ‘Delivering Equality: Towards an Outcome-Focused Positive Duty’, 
Submission to the Cabinet Office Equality Review and to the Discrimination Law Review, (June 2006).   
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equality.583  However, the case of R (Elias) v Secretary of State for Defence might be 
useful in this regard because it held that a failure to consider whether a particular policy 
raised issues relating to racial equality, to assess whether any adverse impact was possible, 
or to consider what steps might be necessary to eliminate any impact, would breach a duty 
for particular regard to be paid to the achievement of equality.584  One problem inherent in 
this decision is that the symmetrical approach to discrimination utilised in relation to all 
protected characteristics, apart from disability, arguably means that an obligation to take 
specific steps to counter inequality, if not directly permitted by legal provisions, runs 
counter to the requirement of equal treatment within non-discrimination legislation.  The 
impact of this is that there is a pervasive uncertainty as to the lawfulness of any measures 
taken by public authorities in pursuit of their mandatory duty.585  This situation is further 
confused by the Government’s confirmation that there is no compulsory requirement for 
any positive action under the Equality Act 2010.586 
 
The situation as to what action is, and may in future be, imposed on public authorities, 
therefore, exhibits a high degree of uncertainty, with authorities caught between the risk of 
engaging in direct discrimination if they take actual measures to redress 
underrepresentation but of failing to fulfil their statutory duty if they do not go some way 
to at least considering how to redress disproportionality, and presumably taking action if it 
is discovered to be necessary.  Coupled with this, the expansive scope of discrimination 
law leaves little room for even voluntary actions, which in itself is criticised for its naivety 
in expecting improvement without the imposition of mandatory positive action 
obligations.587   
 
A further exception to the general avoidance of mandatory positive action are the 
measures used in Northern Ireland588 and it is arguably through these mandatory measures 
that equality has moved from being peripheral to being of mainstream significance within 
 
583 ibid, pp. 9 – 10.   
584 R (Elias) v Secretary of State for Defence [2005] IRLR 788. 
585 L. Barmes, ‘Promoting Diversity and the Definition of Direct Discrimination’ (2003) Industrial Law 
Journal 200. 
586 See Government Equalities Office, ‘Equality Act 2010 – Frequently Asked Questions’, at 
http://www.equalities.gov.uk/equality_act_2010/faqs_pn_commencement_of_the _eq/positive_action.aspx.  
Accessed 06.10.10. 
587 See B. Hepple, M. Coussey, and T. Choudhury, Equality: A New Framework.  Report of the Independent 
Review of the Enforcement of UK Anti-Discrimination Legislation, (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2000), paras 
3.41 - 3.50. 
588 See C. McCrudden, ‘Mainstreaming Equality in the Governance of Northern Ireland’, 22 Fordham Intl L 
Journal 1969 (1998 – 9).   
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the province.589  Pursuant to the FETO the Northern Irish police service may use quotas as 
a means of increasing Catholic recruitment,590 and further measures include provisions 
permitting employers to recruit directly from Catholics not in employment and to offer 
religion specific training. 591   The use of mandatory measures, as opposed to purely 
voluntary, has been linked to an improvement in workplace representation of Catholics.  
In a study by Chris McCrudden, for example, the proportion of Catholics employed within 
monitored firms rose across both the public and private sectors, so that while the 
monitored workforce grew in line with the general employment, rising by 42,350 (around 
12 per cent), Catholic employment in the monitored companies rose by 32,700 (28 per 
cent) while Protestant employment rose by 10,300 (4.8 per cent).592   
 
Whilst the UK arguments against mandatory measures resonate with the arguments of 
opponents of compulsory affirmative action in the US, in the UK such arguments do not 
conclude with a call for inaction but instead for the use of voluntary positive action ‘so 
that the talents of women, disabled people and other discriminated-against groups can be 
fully utilised’. 593   By contrast the unpopularity of US mandatory affirmative action, 
combined with the claimed unconstitutionality of voluntary action has prevented a 
parallel development in the US of affirmative action as a legislative tool to enable social 
change.  Conversely, the UK has faced criticisms for being unduly tentative in its 
approach to mandatory positive action, with voluntary measures also being confined to a 
limited area of use.   This has, however, meant that UK positive action has avoided the 
divisiveness of the debate surrounding the subject in the US. 
 
Apart from being comparable under the same headline categories the uses of affirmative 
action in the US and UK have been subject to very different arguments and influences, 
which in turn has given them a country-specific nature.  Both countries have used 
exclusionary action but, while in the US this use has been widespread in the UK it has 
been confined to a very narrow context, although this may change following the 
commencement of relevant sections of the Equality Act 2010.  In addition, both countries 
 
589 See in particular sections 2.3.2, 3.2.2, 5.1.2 and 5.2.2 above. 
590 Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000, s. 46(1). 
591 FETO, arts. 75 – 6.  See also arts. 72 – 4. 
592 See C. McCrudden, ‘Legal Regulation of Affirmative Action in Northern Ireland’, Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 2004, pp. 401 – 402. 
593 Tessa Jowell, Official Report Hansard HC 21st July 2005, col 1399. See 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/pahansard.   Accessed 23.07.08. 
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have used numerical targets in positive action policies, although US hostility to this form 
of action may be contrasted with dubious legality of the UK’s ‘soft law’ initiatives.  
Finally, the two countries have taken wholly opposite approaches to voluntary and 
mandatory action.  These differences in use of positive action between the US and UK 
may, however, be starting to undergo a degree of convergence, especially in light of the 
current and likely future developments in this area of law, as will be explored in the next 
chapter. 
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6. The Future of Positive and Affirmative Action in the US and the UK 
 
So far this thesis has examined the past and present influences that have shaped positive 
action in the US and the UK and has established the existence of fundamental differences 
at the heart of affirmative action in each country.  Against the backdrop of this analysis 
this chapter will explore the new forms of action that are developing in each country, and 
assess the possibility of convergence in policies and principles between the US and UK.  
Because any such assessment necessarily involves a high level of conjecture this chapter 
will not attempt to cover all conceivable forms of development but just a selection of 
possible ways in which the context of affirmative action within the two countries is 
changing, and will consider how this might affect the legal provisions in each country.  
This chapter will show that contemporary and likely future developments in each country 
may offer the opportunity for the two countries to look across the Atlantic to the legal 
provisions and lessons learnt in the other, as a means of best addressing continuing 
inequality.  Firstly, however, this chapter will explore one of the most pertinent 
contemporary influences on the development of affirmative action in the US and the UK, 
namely that of the increasing fluidity of identity amongst protected individuals, and will 
consider how each country’s experiences could help to inform the other’s approach to 
dealing with this challenge. 
 
6.1 The Growth in Fluidity of Individual Identity 
 
Affirmative action has functioned on the premise that individuals can be categorised 
according to a single characteristic, such as race or gender, and that there are fixed criteria 
for membership of protected groups.  However, policy implementers have found it 
increasingly difficult to place individuals in one of a finite number of homogenous 
categories amid growing ethnic diversity and recognition of the role of intersectionality in 
delineating an individual’s experience of societal opportunities.594  Within the US the 
position of African Americans as the principal excluded minority has also been changing 
with new minorities becoming an increasingly vocal presence within the country.595  As a 
 
594 See J. Squires, The New Politics, op. cit., pp. 161 – 170.  
595 Hispanics, in particular, are a rapidly increasing proportion of the minority population, having grown 
from 32% in 1980 to 37% in 1990, and were recorded as constituting over 50% of the minority population 
in the 2000 Census.  See H.D. Graham, Collision Course. The Strange Convergence of Affirmative Action 
and Immigration Policy in America, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002), p. 149, and appendix 1, 
tables 3 and 4.  Projections forecast that by 2050 non-Hispanic whites will constitute 30.25% of the entire 
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result of such developments the successful integration of minorities into effective 
multicultural societies has become one of the major challenges of the early twenty-first 
century in both the US and UK.596  In addition to the changing identity of the benefited 
classes there have also been shifting attitudes towards affirmative action from within the 
groups themselves.  The feminist movement, for example, has contributed diverging 
views to the debate on the impact on gender-based preferences, including the concern that 
positive action may perpetuate misogynistic notions of female inferiority and their need 
for male protection, alongside continuing support for affirmative action as an important 
means of securing still-elusive substantive gender equality. 597   Both of these 
developments have differently influenced the key foci of affirmative action although the 
changes themselves may open up the possibility for a closer relationship between US and 
UK positive action, as will be shown below.   
 
6.1.1 Changing Racial Identity 
 
In the US the inclusion of ‘new’ minorities within the affirmative action debate, albeit 
that their presence in the country may not be new, has caused uncertainty as to the 
operation and aims of positive preferences aimed predominantly at remedying 
black/white inequality.598  The country’s demography which was previously characterised 
as being split between black and white is increasingly racially diverse and it is estimated 
that by 2042 non-Hispanic white Americans will no longer make up the majority of the 
country’s population, although this will still be the country’s largest racial group.599  The 
problem of minority exclusion, therefore, is increasingly an issue for all minority 
groups600 and this has raised opposition to the unique treatment of African Americans 
 
US population, see US Census Bureau, ‘Projections of the Population by Race and Hispanic Origin for the 
United States: 2010 – 2050’ (2008), table 6, 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/summarytables.html.   Accessed 23.03.08. 
596 K. Henrard and R. Dunbar, Synergies in Minority Protection: European and International Law 
Perspectives, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009), p. 12. 
597 See, W. McElroy, Sexual Correctness: The Gender-Feminist Attack on Women, (McFarland and Co 
Publishers, North Carolina, 2001).  Also W. McElroy, ‘What Does Affirmative Action Affirm?’, pp. 181 – 
188, pp. 184 – 6, in W. McElroy (ed.)., Liberty for Women: Freedom and Feminism in the 21st Century, 
(Ivan R. Dee, Chicago, in association with the Independent Institute, 2002). 
598 T. Wise, Affirmative Action: Racial Preference in Black and White (Routledge, London, 2005).  
See also C. Edley, Jr., Not all Black and White: Affirmative Action and American Values, (Hill and Wang, 
New York., 1996). 
599 US Census Bureau, ‘Projections of the Population by Sex, Race and Hispanic Origin for the United 
States: 2010 – 2050’ (table 4).  http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/summarytables.html.  
Accessed 23.08.10.  
600 See appendix 3, table 4 and appendix 4, tables 4 and 5 demonstrating the continued underrepresentation 
across minority groups in university and professional occupations. 
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within affirmative action. 601   Whilst there remains a strong historical embarrassment 
surrounding slavery in the US and the particular societal and institutional discrimination 
against black Americans following its abolition the growing ability for African Americans 
to access previously closed institutions, and the emergent black middleclass,602 have been 
used to argue that if African Americans do not constitute a uniquely excluded minority 
within society they should not constitute a special group within affirmative action.  Such 
arguments are bolstered by empirical evidence which reveals that whilst the proportion of 
black Americans leaving school with no high school diploma is nearly double that of 
white, non-Hispanic Americans, it is only around half the rate of Hispanic Americans.603  
In addition, between 1978 and 2000, there was a lower rate of improvement in the 
educational attainment of Hispanics than for African Americans, suggesting that the 
Hispanic community is falling further behind African Americans and the majority 
community in educational opportunities.604  This demonstrates that in one of the key 
forums within which affirmative action operates African Americans are not the most 
disadvantaged group and have been improving in status and achievement, whilst other 
minorities, particularly Hispanics, have been declining.  A more accurate reflection of 
contemporary patterns of educational achievement and occupational disadvantage within 
affirmative action would make it less easily condemned as unnecessary, in light of black 
achievement, or unconcerned with actual disadvantage.605  Such a development would be 
likely to require a more equal focus across different racial groups, which would bring US 
affirmative action more into line with UK provisions.    
 
In the UK, as in the US, increasing racial heterogeneity is affecting the development of 
positive action, although minority issues remain on an entirely different scale in the UK 
than the US,606  with UK diversity having being predominantly driven by post-colonial 
immigration after the Second World War.607  Amidst the increasing racial diversity within 
 
601 See, for example, J. Perea, ‘The Black/White Binary Paradigm of Race’ in R. Delgado and J. Stefancic, 
Critical Race Theory.  The Cutting Edge, (2nd ed. Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 2000), pp. 344 – 
353.    
602 M. Patillo-McCoy, Black Picket Fences: Privileges and Perils among the Black Middle-Class, 
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1999). 
603 See appendix 3, table 3.  See also appendix 3 table 4 which shows that the percentage of black 
individuals who had attended higher education in 2000 (17.5%) was nearly double that of Hispanic students 
(9.7%). 
604 See appendix 3, table 4. 
605 See M. Boylan, ‘Affirmative Action: Strategies for the Future’, Journal of Social Philosophy, Vol 33, 
No. 1, (Spring 2002), 117 – 130. 
606 See appendix 1 which summarises the different ethnic break-downs of the US and UK.   
607 See H. Goulbourne, Race Relations in Britain since 1945, (MacMillan Press, London, 1998). 
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the country UK positive action may be equally directed at individuals belonging to 
underrepresented ethnic minority groups, or other protected groups, provided that the 
general legislative criteria are met. 608   The result of this is that the UK has not 
experienced the tension between the legal provisions for positive action and the changing 
pattern of minority disadvantage, as in the US.  Despite the restrictiveness of the 
permitted forms of positive action in the UK there has also been a disproportionate 
increase of minority students at UK universities compared to the overall rise in higher 
education.609  By contrast, the proportion of minority individuals within higher education 
in the US continues to lag behind the proportion of white students.610  The extent to 
which improvements in educational achievement for minorities is directly attributable to 
positive action is, however, questionable and even the ‘presence of a handful of women or 
blacks in positions of power is not necessarily of assistance in reversing discrimination 
against women or blacks in society in general’.611   However, the Equality Act 2010 
broadens the range of affirmative action methods that may be employed in the UK, thus 
going some way to combining the UK’s existing breadth of coverage with a wider, US-
style, range of measures.  This trend will be even more pronounced once the full range of 
positive action provisions under the Act 
 
In order that affirmative action measures can remain relevant in the face of changing 
demographics within the US and UK more research needs to be conducted into the nature 
of on-going prejudice faced by different minority groups and particularly the reason why 
certain racial minorities continue to be underrepresented in the highest educational and 
occupational levels.  Empirical evidence supporting the normalisation of African 
Americans within affirmative action could also be a valuable means of strengthening calls 
for equal positive action provision for all minorities and moving US affirmative action 
away from its black/white focus.  In the light of such developments the UK approach in 
which all minorities are afforded the same legislative protection may prove instructive for 
the US in shaping future affirmative action law, although the continuing social tension 
between minority and majority groups may limit its acceptability.  Conversely the UK 
 
608 The equivalent protection across protected classes is demonstrated by the comparable legal protect for all 
groups in the Equality Act 2010. 
609 See appendix 3, table 2 which shows that minority students are overrepresented amongst undergraduate 
and post-graduate students.    
610 See appendix 3, table 4. 
611 S. Fredman, Discrimination Law, op. cit., p. 125, 
612 In particular Equality Act 2010, ss. 149 and 159. 
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could look at the antagonism caused by the concentration of affirmative action on African 
Americans as a warning against the development of any significant discrepancy in focus 
between protected groups within UK policy. 
 
6.1.2 Gender Identity 
 
Since the instigation of affirmative action policies the position of women within US and 
UK society, especially in relation to their participation in higher education and 
professional employment, has changed significantly,613 though this may owe more to the 
general increase in accessibility of higher education and the diminution in status or pay in 
the jobs in question rather than to improvements arising out of positive action 
programmes.614  The similar progress towards gender equality in both the US and UK has 
led to both women and men raising the question of whether gender inequality is still an 
appropriate basis for affirmative action preferences or whether the time for the temporary 
measures for promoting opportunities for women is now coming to an end. 615   
Consequently, for the first time arguments for the elimination of affirmative action that 
were motivated by the white, male desire to retain a dominant societal position are being 
voiced by women, the very group the policies were intended to help.616   Despite such 
arguments there continues to be a gap between male and female earnings in the US and 
UK.617  Such evidence has led to calls for a new focus to gender-based action which does 
not solely target the inability of women to access education and employment but also the 
glass-ceiling they routinely encounter having done so.618   
 
613 See appendix 3, table 4 showing this increase in the US, and table 1, showing comparable numbers of 
female and males achieving the highest academic levels in the UK. See also appendix 4 tables 1, 4 and 5 
regarding the distribution of females within certain occupation.  In addition women are now more likely to 
attend and graduate from college than men, B. Jacob, ‘Where the Boys Aren’t: Non-Cognitive Skills, 
Returns to School and the Gender Gap in Higher Educations’, Economics of Education Reviews, 21 (2002), 
pp. 581 – 598.  
614 S. Fredman, Discrimination Law, p. 191.    
615 See W. McElroy, Sexual Correctness: The Gender-Feminist Attack on Women, (McFarland and Co 
Publishers, North Carolina, 2001) and W. McElroy (ed.)., Liberty for Women: Freedom and Feminism in 
the 21st Century, (Ivan R. Dee, Chicago, in association with the Independent Institute, 2002). 
616 For example when David Cameron tried to instigate all-women short-lists he faced opposition from a 
number of female MPs.  See G. Jones, ‘Tories Shy away from all women shortlists’, The Telegraph, 22nd 
August 2006.  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1526943/tories-shy-away-from-all-women-shortlists.html.   
Accessed 03.07.08. 
617 See appendix 2, tables 1 and 4.  In addition, a survey conducted in 2008 found that women in the UK 
earned on average 22.6 per cent an hour less than men.  See Labour Force Survey, Q3 (2008), ‘Average of 
Gross Weekly/Hourly Earnings by Occupation’, table 36, 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_labour/LFSHQS/Table36.xls.  Accessed 08.10.10.   
618 See L. Wirth, Breaking Through the Glass Ceiling: Women in Management, (International Labour 
Office, Geneva, 2001). 
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One concern regarding measures to aid women’s advancements in the workplaces and 
society is their potential to reinforce existing social stereotypes and ‘perpetuate...sexual 
paternalism’.619  This risk is illustrated by the case of Abdoulaye in which a payment 
made to women taking maternity leave was challenged on the grounds that it was 
discriminatory to men.620  The ECJ rejected the claim holding that the payment did not 
breach the equal pay principle because it was designed to compensate for long-term 
occupational disadvantages stemming from taking maternity leave. 621   Although this 
judgment defended women’s rights it demonstrates the potential for measures that are 
designed to relieve the practical realities of women’s role as primary carers to entrench 
this position and reinforce the idea that women, and not men, care for children, and 
consequently face occupational disadvantage.622   In addressing these new dimensions of 
gender-exclusion both the US and UK need to conduct further studies to assess the social 
pressures on women that impinge upon their ability to operate freely in the work and 
educational environment.623  Measures to equalise internal family roles, for example, in 
the equal provision of either maternity or paternity leave, may be a means of addressing 
continuing limits placed on women’s equal opportunities whilst avoiding the use of 
positive action.  Learning from the examples of such initiatives in both the UK and US 
would give the two countries an increased range of reference when forming future policy, 
rather than relying on solely domestic experiences.624 
 
As well as ensuring that positive action does not unnecessarily perpetuate stereotypical 
notions about societal roles, whilst remedying exclusion and under-representation of 
 
619 R. S. Dhami, J. Squires and T. Modood., Developing Positive Action Policies: Learning from the 
Experiences of European and North America, Department for Work and Pensions, (HMSO, Norwich, 2006), 
p. 66. 
620 Abdoulaye and others v Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA [1999] ECR I-5723.  See C. McGlynn, 
‘Pregnancy, Parenthood and the Court of Justice in Abdoulaye’, (2000) European Law Review, 654. 
621 ibid, para 20. 
622 See C. McGlynn, ‘Ideologies of Motherhood in European Community Sex Equality Law’ (2000) 6 
European Law Journal 29. 
623 See, for example, the more holistic approach to gender equality described in Government Equalities 
Office, A Fairer Future.  The Equality Bill and other Actions to Make Equality a Reality, (April 2009). 
624 An example of an initiative that has already been used to promote women without the use of positive 
action was the European Community ‘NOW’ (‘New Opportunities for Women’) initiative (1991 – 1994), 
which aimed at increasing women’s skills and to bring them back into the labour market and was funded by 
the European Social Fund. See also the European Commission Gender Equality Framework Strategy 
(2001 – 5) which included action to counter gender stereotypes and developing strategies for mainstreaming 
gender equality as a business and Member State priority. In relation to the US see, for example, the US-
based Gender Equality Principles Initiative which helps companies ‘achieve greater gender equality and 
build more productive workplaces’ through practical implementation of gender equality principles. See 
http://www.genderprinciples.org/index.php.  Accessed 09.10.10. 
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minorities and women, both the US and UK may also benefit from developing a more 
flexible understanding of individual identity and cumulative disadvantage.625  This more 
nuanced understanding does not solely necessitate the acknowledgement that an 
individual may be of mixed ethnic origin, of an underrepresented gender, or have 
undergone gender reassignment,626 but also that identity may be made up of a number of 
different minority characteristics. 627   Further empirical evidence concerning the 
cumulative effect of several minority characteristics would offer valuable evidence to 
show that an individual’s treatment and opportunities are not simply dependent on 
whether they are a ‘minority’ or ‘majority’ individual, but instead recognise that ‘women 
[and other minorities] are often the victims of multiple discrimination’. 628   The UK 
Equality Act 2010 demonstrates the use of such an approach in its recognition of direct 
discrimination on up to two combined grounds.629  In time this could open the door for 
recognition and promotion of this within positive action,630  an approach that may be 
useful within both US and UK positive action.  
 
6.2 New Forms of Positive Protection 
 
As well as changes in the nature of the groups benefited by affirmative action and the way 
that their interests are protected there are also developments in which groups are formally 
recognised as needing protection.  Legislated positive action for people on the basis of 
religious affiliation, sexual orientation and age has already significantly broadened the 
scope of positive action law within the UK on the basis that social exclusion is not fully 
dealt with by focusing only on race and gender.  In the case of P v S, for example, the ECJ 
supported the idea that a more general prohibition of discrimination extending beyond 
gender and nationality was within the remit of the existing laws. 631   The expansive 
approach to positive action was reaffirmed by the implementation into national law of the 
 
625 See R. Blank, ‘Tracing the Economic Impact of Cumulative Discrimination’, The American Economic 
Review, Vol 95, No. 2, (May 2005), pp. 99 – 103.  
626 See the Equality Act 2006, s. 81 and Equality Act 2010, s. 4 which build on the provisions in the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004 (c. 7). 
627  See M. Verloo, ‘Multiple Inequalities, Intersectionality and the European Union’, European Journal of 
Women’s Studies, (2006), Vol. 13(3), pp. 211–228 and L. McCall, ‘The Complexity of Intersectionality.’ 
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, (2005), Vol 30(3), pp. 1771 – 1880. 
628 Race Equality Directive, 2000/43/EC preamble para 14, (incorporated into UK law by the Race 
Relations Act 1976 (Amendment) Regulations 2000).  See also appendix 2, table 2 showing that minority 
women in the UK are disproportionately economically inactive or unemployed compared to white women. 
629 Equality Act 2010, s. 14.    
630 However, the Government’s decision to keep this under consideration, instead of planning to enact it in 
April 2011 as originally envisaged, suggests that such a development may be a significant way off. 
631 P v S and Cornwall County Council [1996] ECR-I 2143, especially paras 18 – 22. 
110 
 
                                                
requirements set out in the Framework Equality Directive which expressly protect 
individuals from discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and religion or 
belief.632  European developments are brought together on an equal footing within UK 
law by the Equality Act 2010 which was specifically designed to increase the consistency 
and uniformity in how positive action is applied.633   
 
The increasingly integrated approach of the UK, exemplified by the Equality Act 2010, is 
contrasted by the position in the US where affirmative action continues to be based on a 
narrow set of conceptually disputed principles, the use of which is frequently attacked by 
popular and judicial hostility, and which cannot be expanded easily to cover additional 
groups.  This is not to say that the scope of affirmative action has been entirely static, as 
there was some early expansion in groups protected, to include disabled individuals and 
Vietnam War veterans,634 and some development in the nature of protection given to 
already benefited groups.635  However, these examples have been superseded by relative 
stagnancy in the scope of the law and also support the claims that white-benefitting 
affirmative action has been more readily incorporated into the US legal system than 
minority-promoting measures.636  US unwillingness to expand affirmative action to new 
minority groups is not just a factor of the inflexibility of the existing regime but can also 
be attributed to the popular hostility towards preferences, as shown in the widespread 
support of Colorado’s Amendment 2 which prevented the development of affirmative 
action preferences based on sexual orientation.637   
 
Despite these different approaches to new forms of positive action they may still offer a 
fruitful avenue for US and UK collaboration.  The US may be able to look to the UK for 
ways to protect a wider range of protected groups by using more cautious, and 
consequently less antagonistic, forms of action.  Reciprocally, the UK, to the degree 
permitted within evolving European parameters, may be able to import some of the US’ 
 
632 Council Directive, 2000/78, preamble para 12, (incorporated into UK law by the Employment Equality 
(Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003 and Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003.  
633 Department for Communities and Local Government, ‘A Framework for Fairness’, op. cit.   
634  Rehabilitation Act 1973 PL 101-336, 104 Stat 327 (codified at 39 USC ss 791), s. 503, and Vietnam Era 
Veterans Adjustment Act 1974 PL 92-450, 86 Stat 1074 (codified at 38 USC ss 2012). 
635 For example through the expansion of the scope of the gender equality assurance in Title VII to include 
sexual harassment and pregnancy leave.  See Merritor Sav. Bank v Vinson 477 US 57 (1986), and Nashville 
Gas Co. v Satty 434 US 136 (1977). 
636 I. Katznelson, When Affirmative Action Was White: An Untold History of Racal Inequality in Twentieth 
Century America, (W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 2006).  
637 E. Gerstman, The Constitutional Underclass, Gays, Lesbian and the Failure of Class-Based Equal 
Protection, (University of Chicago, Chicago, 1999), p. 103. 
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more radical forms of action to bolster its own tentative measures across the wide range 
of protected groups, a trend that may already be evident in the forms of action permitted 
by the Equality Act 2010. 
 
One potential avenue for development of positive action, which avoids the divisiveness of 
race and gender-based measures in both the US and UK are class-based actions.  Such 
measures have lready been promoted in the US as more accurately focusing affirmative 
efforts where there is the greatest need,638 especially amid the emergence of a new black 
middle-class.639  In line with this approach it has been acknowledged that ‘an applicant’s 
prior achievement in light of the barriers that he had to overcome’ should not be solely 
relevant to black candidates.640  Martin Luther King also advocated measures that, whilst 
benefiting poor African Americans, would also benefit poor white individuals, as 
illustrated by his proposal for a Bill of Rights for the Disadvantaged.641  Although class-
based measures have been advocated within US affirmative action they have not escaped 
criticism, including from the growing numbers of middle-class minorities for whom the 
change would be the most detrimental.642  Opponents have also argued that the position 
of middle-class African Americans is more economically fragile than that of their white 
counterparts and therefore that race continues to be a socially relevant basis on which to 
found positive action.643  The US response to class-based affirmative action is revealing 
in that it suggests that minority protectionism may also be influencing the development of 
this form of US affirmative action, although such an argument disregards the vociferous 
and long-standing calls that even the ‘poor white male from Appalachia’ is not exempt 
from the reality of race and gender privilege.644   
 
In the UK there is not the same history of solidly polarised views concerning positive 
action or any comparable debate as to the particular need to remedy past race 
discrimination and its continuing impact as there is in the US.  In addition the UK has less 
 
638 Scalia, in Richmond v Croson op. cit.  at 526. 
639 See appendix 2, table 3, appendix 3, tables 3 and 4 and especially appendix 4, tables 4 and 5 which 
illustrate the development of a new African American middle class in terms of educational attainment and 
economic status. 
640 De Funis v Odegaard op. cit., at 331. 
641 See M.L King, Why We Can’t Wait (Signet Classics) (Longman Publishing, London, 2000), p. 138. 
642 F. Pincus, Reverse Discrimination, op. cit. pp. 143 – 144. 
643 B.P. Bowser, The Black Middle Class: Social Mobility and Vulnerability, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
Inc., Boulder, 2007).  See also, D. Muhammad and B. Ehrenreich, ‘From Recession to Depression, The 
Destruction of the Black Middle Class’, Counter Punch, (5th August 2009). 
644 C.R. Lawrence, III and M.J. Matsuda, We Won't Go Back: Making the Case for Affirmative Action, 
(Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1997). 
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entrenched racial classifications, meaning that social reforms have more generally been 
aimed at eradicating a wider range of problems, such as childhood poverty, as opposed to 
the narrow focus of US positive action.645  Therefore, whilst there has been no general 
positive action requirement or permission for employers to undertake socio-economic-
based positive action there has also been no prohibition of such action.  Therefore, 
employers have been able to implement measures to help remedy this form of 
inequality. 646   However, a key opportunity to place socio-economic considerations 
alongside non-discrimination and positive action provisions, envisaged by the Equality 
Act 2010,647 which placed an obligation on public authorities to consider, when they are 
making decisions, how their decision might help to reduce inequalities associates with 
socio-economic disadvantage has been rejected by the coalition government.648  More 
studies to show the correlation between minority characteristics and economic 
disadvantage may make class-based action a more accessible form of affirmative action 
and whilst there would need to be a fundamental shift in the centrality of race within US 
affirmative action for this to be successfully adopted, the Equality Act 2010 may 
represent the sort of mild form of socio-economic action that also may be successfully 
implemented in the US.   
 
This chapter has shown that whilst significant background differences continue to affect 
the form of, and reception to, any development in US and UK positive action by 
selectively borrowing from each other’s legal framework, both countries could enjoy a 
wider frame of reference from which they can choose the affirmative action measures best 
suited to the country’s needs and background context.649   Cross-referencing between the 
US and UK in future positive action development could enable the US to revisit the 
legitimacy and merits of various forms of action on the basis of the UK’s experience, 
whilst the UK, within the framework set out by Europe, could draw from a wider range of 
positive action measures already tested in the US.650  The result of this greater degree of 
cross-referencing may not be a significant convergence in the forms of action employed, 
 
645 B. Hepple, ‘The European Legacy of Brown v Board of Education’ U. Ill L. Rev, (2006) 605, pp.621 – 2. 
646 See EHRC, Positive Action Briefing Note, (July 2009) providing an example of two schemes, p. 13. 
647 Equality Act 2010, s. 1(1). 
648 Announced by Theresa May, the Home Secretary and Minister for Women and Equalities, on 17 
November 2010.  See http://www.equalities.gov.uk/equality_act_2010.aspx, accessed 03.01.2011. 
649 See T. Trelogan, S. Mazurana, and P. Hodapp, ‘Can’t We Enlarge the Blanket and the Bed? A 
Comparative Analysis of Positive /Affirmative Action in the European Court of Justice and the United 
States Supreme Court’ 28 Hastings Int’l & Comp. Rev. 39 (2004 – 5). 
650 See D. Caruso, ‘Limits of the Classic Method’, op. cit., p. 331. 
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as the measures adapt to their contexts,651 but it may mean that each country’s measures 
are better suited to their context and therefore able to operate more successfully.  For 
example, the experience of the use of positive action in Northern Ireland could encourage 
the US to adopt a more focused approach to the most extreme forms of affirmative action, 
reserving them for contexts of incontestable inequality, or as close to such circumstances 
as possible.  This may be a way of limiting the destructive opposition faced by US 
affirmative action programmes.  In addition, the UK might look to the US for evidence of 
the relatively ineffective nature of voluntary action, as compared to mandatory action, and 
use this as a basis for the implementation of mandatory action requirements.  The UK 
could also provide an example to the US of the equivalent treatment of all 
underrepresented groups under positive action.  This ‘case study’ could help the US to 
implement a greater degree of comparability across underrepresented groups which, as 
well as benefitting a wider range of individuals, could also benefit African Americans if it 
had the effect of decreasing opposition to affirmative from currently non-benefitted 
groups.  These examples seek to demonstrate how the very different trans-Atlantic 
experiences of affirmative and positive action may offer a useful source of cross-
referencing that could shape the future development of the laws in each country. 
 
651 B. Hepple, ‘The European Legacy of Brown’ op. cit. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
US and UK affirmative action consist of two distinct sets of legal principles which are 
fundamentally conditioned by the different developmental contexts within which they 
were founded and which have been instrumental in determining the uses to which the 
policies have been applied.  Subject to some generalised and superficial similarities the 
differences between US affirmative action and UK positive action are present in the 
foundations of each country’s equal opportunities movement and permeate to the core of 
the country-specific laws.   
 
This thesis has shown that central to the fundamental differences between US and UK 
affirmative action is the historical context within which the policies have developed.  The 
social context of affirmative action in the US is greatly influenced by widespread racial 
segregation and the lasting impact that this has had on race relations, particularly relations 
between the white majority and African Americans, which have fuelled very specific 
arguments concerning African American treatment within affirmative action.  
Consequently, for ‘many Americans, the concept of freedom for African Americans … is 
simply based upon the absence of slavery or segregation’ as opposed to more subtle 
indicators of equality and this has influenced the principles upon which affirmative action 
has been based. 652   By contrast, UK history has not afforded any single group the 
unquestionable moral right to compensation for past discrimination and there has been no 
mass social movement for positive action, as has marked US development of affirmative 
action.  Instead economically-driven European policies form the background framework 
against which the combined economic and social priorities of UK positive action operate.  
 
A further differentiating impact of each country’s history of minority relations is the 
extent of continuing inequality that affirmative action seeks to redress, including the 
continuing concentration of minorities in the poorest and least educated sections of 
society. 653   Not only is the disproportionate representation of minorities among the 
poorest social groups more pronounced in the US than the UK but minorities are also 
more numerically significant within the population, thereby affording the black minority 
an important voice in demanding equal opportunities.  This economic and social 
polarisation has meant that US affirmative action measures are significantly at odds with 
 
652 C.J. Ogletree, Jr, All Deliberate Speed, op. cit., p. 303. 
653 See appendix 1, table 3, appendix 2, table 3, appendix 3, table 3 and appendix 4, tables 4 and 5. 
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popular sentiment of the protectionist white majority.  By contrast the history of race 
relations within the UK has from its outset been affected by the small size of the minority 
population and its own ethnic and cultural plurality.  The way in which political and 
judicial opposition to positive action in each country has shaped the law is also 
fundamentally different in each country because whilst both have faced criticism for their 
response to positive action the rationales behind their decisions have related to the 
specific context and legal framework within which the policies exist.  
 
The country-specific contexts for the development of affirmative and positive action have 
led to the varying interpretation and application of equal opportunities principles.  Central 
among these differences are the US and UK constructions of the principle of equality 
which have meant that while US arguments that equality requires identical treatment have 
stunted the progress of affirmative action the UK has increasingly advocated the 
achievement of substantive equality irrespective of the need for differential treatment.  
Further principles upon which affirmative action has been based have also been crafted in 
accordance with contemporary legal, political and social priorities so that the role of 
concepts such as merit is highly value-laden in this context.  The final and arguably most 
obvious manifestation of the fundamental differences between US and UK affirmative 
action are the different programmes actually implemented and their success in creating 
the sought-after equality.  Here, the same US hostility that has encouraged the restrictive 
interpretation of the principles behind affirmative action and opposed the expansion of 
legal measures also seeks the restriction of both voluntary and mandatory forms of action.   
UK use of positive action, by contrast, has consistently prioritised voluntary action and 
while this has been criticised for being too weak an approach to remedy societal 
inequality it has avoided the divisive debate that overshadows US affirmative action. 
Therefore whilst US and UK affirmative action can be compared under the same headline 
terms beneath these they are very different, often polar opposite, sets of legal provisions. 
  
However, in the most recent developments in US and UK affirmative action there may be 
the possibility for closer cross-referencing between the two countries.  This potential is 
particularly suggested by the new forms of action contained in the Equality Act 2010.  
The new scope and provisions in the Equality Act may encourage the UK to look to the 
US for practical guidance of how to implement the new forms of action, and amid the less 
hostile background attitude towards affirmative action in the UK these comparable forms 
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of action may be able to be more successfully implemented within the UK than they have 
been in the US.  In addition, EU and UK law may be able to offer ‘concrete 
suggestions’654 to the US regarding how to develop affirmative action policies which 
gradually expand in scope and form without exacerbating the polarisation of popular 
views that has previously hindered the development of affirmative action.  Accordingly, 
the fundamental differences between US and UK positive action may lie at the foundation 
of possible future cross-referencing between the two countries as the different forms of 
action find a context within which they can finally thrive. 
 
 
654 T. Trelogan, et al, ‘Can’t We Enlarge the Blanket and the Bed? op. cit, p. 93. 
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Appendix One: The Current Demographic Make-up of the US and UK 
 
Table 1: UK Demographic Make-up by Gender and Race 
 
 Male 
 
% Female % Total % 
All People 25,325,926 48.7 26,715,990 51.3 52,041,916 100 
White  British 22,175,065 42.6 23,358,676 44.9 45,533,741 87.5
Irish 302,543 0.6 339,261 0.7 641,804 1.2 
Other 626,682 1.2 718,639 1.4 1,345,321 2.6 
Mixed 
(White &) 
Black 
Caribbean 
115,929 0.2 121,491 0.2 237,420 0.5 
Black 
Africa 
38,736 0.1 40,175 0.1 78,911 0.2 
Asian 95,134 0.2 93,881 0.2 189,015 0.4 
 Other 
Mixed 
75,342 0.2 80,346 0.2 155,688 0.3 
Black Caribbean 261,308 0.5 302,535 0.6 563,843 1.1 
Africa 231,052 0.4 248,613 0.5 479,665 0.9 
Other 45,670 0.1 50,369 0.1 96,069 0.2 
Indian 515,431 1.0 521,376 1.0 1,036,807 2.0 
Pakistani 362,258 0.7 352,568 0.7 714,826 1.4 
Bangladeshi 141,755 0.3 139,075 0.3 280,830 0.6 
Asian 132,117 0.3 109,157 0.2 241,274 0.5 
Chinese 109,033 0.2 117,915 0.2 226,948 0.4 
Other 97,871 0.2 121,883 0.2 219,754 0.4 
 
 
Source: Office of Population Census and Surveys, ‘Census: Great Britain’, CEN 01 CM 56 (OPCS, London, 
2002), table S101 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001.pdf.  Accessed 08.05.09. 
 
Table 2: Summary of the Demographic Make-up of the UK 
 
 
 England Wales Scotland 
Northern 
Ireland 
 
United 
Kingdom 
White 
 90.9 97.9 98 99.3 92.1 
All Ethnic 
Minority 
Groups 
9.1 2.1 2.0 0.8 7.9 
 
 
Source: Office of Population Census and Surveys, ‘Census: Great Britain’, CEN 01 CM 56 (OPCS, London, 
2002), table UV 01. http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001.pdf.  Accessed 08.05.09. 
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Table 3: US Demographic Make-up by Gender and Race 
 
 Number % 
Total Population 281,421,906 100.0 
  
Gender  
Male 138,053,563 49.1 
Female 143,368,343 50.9 
  
Race  
One race 274,595,678 97.6 
White (including Hispanics) 211,460,626 75.1 
(White (excluding Hispanics)) (170,154,808) (62.6) 
Black or African American 34,658,190 12.3 
American Indian and Alaska Native 2,475,956 0.9 
Asian 10,242,998 3.6 
Asian Indian 1,678,765 0.6 
Chinese 2,432,585 0.9 
Filipino 1,850,314 0.7 
Japanese 796,700 0.3 
Korean 1,076,872 0.4 
Vietnamese 1,122,528 0.4 
Other Asian category 1,061,646 0.4 
Two or more Asian categories 223,588 0.1 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander 398,835 0.1 
Two or more races 6,826,228 2.4 
 
 
Table 4: US Demographic Make-up: Proportion of Hispanics and Latinos   
   Number  % 
Total population 281,421,906 100.0 
   
Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 35,305,818 12.5 
Mexican 20,640,711 7.3 
Puerto Rican 3,406,178 1.2 
Cuban 1,241,685 0.4 
Other Hispanic or Latino 10,017,244 3.6 
Not Hispanic or Latino 246,116,088 87.5 
 
 
Source for tables 3 and 4: US Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 1, Matrices P3, P4, PCT4, PCT5, 
PCT8 and PCT11. http://www.census.gov/census2001.  Accessed 19.01.09. 
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Appendix Two: Average Earning of US and UK Workers, by Race and Gender 
 
Table 1: UK Average Weekly Earnings Comparison by Gender 
 
 All Males Females 
Year  Employees 
(‘000s)  
Mean 
(£) 
Employees
(‘000s) 
Mean 
(£) 
Employees 
(‘000s) 
Mean 
(£) 
1993 16,146 291 10,325 324 5,820 232
1994 16,109 300 10,299 335 5,810 239
1995 16,305 310 10,394 348 5,911 244
1996 16,439 328 10,487 365 5,952 265
1997 16,775 336 10,675 374 6,100 268
1998 17,128 350 10,947 390 6,181 280
1999 17,448 367 11,058 407 6,390 298
2000 17,775 385 11,337 426 6,438 312
2001 17,922 401 11,359 443 6,563 330
2002 18,036 416 11,346 457 6,691 348
2003 18,026 432 11,340 475 6,686 361
2004 18,046 448 11,298 496 6,748 369
2005 18,328 463 11,349 505 6,979 396
 
Source: Labour Force Survey, Historical Quarterly Supplement Table 34 - Distribution of gross weekly 
earnings of full-time employees, as of May 2006. http://www.statistics.gov.uk.  Accessed 23.01.09. 
 
Table 2: UK Economic Activity for Women by Race 2000 - 2002 
 
 Economically 
Inactive (%) 
Economically Active (%) 
 
 
 Not in 
labour 
force 
Full time 
student 
Full-
time 
Part-
time 
Self-
Employ
ed 
Unemplo
yed 
Unemploy
ment rate 
White 24 2 38 28 5 3 4 
Black 
African 
30 10 34 16 3 9 15 
Black Other 27 5 33 22 3 10 15 
Indian 31 5 37 17 6 4 7 
Pakistani 65 3 14 12 2 4 15 
Bangladeshi 78 3 9 6 1 4 21 
Chinese 28 16 27 15 11 2 5 
Other 34 8 33 16 4 5 9 
All 25 3 38 27 5 3 4 
 
 
Source: J. Lindley and A. Dale, ‘Ethnic Differences in Women’s Demographic Family Characteristics and 
Economic Profiles, 1992 – 2002’, Labour Market Trends, Vol. 112, No. 4, (April 2004).   
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Table 3: US Average Money Income Comparison by Race 
 
Race and  
Hispanic  
Origin 
2001 2002 
Workers  
(‘000s) 
Median 
Income ($) 
Workers 
(‘000s) 
Median  
Income 
Estimate ($) 
All Races 
 
109,297 42,900 111,278 42,409 
White 
 
80,818 47,041 81,166 46,900 
Black 
 
13,315 29,939 13,778 29,177 
Asian and 
Pacific 
Islander 
4,071 54,488 4,079 52,285 
Hispanic 
 
10,499 34,099 11,339 33,103 
 
 
‘Money Income’ includes: earnings, unemployment compensation, social security, public 
assistance, interest, dividends, child support etc, before deductions.   
 
 
Source: US Census Bureau, Household Income by Race and Hispanic Origins.  Income in the United States: 
2002, (September 2003), table 1, pp. 3 – 5. http://www.census.gov/census2001.   Accessed 19.01.09. 
 
 
 
Table 4: US Average Income Comparison by Gender of Full-time Workers 
 
 
Gender 2005 2006 
Workers 
(‘000s) 
Median 
Income ($) 
Workers  
(’000s) 
Median  
Income 
Estimate ($) 
Men 
 
61,500 42,743 63,055 42,261 
Women 
 
43,351 32,903 44,663 32,515 
 
 
Source: US Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2006 
(Issued August 2007), table I, p. 5. http://www.census.gov/census2006.   Accessed 19.01.09. 
 
 Appendix Three: Educational Attainment in the US and UK by Race and Gender 
 
Table 1: UK Gender and Highest Level of Qualification 
 
 
 Male 
(aged 16 – 74 
years) 
Female  
(aged 16 – 74 
years) 
All 
(aged 16 – 74 
years) 
All People 18,504,583 19,102,855 37,607,438 
No Qualification 5,096,416 5,840,626 10,937,042 
Level 1 3,106,513 3,123,520 6,230,033 
Level 2 3,380,122 3,907,952 7,288,074 
Level 3 1,524,265 1,585,870 3,110,135 
Level 4/5 3,718,729 3,714,233 7,432,962 
Other Qualifications 
- Level Unknown 
1,678,538 930,654 2,609,192 
 
 
Source: Office of Population Census and Surveys, ‘Census: Great Britain’, CEN 01 CM 56 (OPCS, London, 
2002), table S0105. http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001.pdf.   Accessed 08.05.09. 
 
 
Table 2: UK Race and Participation in Higher Education 
 
 
 Total White Total 
Minority  
Black & 
Black 
British 
Asian Chinese 
& Other 
Asian 
Mixed & 
Other 
Total in 
UK 
(%) 
52,941,916 
(100%) 
 
47,520,866
(90.9%) 
5,421,050 
(9.1%) 
1,139,577 
(2.4%) 
 
2,273,737
(4.5%) 
446,702
(0.8%) 
661,034 
(1.4%) 
Total in 
HE (%) 
829,795 
(100%) 
 
688,520 
(83%) 
141,270 
(17%) 
46,695 
(5.6%) 
47,830 
(5.8%) 
 
18,810 
(2.3%) 
27,935 
(3.6%) 
Postgrd 
(%) 
166,430 
(100%) 
 
139,160 
(83.6%) 
 
27,270 
(16.4%) 
7,960 
(4.8%) 
 
9,560 
(5.7%) 
4,330  
(2.6%) 
5,420 
(3.3%) 
Underg
rd (%) 
663,365 
(100%) 
 
549,365 
(82.8%) 
 
114,000 
(17.2%) 
38,735 
(5.8%) 
 
38,270 
(5.8%) 
14,480 
(2.2%) 
25,205 
(3.8%) 
 
Source: Higher Education Statistics Agency, First year UK domiciled HE students by qualification aim, 
mode of study, gender and ethnicity 2007/08, (2009), table 10b.  Note: contains some rounding.   
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Table 3: US Educational Attainment by Gender and Race 
 
Highest 
Educational Level 
Reached 
Race/ Ethnicity (%) Gender (%) 
White, 
non-
Hispanic 
Asian Black, 
non-
Hispanic 
Hispanic Male Female
No high school 
diploma 
11.5 14.4 21.1 43.0 15.8 16.0 
High school diploma 34.1 22.1 35.3 27.9 31.9 34.3 
Some College 26.3 19.6 27.0 18.4 24.5 26.1 
Bachelor’s Degree 18.6 28.7 11.5 7.3 17.8 16.3 
Advanced Degree 9.5 15.2 5.1 3.3 10.0 7.3 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
 
Source: Chronicle of Higher Education (2002); US Census Bureau, ‘The Big Payoff: Educational 
Attainment and Synthetic Estimates of Work-Life Earnings’, Current Population Studies (P23 – 210) (2001) 
http://www.census.gov/census2001.  Accessed 19.01.09. 
 
 
Table 4: US Participation in Higher Education: Changes over Time 
 
 Individuals who have attended Higher 
Education (%)
 1978 2000 
Race/ Ethnicity   
    White 24.5 29.6 
    Black 11.8 17.5 
    Hispanic 9.6 9.7 
    White/ Black655 2.1 1.7 
    White/ Hispanic 2.6 3.1 
   
Gender   
    Male  26.0 27.9 
    Female  20.6 30.1 
    Male/ Female656 1.3 0.9 
 
 
Source: W.B. Harvey, Minorities in Higher Education 2001 – 2002: Nineteenth Annual Status Report, 
(American Council on Education, Washington D.C., 2002). 
                                                 
655 The white graduation rate is divided by that of the black or Hispanic population.  A ration greater than 
1.0 indicated a white advantage, a ratio of less that 1.0 indicates a black or Hispanic advantage 
656 The male graduation rate is divided by that of the female population.  A ration of greater than 1.0 
indicates male advantage; a ration of less than 1.0 indicates a female advantage. 
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Appendix Four Occupation Type in the US and UK by Race and Gender  
 
Table 1: UK Occupation Type by Gender of Economically Active People  
 
 
Occupation 
 
Male (%) Female (%) Total (%) 
Manager and Senior Officials  10.0 5.1 15.1 
Professionals 6.6 4.6 11.2 
Associate Professional /Technical  7.3 6.5 13.8 
Administrative and Secretarial  2.9 10.4 13.3 
Skilled Trades  10.5 1.1 11.6 
Sales, Customer & Personal Services 2.3 11.3 14.6 
Plant and Machine Operatives 7.1 1.4 8.5 
Elementary  6.4 5.5 11.9 
 
 
Source: Office of Population Census and Surveys, ‘Census: Great Britain’, CEN 01 CM 56 (OPCS, London, 
2002), table S033. http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001.pdf.   Accessed 08.05.09. 
 
Table 2: UK Economic Activity by Ethnic Group  
 
 All 
(16 – 
74yrs) 
Manag
er/ 
Senior 
Role 
Professi
onal 
Associat
e  & 
Technic
al 
Admin
Secreta
rial 
Skilled
Trades
Person
al  
Service
s 
Sales & 
Customr 
Services 
Plant 
Operat
ive 
Eleme
ntary 
All 
 
100 15.11 11.17 13.78 13.32 11.64 6.91 7.67 8.51 11.78 
White 
 
93.08 
(100) 
13.98 
(15.02) 
10.21 
(10.97) 
12.89 
(13.79) 
12.40 
(13.33)
11.10 
(11.92)
6.48 
(6.97) 
6.98 
(7.50) 
7.90 
(8.50) 
11.01 
(11.83)
Asian 
 
3.44 
(100) 
0.52 
(15.24) 
0.52 
(15.22) 
0.36 
(10.53) 
0.43 
(12.54)
0.25 
(7.27) 
0.13 
(3.88) 
0.40 
(11.56) 
0.41 
(11.92)
0.41 
(11.86)
Black 
 
1.94 
(100) 
0.19 
(9.63) 
0.22 
(11.14) 
0.33 
(17.19) 
0.33 
(16.17)
0.15 
(7.44) 
0.19 
(10.19) 
0.16 
(8.18) 
0.13 
(6.64) 
0.26 
(13.41)
Chinese  
 
0.41 
(100) 
0.07 
(17.00) 
0.07 
(18.10) 
0.05 
(12.86) 
0.04 
(9.53) 
0.07 
(17.39)
0.001 
(2.51) 
0.04 
(8.65) 
0.001 
(2.49) 
0.47 
(11.47)
Mixed 
 
0.76 
(100) 
0.10 
(13.18) 
0.09 
(13.10) 
0.33 
(16.95) 
0.31 
(13.55)
0.02 
(7.77) 
0.02 
(7.42) 
0.16 
(10.05) 
0.13 
(5.67) 
0.26 
(12.37)
Other 
 
0.37 
(100) 
0.06 
(16.31) 
0.05 
(13.91) 
0.08 
(20.02) 
0.04 
(9.78) 
0.03 
(6.62) 
0.03 
(8.62) 
0.03 
(7.23) 
0.02 
(4.62) 
0.05 
(14.03)
 
Table shows the percentage of individuals from major racial groups within different forms of economic 
activity.  Non-bracketed numbers show the percentage of individuals as a percentage of the UK population; 
bracketed numbers show the percentage of individuals within each ethnic group as a percentage of that 
ethnic group to enable comparison between ethnic groups and show relative over or under-representation of 
groups in particular employment sectors. 
 
 
Source: Office of Population Census and Surveys, ‘Census: Great Britain’, CEN 01 CM 56 (OPCS, London, 
2002), table S109 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001.pdf.   Accessed 08.05.09. 
 
Table 3: UK Ethnicity and Economic Activity of People (%) 
 
 
 All  
 
Full 
time 
Part 
time 
Self 
Emplyd
Unemp
lyd 
Student Retired
 
Other  
All  100 40.55 11.78 8.28 3.35 2.57 13.60 9.63 
White  91.76 37.8 11.09 7.68 2.86 2.15 13.14 8.26 
Mixed 0.86 0.31 0.80 0.60 0.50 0.70 0.40 0.12 
Asian 4.26 1.31 0.37 0.36 0.22 0.18 0.24 0.85 
Black inc 
African 
2.19 0.85 0.2 0.15 0.19 0.13 0.16 0.26 
Chinese & 
other 
0.95 0.30 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.15 
Source: Information extracted from Office of Population Census and Surveys, ‘Census: Great Britain’, CEN 
01 CM 56 (OPCS, London, 2002), amended version of table T13. 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001.pdf.   Accessed 08.05.09. 
 
Table 4: US Occupation Type by Race 
 
 Total Workers  
(‘000s) 
Full time 
(‘000s) 
Part time  
(‘000s) 
Unemployed 
(‘000s) 
All  154,286 (100%) 120,030 (77.8%) 25,332 (16.4%) 8,924 (5.8%) 
White  125,635 (100%) 97,724 (77.8%) 21,401 (17%) 6,510 (5.2%) 
Black inc 
African 
17,740 (100%) 13,653 (76.9%) 2,299 (12.9%) 1,788 (10.1%) 
Asian 7,202 (100%) 5,923 (82.2%) 994 (13.8%) 285 (4.0%) 
Hispanic 22,025 (100%) 17,298 (78.5%) 3,048 (13.8%) 1,679 (7.6%) 
Source: Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, ‘Employed and Unemployed, full and 
part-time workers by age, sex, race, and Hispanic or Latino ethnicity’, table 8 (2008).  See 
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cps_aa2008.htm.   Accessed 21.10.09. 
Table 5: US Occupation Type by Gender and Race 
 Women 
(%) 
African 
American (%) 
Hispanic 
(%) 
Population Overall 50.9 12.3 12.5 
Category of Occupation: 
 Management, business & financial 
occupations 
42.7 7.0 7.6 
 Legal occupations (inc. lawyers, judges, 
magistrates and other judicial workers) 
38.3 4.8 4.9 
 Service Occupations 57.2 15.4 20.6 
 Sales and Office occupations 63.0 11.2 12.4 
 Natural Resources, Construction and 
Maintenance occupations 
4.4 6.8 24.2 
 Production and Transportation 
occupations 
21.4 13.5 21.1 
 
   
Source: Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, ‘Employment by detailed occupation, 
sex, race, and Hispanic ethnicity, 2008 annual averages’.  See http://www.bls.gov/cps/cps_aa2008htm.   
Accessed 21.10.09. 
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Appendix Five: Political Representation in the US and UK by Race and Gender 
Table 1: UK Female Members of Parliament following General Elections 
 
Year  Female 
MPs 
 
% Con Lab Lib Others
1945 24 3.8 1 21 1 1 
1950 21 3.4 6 14 1 - 
1961 17 2.7 6 11 - - 
1955 24 3.8 10 14 - - 
1959 25 4 12 13 - - 
1964 29 4.6 11 18 - - 
1966 26 4.1 7 19 - - 
1970 26 4.1 15 10 - 1 
1974 (Feb) 23 3.6 9 13 - 1 
1974 (Oct) 27 4.3 7 18 - 2 
1979 19 3 8 11 - - 
1983 23 3.5 13 10 - - 
1987 41 6.3 17 21 2 1 
1992 60 9.2 20 37 2 1 
1997 120 18.2 13 101 3 3 
2001 118 17.9 14 95 5 4 
2005 128 20 17 98 10 3 
2010 143 22 50 80 7 6 
 
Source: House of Commons Research Papers 01/75 & 05/33.  
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/briefings/dnpc/05057.pdf.   Accessed 01.02.09.  2010 
information collated from the list of MPs at www.parliament.uk/mps-lords-and-offices/mps/.   Accessed 
06.08.10. 
 
 
Table 2: UK Ethnicity of Members of Parliament following General Elections 
 
Election Year 1987 1992 1997 2001 2005 2010 
White MPs 647  
(99.4%)
645 
(99.1%) 
650 
(98.6%) 
647 
(98.2%) 
631 
(97.7%) 
622 
(95.8%) 
Non-White 
MPs 
4 
(0.6%) 
6 
(0.9%) 
9 
(1.4%) 
12 
(1.8%) 
15 
(2.3%) 
27 
(4.2%) 
Total MPs 
 
651  
(100%)
651 
(100%) 
659 
(100%) 
659 
(100%) 
646 
(100%) 
649 
(100%) 
 
Source: D. Butler and D. Kavanagh, ‘The British General Election of 1997: Operation Black Vote’, House 
of Commons Library Research Paper 05/33 Notes 
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research./notes/sn-SG-01528.pdf.  Accessed 01.02.09. 
2010 information collated from information at www.parliament.uk/about/faqs/house-of-commons-
faqs/members/faqs-page2/.  Accessed 06.08.10. 
 
Table 3: US Political Representation by Gender  
 
Congress and Year Male % Female % Total 
Representatives 
103rd 1993 388 89.2 47 10.8 435 
104th 1995 388 89.2 47 10.8 435 
106th 1999 379 87.1 56 12.9 435 
107th 2001 376 86.4 59 13.6 435 
108th  2003 376 86.4 59 13.6 435 
109th  2005 369 85.0 65 15.0 434 
110th  2007 361 83.0 74 17.0 435 
111th  2010 364 82.7 76 17.3 441 
Senators 
103rd  1993 93 93 7 7 100 
104th  1995 92 92 8 8 100 
105th  1999 91 91 9 9 100 
106th  2001 87 87 13 13 100 
107th  2003 86 86 14 14 100 
108th  2005 86 86 14 14 100 
109th  2005 86 84 14 16 100 
110th  2007 84 84 16 16 100 
111th  2010 83 83 17 17 100 
 
Source: ‘Members of Congress: Selected Characteristics’, table 308, 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/tables/308/pdf.     Accessed 21.10.09.  For figures relating to the 
111th Congress’ see J.E. Manning, ‘Membership of the 111th Congress: A Profile’, Congressional Research 
Service (4th February 2010). 
 
126 
 
 
Table 4: US Political Representation by Race 
 
Congress and 
Year 
W
hi
te
 
%
 
B
la
ck
 
%
 
A
si
an
 &
 
Pa
ci
fic
 
Is
la
nd
er
 
%
 
H
isp
an
ic
 
%
 
N
at
iv
e 
A
m
er
ic
an
s 
%
 
T
ot
al
 
Representatives  
Congress Year            
103rd  1993 373 85.8 38 8.7 7 1.6 17 3.9 - 0 435 
104th  1995 371 85.3 40 9.2 7 1.6 17 3.9 - 0 435 
106th  1999 371 85.3 39 9.0 6 1.4 19 4.4 - 0 435 
107th  2001 370 85.1 39 9.0 7 1.6 19 4.4 - 0 435 
108th  2003 368 84.6 39 9.0 5 1.2 22 5.1 1 .3 435 
109th  2005 364 83.9 42 9.7 4 0.9 23 5.3 1 .3 434 
110th  2007 363 82.7 42 9.6 4 1.1 23 6.2 1 .3 439 
111th  2010 362 82.1 41 9.3 10 2.3 28 6.4 1 .3 441 
Senators  
103rd  1993 96 96 1 1 2 2 - 0 1 1 100 
104th  1995 96 96 1 1 2 2 - 0 1 1 100 
106th  1999 97 97 - 0 2 2 - 0 1 1 100 
107th  2001 97 97 - 0 2 2 - 0 1 1 100 
108th  2003 97 97 - 0 2 2 - 0 1 1 100 
109th  2005 94 94 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 100 
110th  2007 95 95 1 1 2 2 3 3 - 0 100 
111th  2010 96 96 1 1 2 2 1 1 - 0 100 
 
Source: ‘Members of Congress: Selected Characteristics’, table 308, 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/tables/308/pdf.     Accessed 21.10.09.  For figures relating to the 
111th Congress’ see J.E. Manning, ‘Membership of the 111th Congress: A Profile’, Congressional Research 
Service (4th February 2010). 
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